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Abstract 
 The group threat hypothesis is part of the conflict theoretical perspective, 
which has been one of the most dominant and useful theories in the fields of 
criminology and criminal justice for decades.  The usefulness of this perspective 
relates to the understanding it provides of how the law can be used by those in 
power as a measure of control.  The use of law as a method of control has a long 
history in the US society, and there are many examples from which to pull.  This 
project examines the use of one set of laws, felony disenfranchisement 
legislation, to determine if these laws can be seen as a method for controlling a 
subgroup of the population.  Historically, felony disenfranchisement legislation 
has been a part of the American legal system from the founding of this country.  
While the laws have changed many times, the constant has been an effort to 
disenfranchise a segment of the population deemed as dangerous and prevent 
such groups from participating in the political process through their votes.  Using 
data on African American population, arrests, and incarceration, this study tests if 
the strictness of disenfranchisement legislation is associated with the size of 
African American population, as well as African American arrest and 
incarceration rates.  Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to 
understand the nature of felony disenfranchisement legislation and to determine 
if disenfranchisement legislation could be used as a tool to control African 
Americans.  The qualitative analysis indicates that African Americans are more 
impacted by disenfranchisement laws in two regards: the criteria that leads to 
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disenfranchisement and the requirements for vote restoration.  However, the 
research hypotheses are partially supported by quantitative analysis.  That is, 
while results indicate that the proportion of African Americans in a state is 
correlated to the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, there is no 
relationship between the arrest and incarceration rates and either the strictness 
of disenfranchisement legislation or the difficulty of the vote restoration 
procedures.  These results point to limitations of using the group threat 
hypothesis to understand the relationship between disenfranchisement law and 
criminal justice operation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The group threat hypothesis is part of the conflict theoretical perspective, 
which has been one of the most dominant and useful theories in the fields of 
criminology and criminal justice for decades.  The usefulness of this perspective 
is the understanding it provides of how the use of the law provides a measure of 
control to those in power.  The use of law as a method of control has a long 
history in American government and there are many examples from which to pull.  
This project examines the use of one set of laws, felony disenfranchisement 
legislation, to determine if these laws can be seen as a method of controlling an 
entire segment of the population.  More specifically, this study is an examination, 
not of the disenfranchisement laws themselves, but rather the group threat 
hypothesis is used to understand the nature of disenfranchisement legislation 
and policies. 
The disenfranchisement of persons convicted of a felony offense, that is, 
the removal of voting rights, has deep roots in the American legal system, and 
disenfranchisement laws have a firm foundation in Supreme Court decisions and 
state laws.  For example, in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the court 
held that, although the right to vote was essential to a democratic society, felony 
disenfranchisement legislation was acceptable.  In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U.S. 24 (1974), the court held that disenfranchisement legislation were not 
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, which stated that all citizens were 
guaranteed equal treatment under the law, and therefore, disenfranchisement 
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was viewed as an acceptable form of punishment.  The roots of these laws are in 
the concept of “civil death” found in English common law and Ancient Roman 
legal codes (Parkes, 2003).  “Civil death” involved the sacrifice of all land 
holdings, the inability to hold office, and the loss of any right to vote for those who 
violated laws.  Denial of the right to vote of those who have violated the law 
continues to be practiced in the United States, although it has been abandoned 
in other democratic nations, such as Great Britain and Germany (Fellner and 
Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Parkes, 2003).   Many recent changes made to 
United States disenfranchisement laws have further enhanced the restrictions 
(Fellner and Mauer, 1998).   
A discussion of contemporary felony disenfranchisement legislation is not 
as simple as stating that, once a person is convicted of a felony, they are 
permanently disenfranchised.  There are different levels of disenfranchisement.  
Generally, however, one can narrow the levels of disenfranchisement into three 
broad categories (Taormina, 2003).  First, disenfranchisement may be mandated 
for only the period of incarceration for a felony offense (Taormina, 2003).  That is, 
once released from prison, voting rights are restored.  Second, a person can be 
disenfranchised for the period of incarceration plus a predetermined time during 
post-incarceration release (Taormina, 2003).  For example, the state of Alaska 
mandates that a person be disenfranchised during incarceration as well as 
throughout any period of parole (Alaska Statute § 15.05.030).  Lastly, 
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disenfranchisement can occur on a permanent basis upon conviction of a felony 
offense (Taormina, 2003).  
However it is applied, the literature has suggested that felony 
disenfranchisement is a method of social control of groups (Behrens, Uggen, and 
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Pettus, 2002).  In this 
case, control is exercised by limiting voting rights.  The act of voting is important 
to the political participation in a democratic society as it ensures individuals have 
a voice to effect change.  Full voting participation by all citizens protects 
everyone, as it prevents a small majority from utilizing power to dominate.  
According to Justice Thurgood Marshall, “a temporal majority could use such a 
power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order simply by disenfranchising 
those with different views” (Marshall in dissent, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 
24, 1974).   
With the national war on drugs and other tough-on-crime legislation, there 
has been an increased emphasis on controlling offenders in American society 
(Garland, 2001; Tonry, 1995).  This control can be seen in the use of mandatory 
minimum sentencing, three-strikes laws, and other legislation designed to 
strengthen current legal sanctions (Tonry, 1995).  The United States has seen a 
35% increase in prison incarceration in the last decade, and that number is 
expected to increase (Tonry, 2004; United States Department of Justice, 2004).  
With current disenfranchisement laws in place, increased prison incarceration 
rates have resulted in large numbers of disenfranchised individuals.   
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African Americans represent only 13% of the United States population, but 
make up 45% of the prison population (Census, 2000; United States Department 
of Justice, 2004).  The disproportionate racial make-up of incarcerated offenders 
and the use of felony disenfranchisement codes create disproportionate 
disenfranchisement of African Americans.  As a consequence, African Americans 
are not fairly represented in political decisions and are unable to participate in the 
political process to address the grievance of unfair representation.  
These race effects suggest the utility of the conflict perspective in 
examining felony disenfranchisement laws (Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003; 
Ewald, 2002; Fletcher, 1999; Giles and Kaenan, 1994).  Conflict theory is one of 
many theoretical perspectives utilized to explain the United States criminal justice 
system and its operation.  Conflict theory argues that power, either the desire to 
attain it or maintain it, motivates individuals and groups to control others 
(Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1997).  Consistent with this approach, 
the group threat hypothesis offers particular theoretical promise.  The group 
threat hypothesis is based upon the conflict perspective and is therefore similar 
in orientation.  However, while conflict theory emphasizes interests (group or self) 
and power in general, it does not provide a clear definition of conflict of interest or 
conflict of power.  The group threat hypothesis focuses on a specific situation of 
conflict of interests and power, meaning the threat posed to the dominant group 
by minority groups, in this case racial minorities.  This threat causes race 
prejudice among members of the dominant group and they attempt to re-
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establish their dominant position by various means, including aggression, 
discrimination, violence, social/crime control (Blumer, 1958).  Blumer (1958) 
argues that “essential to race prejudice is a fear or apprehension that the 
subordinate racial group is threatening, or will threaten, the position of the 
dominant group.  Thus, acts or suspected acts that are interpreted as an attack 
on the natural superiority of the dominant group, or an intrusion into their sphere 
of group exclusiveness, or an encroachment on their area of proprietary claim 
are crucial in arousing and fashioning race prejudice.  These acts mean ‘getting 
out of place’” (p. 4).  The group threat hypothesis posits that those in power will 
attempt to control any group perceived to be a threat to that power (Blalock; 
1967; Blumer, 1958).  It is the control of a class based upon the perception that 
they are a threat to the majority that distinguishes the group threat hypothesis 
from the larger conflict perspective.  That is, the group threat hypothesis focuses 
on perception, not necessarily reality.  Those in power formulate and utilize laws 
to control those that might undermine their power.  Reliance on the concepts of 
power and control has made both the conflict perspective and the group threat 
hypothesis effective tools in explaining criminal sanctions (Black, 1980; Beirne 
and Quinney, 1982; Chambliss, 1995; Collins, 1984; Olzak, 1992).  These 
concepts also suggest the utility of the conflict perspective generally, and the 
group threat hypothesis specifically, in explaining civil sanctions connected with 
criminal sanctions, such as felony disenfranchisement.  Scholars on felony 
disenfranchisement have used both Marx’s concept of “dangerous class” and the 
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group threat hypothesis’ concept of “negro menace” to explain the 
disproportionate representation of minorities in the disenfranchised population 
(Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003).  
Although felony disenfranchisement has been discussed in the literature, 
understanding of its nature and its effects on minority populations is still limited.  
Few empirical studies of disenfranchisement explore the impact of these codes 
on minorities nationwide (Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003; King and Mauer, 
2004; Parkes, 2003).  Additionally, although the group threat hypothesis has 
promising explanatory powers for the persistence of disenfranchisement, the 
hypothesis has not been tested sufficiently to validate it as an explanation for the 
laws specifically as an expression of power and control.  Problems such as 
sample size and data affect the generalizability of the research findings to date 
(Behrens, Uggen and Manza, 2003; Cardinale, 2004; King and Mauer, 2004; 
Mauer and Kansal, 2005).  For example, King and Mauer (2004) utilized data for 
only one major metropolitan area (Atlanta, GA), Cardinale’s (2004) study 
included interviews from fifty persons in Los Angeles, and Mauer and Kansal 
(2005) examined data on disenfranchisement and restoration for fourteen states.  
Additionally, even when state-level and national-level data have been used, as in 
Behrens, Uggen, and Manza (2003), the data gathered failed to include 
information regarding the diversity of state’s disenfranchisement laws and the 
voting restoration procedures.  State differences in strictness of 
disenfranchisement and restoration procedures were not fully examined.  Most 
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research on the topic has addressed state differences on the strictness of laws 
that remove the vote from offenders, but the actual voting restoration processes 
of these states have not been addressed.  Restoration processes, which vary 
from automatic restoration to mandating multiple requirements, may enhance our 
overall understanding of how strict these state laws may be and what effects 
these laws have on former offenders specifically and on voting generally.  For 
example, a state may have a strict disenfranchisement law that would remove 
the vote of any offender once they have committed a felony offense, but may 
have an automatic restoration process.  This state law may, in fact, be less strict 
overall than a state that disenfranchises only when the offender is incarcerated, 
but makes that disenfranchisement permanent.  Not examining differences in 
strictness of disenfranchisement and restoration procedures likely masks state 
differences in the divergent effects of disenfranchisement laws on racial 
minorities and obscures explanation of the laws themselves.   
To address some of the problems in the literature, this study examines 
disenfranchisement legislation and its effects on the African American population.  
The specific purpose of this study is to test conflict theory, using group threat 
hypothesis to understand the nature of disenfranchisement laws.  Because 
conflict theory and the group threat hypothesis focus on power and control by the 
majority and further argue that law is used as a method of control over those that 
may threaten the majority, conflict theory and group threat hypothesis could 
explain the nature of disenfranchisement laws.  That is, disenfranchisement laws 
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could be explained as being an additional control mechanism utilized by the 
majority to control a perceived threat.  Because the group threat hypothesis may 
help explain how a perception of threat from a minority group might lead to 
greater emphasis on controlling the minority group, through the use of 
disenfranchisement laws, the research hypotheses for this project are drawn 
from the group threat hypothesis.  Additionally, although Blalock’s initial threat 
hypothesis was not specific to African Americans as the threatening group, given 
the history of racial prejudice directed towards African Americans (Chapter 
discusses this in more detail) the focus of this study will be on the African 
American population.  Further, although African American arrest and 
incarceration rates may not precisely fit with Blalock’s assessment of the size of 
the minority population being considered a threat, the increase in arrests and 
incarceration of African Americans may reflect, or may be a result of, the effort to 
control the perceived threatening group.  Based upon Blalock’s (1967) concept of 
racial threat being related to the relative size of a minority population, this study 
measures racial threat, in part, as the number of minorities arrested and 
incarcerated.  The argument is that as the number of African Americans in a 
state increases, the perception among the dominant class is that of an increase 
of power of African Americans.  To diminish this perceived increase in power, the 
ruling class creates legislation aimed at controlling African Americans.  This 
legislation is then enforced by the criminal justice system that acts as the control 
apparatus of the ruling class.  The criminal justice system is then utilized to 
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control African Americans by enforcing the laws through arrest and then through 
incarceration of more and more African Americans.  Ultimately then, the criminal 
justice system generally, and felony disenfranchisement legislation specifically, 
act as control mechanisms over those considered a threat to the ruling class.  
Therefore, the use of African American arrest and incarceration statistics is also 
important as a measure of power a perceived threat.  As such data on African 
American arrest and incarceration rates are included as a measure of group 
threat. 
This study tests the following hypotheses:  
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the 
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;  
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the 
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and  
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more 
difficult the voting restoration procedures.  
Disenfranchisement legislation, voting restoration laws as well as information on 
racial composition of arrest, racial composition of incarceration and racial 
composition of population in 50 states and the District of Columbia was used to          
test these hypotheses.   A more detailed description of the methods used for 
analysis is presented in Chapter 4. 
This study is important for a variety of reasons.  First, this study will 
contribute to the literature of conflict theory and the group threat hypothesis by 
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providing an additional test of the group threat hypothesis.  Secondly, this study 
will improve understanding of the nature of disenfranchisement laws.  This study 
will accomplish this understanding through a qualitative examination of the 
disenfranchisement laws in each state.  Additionally, the voting restoration 
procedures for each state will also be closely examined.  By examining the laws 
and the restoration procedures it is believed that a deeper understanding of the 
nature of disenfranchisement can attained, going beyond simply an examination 
of the numbers of the disenfranchised.  Lastly, this study should contribute to the 
knowledge of how law is used as a control mechanism generally, and how law is 
used to control racial minorities specifically.  By examining the laws themselves, 
as well as the data on arrest and incarceration of minorities, the impact on racial 
minorities should become clearer.  The study, then, will ultimately improve 
knowledge about racial relations in the criminal justice system.  A deeper 
understanding of the impact disenfranchisement laws have on specific groups 
may assist in the creation of laws that are equal in design and effect.    
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Chapter 2: Disenfranchisement in the United States 
This chapter reviews the literature on disenfranchisement in general and 
the disenfranchisement of those who have committed a felony offense in 
particular.  This review begins with a selective history of disenfranchisement in 
the United States, followed by an examination of contemporary felony legislation.  
A history is needed in order to establish a foundation for the current state of 
disenfranchisement codes.  This chapter concludes with an examination of 
research on disenfranchisement as well as an evaluation of the gaps in the 
current literature. 
History of Disenfranchisement in the United States 
 Disenfranchisement is rooted in ancient Greek and Roman times (Parkes, 
2003).  In Europe, during medieval times, persons who violated the law of the 
land in an “infamous” manner were subject to “civil death” (Fellner and Mauer, 
1998; Parkes, 2003).  Civil death entailed “the deprivation of all rights, 
confiscation of property, exposure to injury and even to death, since the outlaw 
could be killed with impunity by anyone” (Fellner and Mauer, 1998, p. 2).  The 
idea of “civil death” was continued into English law in the form of “civil disabilities” 
(Brodie, 1991).  According to Brodie (1991), civil disabilities entailed not simply 
the loss of the franchise, but the loss of other liberties as well, such as the loss of 
the right to own property, the ability to inherit and bestow wealth, the right to hold 




 Although not all aspects of ‘civil death’ or ‘civil disability’ were brought over 
to America from England, the disenfranchisement of criminal offenders was.  
Nearly all of the thirteen original states had some form of criminal 
disenfranchisement and with the growth of the country came the expansion of the 
disenfranchisement laws (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  According to Fellner and 
Mauer (1998), by the middle of the 1800s well over half of the then 34 states 
making up the United States had some form of law that disenfranchised criminal 
offenders.  It is, however, important to note here that during this time in America, 
felons were far from the only ones lacking the rights to suffrage.  Those without 
property, women, African-Americans, and those deemed illiterate and or feeble-
minded, were also denied the right to vote in the early period in our country’s 
history (Porter, 1969; Keyssar, 2000).  In fact, suffrage was far from universal, as 
it was effectively limited to those wealthy white men who owned property, roughly 
six percent of the entire population (Porter, 1969; Keyssar, 2000).   
The United States Constitution and the Right to Vote 
Although voting is one of the most basic civil rights, the Constitution 
originally drafted by the country’s forefathers failed to enumerate voting rights for 
any specific population or group (Parkes, 2003; Weedon, 2004).  In fact, the 
Constitution does not provide American citizens with a right to vote (Parkes, 
2003).  Additionally, there is no Constitutional guarantee of elections of 
government officials, nor is there a specific enumeration of the qualifications of 
those who can and cannot vote (Parkes, 2003).  Rather, the Constitution leaves it 
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up to the states to determine those qualifications the voter must have (U.S. 
Constitution, Article I, Section 2).   
Since the time the Constitution was drafted, however, amendments have 
been made to advance civil liberties through the enumeration of voting rights.  
Although the changes to voting rights have mandated the inclusion of many 
denied the right to vote due to race, gender, age, in many cases the prohibition 
against felony offenders was strengthened.  With the Civil War, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which ended government 
sanctioned slavery (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 13, 1865), the United States 
and the Constitution itself faced numerous changes requiring new laws designed 
to protect our country’s newest ‘citizens,’ the former slaves.  Again, although the 
Constitution failed to enumerate the right to vote, rapid changes taking place in 
the United States after the Civil War necessitated, for the first time, the 
specification of individual rights, including the right to vote. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, better known as the amendment 
guaranteeing equal protection under the law, articulated that all citizens, 
including those freed from slavery, were essentially equal (U.S. Constitution, 
Amendment 14, Section 1, 1868).  However, in spite of the equal protection 
clause, the right to vote was still limited primarily to white male property owners 
(Keyssar, 2000; Porter, 1969).  Felony offender disenfranchisement statutes 
were in place in many states and the language of the Fourteenth Amendment 
strengthened those statutes by authorizing individual states to disenfranchise any 
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of their citizens for “rebellion or other crimes” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, 
Section 2, 1868).   
Ironically, the Fourteenth Amendment, which was designed to guarantee 
equal protection for all citizens under the law, may have actually contributed to 
the glut of disenfranchisement legislation during Reconstruction (Behrens, 
Uggen, and Manza, 2003).  Although Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens, it is the ‘other crimes’ 
phrase of Section 2 that allowed many states during the Reconstruction era to 
undermine the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment by enhancing their felony 
disenfranchisement laws (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, 1868; Behrens, 
Uggen, and Manza, 2003).  It is clear from both the rapid increase of felon and 
ex-felon disenfranchisement legislation during the period as well as from 
statements made during state constitutional conventions that a primary focus of 
these legislation was to retain a modicum of control over newly freed slaves 
(Key, 1949; Kousser, 1974). 
The Fifteenth Amendment, however, provided that “the right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or 
by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude” (U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment 15, Section 1, 1870).  Although the Fifteenth 
Amendment provided the franchise to African Americans, women, including 
African American women, were not mentioned until 1920 with the ratification of 
the Nineteenth Amendment which specified that “the right of citizens of the 
15 
 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex” (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 19, 1920).  
Additionally, the age requirement for the right to vote was not specified by the 
United States until 1971, when the Twenty-sixth Amendment placed the voting 
age at 18 (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 26, 1971).  As can be seen, although 
the Constitution as originally drafted failed to enumerate a specific right to vote 
we have continued to broaden voter classifications to include most adult 
Americans of all races and both genders.  A group not included in this 
broadening of the voter rolls included those who had been disenfranchised due 
to the commission of a felony offense. 
  Although the general outcome of these constitutional amendments was 
to increase voting rights to all and to create universal suffrage, the ultimate 
decision as to who specifically was allowed to vote was left to each individual 
state (Boyd and Markman, 2001; Chin, 2004; Ewald, 2002; Parkes, 2003; 
Weedon, 2004).  As will be demonstrated, the decision to leave voting decisions 
to the states resulted in wide disparity in voting rights from state to state.  
Ultimately, the decision to allow the states to establish their own voting rights and 
practices within the framework of the constitutional amendments led to conflicting 
laws and eventually to the establishment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well 
as changes made to the Act in the years since. 
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Voting Rights during the Civil War 1861-1865 and the Reconstruction Era  
 The Civil War was arguably one of the most important events in U.S. 
history in the fight for universal suffrage (Keyssar, 2000).  The Civil War was not 
fought to give the franchise for those that had been left out of the process of 
government, but the war and events following set the stage for the constitutional 
battle over civil liberties and the right to vote (Keyssar, 2000, McPherson, 1988).    
The Civil War, while ending slavery, also led to a movement to diminish the 
political impact of freed blacks (Keyssar, 2000).  Chief among the methods to do 
so was limiting the right to vote (Keyssar, 2000).  According to McPherson 
(1988), the end of slavery presented numerous problems for the South.  Among 
these problems was the impact that such a large population of blacks might have 
on the political landscape of the South (Keyssar, 2000, McPherson, 1988).  The 
massive influx of suddenly eligible voters was beginning to become a reality in 
January of 1863 when President Lincoln issued the final Emancipation 
Proclamation and subsequently emphasized the enlistment of the newly freed 
black men into the Union Army (Franklin, 1994).  It was not, however, until the 
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which effectively ended government 
sanctioned slavery in January of 1865, that the large increase in voters was 
realized (Franklin, 1994; Keyssar, 2000).   
 Despite the substantial impact of the Civil War, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the addition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, freed blacks found difficultly exercising their new rights (Franklin, 
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1994).  According to Keyssar (2000), white’s reaction to these changes, 
particularly in the South, impacted voting rights in this country.  That is, the 
Reconstruction Era, even more than the Civil War, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, had the most profound impact on 
who was able to vote and to what extent that vote would be counted (Franklin, 
1994; Keyssar, 2000).   
 Massive opposition by Southern states to the ratification of the Fifteenth 
Amendment led to the passage of state voting laws that were, on their face, race-
neutral, but, in effect, limited the ability of blacks to vote (Behrens, Uggen, and 
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Pinaire, Huemann, and Bilotta, 2003; 
Uggen and Manza, 2002).  Although these laws varied from state to state, “race-
neutral” voting barriers included literacy tests, poll taxes, and the addition of or 
enhancement to felon disenfranchisement provisions (Behrens, Uggen, and 
Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Pinaire, Huemann, and Bilotta, 2003; 
Uggen and Manza, 2002).  Ultimately, these laws were little more than “new 
forms of ‘Jim Crow’ legislation meant to target African Americans in particular, 
with the intention of disqualifying them from the vote” (Pinaire, et al., 2003, 
p.1525).   
 Although felony disenfranchisement laws were already in place in most 
states during the period of reconstruction, many of these laws were enhanced to 
further limit African American suffrage (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003).  All 
these felony disenfranchisement enhancements include restrictions designed to 
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disenfranchise African Americans specifically (Shapiro, 1993).  For example, 
crimes such as miscegenation and theft, thought to be most often committed by 
blacks, could result in disenfranchisement (Shapiro, 1993).  In fact, “between 
1890 and 1910, many Southern states tailored their criminal disenfranchisement 
laws, along with other voting qualifications, to increase the effect of these laws on 
black citizens” (Shapiro, 1993, p. 540).  
Criminal disenfranchisement laws became stricter during the period of 
reconstruction following the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment (Behrens, 
Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Shapiro, 1993).  According to Fellner and Mauer 
(1998), the State of Alabama provides an illustration of racist attitudes of the 
time.  Alabama lawmakers in 1901 “openly stated that their goal was to establish 
white supremacy” (Fellner and Mauer, 1998, p. 3).  To that end, Alabama state 
lawmakers included in the State Constitution a clause that made a conviction for 
the crime of “moral turpitude” grounds for permanent disenfranchisement (Hull, 
2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002).  Further, Alabama legislators, in 
the process of revising the Alabama constitution in 1901, included the crime of 
“wife-beating” as a crime of disenfranchisement “as it would disqualify sixty 
percent of the Negroes” from the right to vote (Hull, 2003, p. 47). 
Alabama was not, of course, the only state to either add or enhance 
disenfranchisement legislation.  Many of the former Confederate States 
attempted to counteract established rights for freed African Americans by 
revamping their criminal codes to increase disenfranchisement opportunities, 
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primarily because these criminal codes “had express constitutional sanction” 
unlike grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and literacy tests (Hull, 2003, p. 47).  For 
example, in an 1890 ruling from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the change of 
the criminal code was praised by the court when it stated, “restrained by the 
federal constitution from discriminating against the Negro race, (the convention) 
discriminated against its characteristics and the offense to which its weaker 
members were prone … burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under false 
pretenses were declared to be disqualifiers, although robbery and murder and 
other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient, were not” (cited in 
Hull, 2003, p. 53).  In fact, the ‘crime’ of miscegenation would disqualify one from 
the vote in Mississippi although the crime of rape would not (Hull, 2003; 
Thompson, 2001).  As Thompson (2001) states, “for almost a century thereafter 
you couldn’t lose your right to vote in Mississippi if you committed murder or 
rape, but you could if you married someone of another race” (p. 19).  
The State of Virginia provides another example of a state that illustrated 
disdain for the new constitutional amendments and for African Americans (Hull, 
2003).  During the 1901 Virginia State Convention, Senator Carter Class stated, 
“Discrimination! … That, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for – to 
discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limits of the 
Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every Negro voter who can 
be gotten rid of legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the 
white electorate” (cited in Hull, 2003, p. 53).  The State of Florida drafted a 
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constitution in 1868 to include the disenfranchisement of ex-felons “as well as 
anyone convicted of larceny, a crime that courts were given special jurisdiction 
over in 1865 because of ‘the great increase in minor offenses, which may be 
reasonably anticipated from the emancipation of former slaves’” (Hull, 2003, p. 
54).   
One needs only to examine the results of the legislation of the 
Reconstruction era to see effects on African American voting numbers.  Consider 
the state of Mississippi, for example; in 1867, African American voter registration 
totaled nearly seventy percent of the eligible African American population.  After 
the felon disenfranchisement statues were created and the state criminal code 
reworked in 1890, African American voter registration dropped to six percent of 
the eligible African American population (Hull, 2003).  As Hull (2003) states, “As 
with so much of this country’s past, a large part of the history of felon 
disenfranchisement hangs on the issue of race.  It’s no coincidence that blacks 
are harmed the most by felon disenfranchisement; many of the laws seem to 
have been drawn up for that purpose” (p.53). 
Contemporary Laws on Disenfranchisement in the United States 
 Although each state possessing a disenfranchisement law has the ability 
to create statutes to suit their own needs, one thing links these laws together: 
they all disenfranchise offenders who have committed a felony.  This section 
examines the creation and implementation of contemporary felony 
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disenfranchisement legislation and the requirements for reinstatement of voting 
rights. 
Disenfranchisement Legislation 
Although the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, 
the disenfranchisement of felony offenders acts as an extra form of punishment 
that eliminates, in some cases for life, the opportunity to regain full citizenship 
(Mauer and Kansal, 2005).  The United States is the only industrialized nation 
that prevents ex-convicts from voting (Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; 
Parkes, 2003).  In fact, every state except Maine and Vermont places some 
restrictions on the voting practices of current and or former felons (Mauer & 
Kansal, 2005).     
Variations in laws across states are not isolated to disenfranchisement 
legislation, of course.  Because the United States Constitution has left the 
creation of most laws, including voting regulations, to the individual states, the 
laws themselves will be inconsistent (Mauer and Kansal, 2005).  Despite the 
inconsistent content of the laws, certain elements of the laws allow for 
categorization.  Each state that disenfranchises felons does so for a specified 
period of time.  This specification of time period allows these laws to be placed in 
four separate categories.  Maine and Vermont do not disenfranchise felony 
offenders at all (Taormina, 2003).  Of the 48 state codes, 12 disenfranchise 
felony offenders permanently; 23 states disenfranchise for a period of 
incarceration and a period of post-incarceration, such as parole; and 14 states 
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disenfranchise only for the period of incarceration (Taormina, 2003).  The District 
of Columbia has a disenfranchisement code that falls into the third category, 
disenfranchising only for the period of incarceration (Taormina, 2003).  This 
classification is presented in Table 2-1.*    
 Just as states have free reign in determining what their laws declare, they 
also have the ability to determine which crimes trigger disenfranchisement 
(Ewald, 2002).  For example, some states mandate those convicted only of 
felony offenses be disenfranchised (Ewald, 2002).  Other states, such as New 
York, mandate that disenfranchisement only result upon incarceration for a 
felony, not simply a conviction (N.Y. Election Law § 5-106).  Some states, such 
as Illinois, allow for disenfranchisement for a third misdemeanor offense, 
particularly if those offenses are drug related (Thompson, 2001).  According to 
Thompson, “three out of every five felony convictions don’t lead to jail time, and 
there’s no clear line you have to cross to earn one.  Being convicted for driving 
although intoxicated three times bans you from voting in numerous states.  Being 
caught with one-fifth of an ounce of crack earns you a federal felony, but being 
caught with one-fifth of an ounce of cocaine only earns a misdemeanor” (2001, 
p.18).  As an example, a person can be convicted of a felony in the state of 
Florida for stopping payment on a check of more than $150, if there is intent to 
defraud (Florida Statute § 832.041).  In Delaware a person can be convicted of a 
felony after a third offence of driving under the influence (DCA § 4177), while in  
                                                 
* For Table 2-1, columns represent three levels of disenfranchisement.  States that do not 
disenfranchise at all appear with none of the three columns checked. 
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Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes 
(adapted from Taormina, 2003) 
 
State Incarceration Parole Permanent Requires Restoration or 
Pardon 
Alabama X X X 
Alaska X X  
Arizona X X 
 
X 
On second offense 




















Some crimes unpardonable 
D.C. X   
Florida X X X 











Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued) 
(adapted from Taormina, 2003) 
 





Includes some misdemeanors 
  




Includes some misdemeanors 
X  







Louisiana X   








Depends on crime & recidivism






Minnesota X X  
Mississippi X X X 
Missouri X X  




Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued) 
(adapted from Taormina, 2003) 
 





Plus 2 years post-discharge 
X  
Nevada X X 
 
X 
Violent or second offense only 
New 
Hampshire X   
New Jersey X X  




Only if incarcerated 
X  
North Carolina X X  
North Dakota X   
Ohio X   
Oklahoma X X  
Oregon X   
Pennsylvania X   











Table 2-1: Disenfranchisement Statutes (Continued) 
(adapted from Taormina, 2003) 
 








Tennessee X X 
 
X 
Some crimes unpardonable 
depends on crime & time 
period 
Texas X X  
Utah X   
Vermont    
Virginia X X X 
Washington X X  
West Virginia X X 
 
X 
For bribery of state official only
Wisconsin X X  
Wyoming X X X 
 
Incarceration Only: 13 States and the District of Columbia 
Incarceration and Parole: 23 States 
Permanent: 12 States 
No Law: 2 States 
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Tennessee it takes four convictions of DUI to earn a felony (TCA § 55-10-403). 
In the main, existing studies show that felony disenfranchisement has had 
a disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement on minority populations (Fellner 
and Mauer, 1998; Hull, 2003; Parkes, 2003; Pinaire, et.al., 2003; Weedon, 2004).  
In 2003, approximately 4.7 million Americans were disenfranchised; 36 percent 
of whom were African American with approximately 60 percent being white (Hull, 
2003; Parkes, 2003; Pinaire, et.al., 2003; Weedon, 2004).  These numbers 
reflect a disproportionate impact on African Americans, given that nationally, less 
than 13 percent of the population is African American (U.S. Census, 2000).  
When the population and disenfranchisement figures are examined by individual 
state, the statistics indicate a similar disproportion.  For example, in Iowa, the 
state population is nearly 95 percent white and two percent African American, yet 
the disenfranchised population is 69 percent white and 26 percent African 
American (Census, 2000; Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  Twohey (2001) presents 
the example of Florida, stating that “altogether, 500,000 Florida residents – 4.6 
percent of the state’s voting-age population – have served time behind bars for 
various crimes and thus are unable to vote because of the ban…(N)early 
170,000 black adult men in Florida – roughly 25 percent of the state’s black male 
residents – can’t vote because of a current or past conviction” (p. 46).  
Comparing the approximately 25 percent disenfranchisement rate for African 
Americans in Florida to the statewide population of 15 percent African American 
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is further indication that disenfranchisement has a racially disproportionate effect 
(U.S. Census, 2000; Twohey, 2001).      
Reinstatement of Voting Rights    
As with the revocation of voting rights, no state has an identical system for 
restoring the vote.  Despite variations, restoration procedures can be categorized 
into two distinct groups: automatic restoration and restoration that requires some 
form of petition to the state.  There is, however, some variation within these 
categories as well.  For example, in the first category, automatic restoration, 
reinstatement of voting rights depends upon exactly when the state classifies an 
individual as “released.”  Massachusetts, for example, is among the states that 
grants the restoration of rights to vote automatically upon release from actual 
incarceration in a state prison (Massachusetts Annotated Laws Chapter 51, § 1).   
Other states, such as Alaska, Indiana, and New York, automatically restore an 
offender’s right to vote only after those offenders have been released from parole 
(Love, 2005).  
In the second category of restoration, those which require some form of 
petition, variation exists as well.  This variation is not simply when the offender 
may petition (after incarceration or after parole), but also varies in the form the 
petition takes.  For example, North Carolina allows ex-felons to petition for 
reinstatement, by paying all fines associated with the offense, following release 
from any form of state custody, which would include a period of parole (NC 
General Statute § 163-55).  Arizona’s restoration process, like the one in 
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Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, requires that an investigation of the offender 
be conducted in order for voting rights to be restored. 
Even in states that disenfranchise for life, mechanisms are in place to 
regain the vote (Allard and Mauer, 2000; Mauer, 2002).  In permanent 
disenfranchisement states like Alabama, for example, those wishing to regain 
their franchise must furnish a DNA sample and seek a pardon from the state 
parole board (Mauer, 2002).  No legal reason for such mandate is apparent other 
than blocking those attempting to regain the ability to vote (Mauer, 2002).  
Further, as Mauer and Kansal (2005) explain, although it is certainly true that 
most states that disenfranchise felony offenders have mechanisms in place to 
enable ex-convicts to reestablish their voting rights, many of these are 
cumbersome with the effect of discouraging voting.   
 Florida’s voting restoration process contains 23 qualifications “ranging 
from the type of crime you committed to your financial status” (Thompson, 2001, 
p. 17).  The financial status requirement states, in part, that the ex-felon cannot 
be in debt to the State of Florida for more than $1000 (Mauer and Kansal, 2005; 
Thompson, 2001).   For former offenders who face substantial court-mandated 
fines and/or restitution payments, this requirement may prohibit them from 
regaining their voting rights (Mauer and Kansal, 2005; Thompson, 2001).  
Provided the affected former felon can traverse the “type of crime” issue and the 
monetary fines, Mauer and Kansal (2005) claim that the State of Florida asks 
extensive questions relating to background, such as manner of death of the 
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former felon’s parents.  They argue that questions like these have nothing to do 
with voting restoration and merely serve to make the process longer and more 
difficult.  Such a process resulted in only 1 out of every 300, or less than one-half 
of one percent, of former felons who attempt to do so actually regaining their right 
to vote in the State of Florida between 1998 and 2004  (Mauer and Kansal, 
2005). 
It appears that systems of restoration vary as widely as the state laws to 
eliminate voting rights in the first place (Love, 2005).  Because of such disparity 
in both the process of disenfranchisement and in the restoration of voting rights, 
any attempt to discern the true nature of disenfranchisement legislation is difficult 
at best (Love, 2005).    
Research on Contemporary Disenfranchisement 
Research on the contemporary use of disenfranchisement legislation has 
expanded in recent years.  This research can be seen as falling into two distinct 
categories: research on the nature, as well as the political and legal aspects of 
disenfranchisement and research on the consequence and impacts of 
disenfranchisement laws.  In this section, the current literature on felony 
disenfranchisement is examined according to these two categories. 
Ewald (2002) examined the historical practice of disenfranchisement, not 
only in the United States, but also in ancient and medieval times.  Ewald (2002) 
used a historical perspective to explain how the current laws on 
disenfranchisement emerged.  In addition to this historical review, Ewald also 
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examined the premises of the American legal system and how it has influenced 
the continued use of the practice of disenfranchising criminal offenders.  Ewald 
argued that, although felony disenfranchisement had deep roots in American law, 
these roots were paradoxical in nature, particularly in a country that espoused 
freedom and democracy.  Ewald stated that a critical understanding of these laws 
and the historical context and ramifications of disenfranchisement could only 
“lead Americans today to conclude that the policy is incompatible with modern 
understandings of citizenship, voting, and criminal justice” and the laws should 
therefore be eliminated (2002, pp. 1134-35).   
In another historical and legal essay, Pettus (2002) examined felony 
disenfranchisement legislation and the connection with political freedom as part 
of her study exploring the legal aspects of disenfranchisement laws.  Pettus 
(2002) examined the historical context of disenfranchisement legislation and 
argued that these laws were incompatible with the idea of political freedom and 
that they created a society in which the disenfranchised were ruled by those who 
retained the right to vote.  In essence, Pettus (2002) argued that 
disenfranchisement legislation, as currently practiced, not only went against the 
idea of a democratic society, but also brought into question the general 
legitimacy of criminal law.  Pettus (2002) made this argument, in part, because of 
the disproportionate racial impact of the criminal justice sanctions.  This 
disproportionate racial make-up of the American prison population resulted in 
disproportionate numbers of racial minorities that were denied true citizenship, in 
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that they were no longer allowed to participate in the political system in society 
(Pettus, 2002). These laws then, according to Pettus (2002), contradicted any 
conceptualization of citizenship in a democratic society.   
Schall (2004) examined the compatibility of felony disenfranchisement 
legislation with citizenship theory.  In his paper, Schall (2004) discussed not only 
the historical context of why the United States maintains a ban on felon voting, 
but also explored whether or not disenfranchisement could be justified in a 
society that espoused democratic citizenship.  Schall (2004) argued that 
disenfranchisement was incompatible with any definition of citizenship, in that the 
right to vote was an essential part of citizenship.  Voting was the means by which 
a citizen could express their desires and by choosing the leadership of their 
government (Schall, 2004).  Additionally, “because felon disenfranchisement 
does not serve any penological goals, the deprivation of convicts’ political 
liberties cannot be justified as punishment” (Schall, 2004, p. 32).  Ultimately then, 
Schall (2004) stated that felony disenfranchisement was incompatible with the 
idea of citizenship in a democratic society and should be abandoned.   
Like authors discussed above, Parkes (2003) agreed that, although 
arguments exist for felon disenfranchisement legislation, the racial impact of 
these laws make them untenable.  Parkes (2003) stated that although the racial 
impact alone should be enough to justify the repeal of disenfranchisement 
legislation, the laws in the United States should be carefully scrutinized and 
brought in-line with other countries, regardless of any racial impact the laws may 
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have.  In her paper, Parkes (2003) described disenfranchisement in the U.S. 
criminal justice system and compared it to the Canadian criminal justice system 
that recently overturned all prisoner disenfranchisement laws by declaring that 
the laws were unconstitutional.  According to Parkes (2003), while there may be 
reasons to deny the vote to current or former felons, these reasons did not 
override the restitutive effect that enfranchisement has, “disenfranchisement 
profoundly affects a person’s dignity and relegates him or her to the status of 
second-class citizen or even sub-human” (p. 92).  By allowing former felons (and 
in the Canadian case, even prisoners) to vote, society begins the process of 
healing and restoring every citizen, regardless of their criminal history (Parkes, 
2003).  Parkes (2003) stated, that restoration of total citizenship should be one of 
the main goals of the criminal justice system and because disenfranchisement 
goes against that goal it should be eliminated. 
The work of Ewald and Parkes, among others, has spawned additional 
research that may provide a more in-depth understanding of felony 
disenfranchisement generally.  An example of this type of research is a 2002 
study by Manza, Brooks, and Uggen in which they attempted to ascertain public 
opinion on felony disenfranchisement legislation in the United States.  By 
ascertaining public opinion on the issue of disenfranchisement, the authors 
attempted to provide a more in-depth understanding of disenfranchisement.  This 
study was relevant in that public opinion may have influenced the use of 
disenfranchisement legislation.  Utilizing the Harris Interactive monthly telephone 
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survey, the researchers asked respondents several questions about their 
attitudes towards crime, criminals, and the rights of criminal offenders (Manza, 
Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).  A national sample of 1000 adults was gathered using 
a random stratified sampling technique to ensure that representative sample was 
attained (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).  The researchers asked a series of 
questions designed to gage the respondent’s attitude regarding 
disenfranchisement based upon whether the offender was incarcerated, on 
probation, or on parole.  An additional set of questions asked the respondent to 
judge between the seriousness of criminal offenses (e.g. a violent offender vs. a 
generic offender) and whether or not they impacted the disenfranchisement of 
offenders.  Both the attitudes on the status of the offender (incarcerated, 
probation, parole) and type of criminal offender (generic, violent, white collar, sex 
crime) were treated as dependent variables, while attitudes toward the criminal 
justice system and support for civil liberties were treated as independent 
variables (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).   
Using logistic regression, the researchers tested whether or not an 
individual’s attitude toward civil liberties and the criminal justice system impacted 
their views on whether or not civil liberties were extended to criminal offenders 
(Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).  The findings suggested fairly strong public 
support for enfranchising those offenders that were currently on probation (68%) 
or parole (60%), while showing limited support (31%) for allowing currently 
imprisoned offenders the right to vote (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).  
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Further, when tested against the type of criminal offense committed by former 
offenders, the findings were similar in regards to support for restoration of civil 
liberties: generic offenders (80% support), white-collar offenders (63%), violent 
offenders (66%), and sex offenders (52%) (Manza, Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).  
Manza, et.al (2002), argued that the difference between the support level for the 
generic offender and the sexual offender may indicate a particularly poor view 
the public holds towards sex offenders rather than a view that these offenders 
should be denied the right to vote.  Generally, the findings indicated that the 
public appears to support the enfranchisement of former offenders, as well as 
those on probation, or on parole regardless of type of offense committed (Manza, 
Brooks, and Uggen, 2002).   
Throughout much of the literature on felony disenfranchisement the 
disproportionate racial make-up in the criminal justice system was a theme.  
Fletcher (1999) for example, argued that the impact on racial minorities due to 
disenfranchisement was no different than the impact due to drug laws, such as 
the differential punishment meted out for crack versus cocaine, or the 
disproportionate impact of the death penalty on minority offenders.  All three of 
these cases (disenfranchisement, drug laws, and the death penalty) acted to 
treat criminal offenders, particularly those of a racial minority group, as an 
“untouchable” in today’s society (Fletcher, 1999, p. 1898).  More specifically, 
Fletcher (1999) argued that felony disenfranchisement was simply another 
“technique for reinforcing the branding of felons as the untouchable class of 
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American society” (p. 1895).  Part of Fletcher’s argument against the use of 
disenfranchisement legislation was the “mystical” and “fanciful” argument of the 
need to maintain the “purity of the ballot box” (1999, p. 1899).  The argument that 
voting by current and former offenders would harm “the purity of the ballot box” 
was based on the idea that criminal offenders would taint the voting process 
(Fletcher, 1999).  This belief, Fletcher argued, goes against the rationale of a 
legal system based on fact, and therefore has no place in the American legal 
system.  Further, Fletcher (1999) argued that because there is a disproportionate 
number of racial minorities represented among this permanent underclass, 
disenfranchisement continues to perpetuate the view that the criminal justice 
system is racist, if not in intent, certainly in outcome.   
Hench (1998) furthered the argument that racial minorities were 
disproportionately impacted by disenfranchisement legislation by emphatically 
stating that “minority voting rights are dead” (p. 730).  Although the main premise 
of her work was to examine the overall impact of the disenfranchisement of 
minorities, not just of those who have committed criminal offenses, Hench (1998) 
discussed the specific impact of the felony disenfranchisement laws on the 
minority community.  Essentially, Hench (1998) argued that the increased 
incarceration rate of minority offenders has amounted to the dilution of the 
minority voting power.  Because the racial disparity in incarceration has 
increased, she argued, felony disenfranchisement was indistinguishable from 
many of the historic attempts to prohibit minorities from exercising their rights 
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(Hench, 1998).  Although Hench admitted that there were other motives, aside 
from race, in the voting prohibition of criminal offenders, she argued that race 
was an overriding factor that could not be ignored.  Hench stated that “the 
unsavory facts are that present day felon disenfranchisement has its roots in a 
mentality that assigned people of color to the status of non-person, and that 
these laws continue to operate with discriminatory effect” (1998, p. 771).  It is this 
discriminatory effect that Hench believed needs to be the focus of any 
examination of disenfranchisement (Hench, 1998). 
 In another study, King and Mauer (2004) examined the impact of felony 
disenfranchisement on minorities and their voting power in Atlanta, Georgia.  The 
goal of this study was to determine if there was a disenfranchisement impact on 
the black population at the local level (King and Mauer, 2004).  In addition to 
determining the percentage of persons (black and non-black) who were 
disenfranchised, this study examined the overall impact disenfranchisement has 
on voter registration for neighborhoods in Atlanta (King and Mauer, 2004).  Using 
Atlanta zip codes and correctional data, King and Mauer (2004), estimated the 
total number of disenfranchised persons, by race, for each of twenty zip codes 
that could be identified as covering a geographical area (King and Mauer, 2004).  
Zip codes reserved for businesses were excluded from the analysis (King and 
Mauer, 2004).  Additional data related to race, ethnicity, median household 
income, and poverty rate were attained from the United States Census Bureau 
(King and Mauer, 2004).   
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 King and Mauer (2004) determined that one in seven black males in the 
Atlanta area was disenfranchised due to a felony conviction (King and Mauer, 
2004).  Further, the rate of black male disenfranchisement was eleven times 
higher than that of non-black males in Atlanta (King and Mauer, 2004).  Some 
neighborhoods had a black male disenfranchisement rate of over twenty percent 
while no neighborhood had more than a four percent disenfranchisement rate for 
non-black males (King and Mauer, 2004).  The authors argued the proportion of 
black males that were disenfranchised in each area indicated a substantial racial 
impact from disenfranchisement legislation (King and Mauer, 2004).  However, 
the more important finding, according to King and Mauer, was that black male 
voter registration rates were even more impacted by disenfranchisement laws.  
This was illustrated by the finding that sixty-nine percent of the voter registration 
gap between black males and non-black males was a function of 
disenfranchisement legislation (King and Mauer, 2004).   
Fellner and Mauer (1998) provided a more rigorous empirical research 
study on the impact of felony disenfranchisement legislation in the United States.  
Utilizing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fellner and Mauer attempted 
to ascertain the national and racial impact of felony disenfranchisement laws 
across the country.  Because data on the size of the disenfranchised population 
was not available, the authors were required to make estimates on the size of the 
disenfranchised population, based on data from 1995.  These estimates were 
needed as some states disenfranchised for all felonies, while others 
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disenfranchised only for a second felony conviction (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  
To complete the data set used for their study, Fellner and Mauer also estimated 
the total number of persons with prior convictions, as some states count prior 
convictions toward disenfranchisement.  Lastly, to be able to judge the racial 
impact of disenfranchisement legislation, the number of black males in prison, on 
probation, and on parole were estimated for each state of the year 1996 (Fellner 
and Mauer, 1998). 
 After gathering the estimates as described above, Fellner and Mauer were 
able to calculate the proportion of the general population for each state that was 
disenfranchised, as well the proportion of black males that were disenfranchised 
in each state.  The findings indicated that being black has a substantial impact in 
many states (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  For example, while the total 
disenfranchised population for the United States represented two percent of the 
total population, disenfranchised black males represented 13.1% of the black 
male population.  The 13.1% represents approximately 1.4 million black males or 
one-third of the total disenfranchised population (Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  
When the data were examined by state, two states (Alabama and Florida) 
disenfranchised thirty-one percent of the black male population; in five states 
(Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming) one in four black males 
were disenfranchised; and six other states (Texas – 20.8%; Delaware – 20%, 
Rhode Island – 18.3%, Wisconsin – 18.2%, Minnesota – 17.8%, New Jersey – 
17.7%) had at least seventeen percent black male disenfranchisement.  Based 
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on a simple proportion, Fellner and Mauer (1998) were able to show that laws 
that disenfranchise felony offenders had a substantial racial impact.   
Several studies indicated that there were political consequences of felony 
disenfranchisement laws (Manza and Uggen, 2003; Uggen and Manza, 2001; 
Uggen and Manza, 2002).  For example, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002) 
utilized the Voting Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
determine the impact felony disenfranchisement had on voter turnout.  As an 
additional measure, the researchers used National Election Study (NES) data 
covering a twenty-eight year period (1972 – 2000) in an attempt to determine 
voter preferences and choice of political candidates (Uggen and Manza, 2001 
and 2002).  Using these two sources, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002), 
estimated the expected voter turnout and the expected vote choice of 
disenfranchised offenders.  Estimates of voter turnout and vote choice were 
necessary in this case because there was no accurate “survey data that asks 
disenfranchised felons how they would have voted” (Uggen and Manza, 2001, p. 
10).  Even with this lack of data to measure the exact political consequences of 
felony disenfranchisement, Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002), believed that 
their estimates were accurate.  Both the CPS and NES obtained data on 
demographic information which allowed inferences to be made regarding how an 
individual might vote based upon their race, sex, age, and socioeconomic status, 
among others (Uggen and Manza, 2001).  
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The authors used logistic regression with two dichotomous dependent 
variables, whether or not a person would have voted and if that individual would 
have voted for the Democratic or Republican candidate.  The findings indicated 
an estimated voter turnout of thirty-one percent on average for all senatorial and 
presidential elections from 1972 to 2000 (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).  
Although the thirty-one percent estimate is far less than the national average∗ for 
non-felon voters, the authors argued that the numbers “suggest that a non-trivial 
proportion of disenfranchised voters were likely to have voted if they had been 
given the opportunity to vote” (Uggen and Manza, 2001, p. 15). 
The political party or candidate choice estimate showed similar results.  
That is, given the data available, the disenfranchised felon vote would likely had 
made a difference in several senatorial and presidential elections (Uggen and 
Manza, 2001 and 2002).  Based on the estimates, the disenfranchised felon 
voter, hypothesized in these studies, indicated an overwhelming preference for 
Democratic candidates (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).  Given this finding, 
Uggen and Manza (2001 and 2002) argued that disenfranchising felony 
offenders provided a “clear advantage to Republican candidates in every 
senatorial and presidential election from 1972 to 2000 (p. 16).   
In support of this argument, Uggen and Manza examined the actual 
elections that took place between 1978 and 2000 to determine if any of those 
elections might have turned out differently if felons had the opportunity to vote.  
                                                 




After examining all of those elections, the authors found evidence that seven 
senatorial elections and two presidential elections were likely influenced by the 
disenfranchisement of felony offenders (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).  
Further, the authors argued that the possibility that these elections might have 
turned out differently had an influence far beyond the actual election in question 
(Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).  For example, because the U.S. Senate 
had been fairly evenly divided between Democrat and Republican over the 
period examined, a shift of even one would have likely shifted the balance of 
power in the Senate (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).  Further, with the 
incumbent in any election having a decided advantage when it comes to 
reelection, a shift from one party to another in 1978, may indeed have had an 
impact in that senatorial district for years (Uggen and Manza, 2001 and 2002).   
 Voter turnout was the main factor under consideration in a 2004 study 
conducted by Miles.  Using a “triple-differences” framework, Miles tested whether 
or not disenfranchisement reduced the voter turnout of African-American men.  
The triple differences (or difference-in-differences-in-differences) approach 
utilized “three dimensions of comparison to identify a causal effect” (Miles, 2004, 
p. 100).  Miles (2004) used race (African-Americans vs. Whites) as the first 
difference, sex as the second difference, and state disenfranchisement laws as 
the third difference in an attempt to determine if there was a causal effect of race 
and sex and disenfranchisement laws on voter turnout.  Voter turnout was the 
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dependent variable and race, sex, and the disenfranchisement law of a state 
were all independent variables (Miles, 2004).   
Using a sample of twenty-six states, Miles (2004) found that states with a 
permanent disenfranchisement law were no more likely to impact voter turnout 
rates among black male voters than were states without a permanent 
disenfranchisement law.  That is, unlike many studies presented here, Miles 
(2004) findings suggested that disenfranchisement legislation had no discernable 
impact on voter turnout.  Miles (2004) suggested that his findings vary from other 
studies because previous studies focused too much on the disproportionate 
numbers of disenfranchised African-American males and not on the causal effect 
on actual voting practices.  In fact, Miles argued that “the absence of an effect is 
consistent with the view that on average felons belong to a demographic groups 
that, although eligible to vote, infrequently exercise that right” (2004, p. 122). 
The study conducted by Miles (2004) was a contrast to most research on 
the political consequences of felony disenfranchisement.  There may be several 
reasons for the difference in findings.  First, Miles (2004) examined not the 
numbers of incarcerated offenders, but rather actual voter turnout numbers.  
Second, statistical tests used may have provided differing results.  Lastly, the 
size of the population in Miles’s study may have resulted in divergent results.  
Whatever the reason for the difference in findings between Miles’s study and 
each of the other studies, the Miles study appears to be the lone study arguing 
that felony disenfranchisement does not have a political consequence. 
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The above research has expanded our understanding of felony 
disenfranchisement.  However, there remain issues in need of resolution.  In the 
following section, gaps in the literature on disenfranchisement legislation are 
discussed. 
Gaps in the Literature on Disenfranchisement 
An analysis of the literature on disenfranchisement reveals two important 
gaps.  First, most prior studies of felony disenfranchisement fail to provide a 
theoretical framework to explain the nature and practices of felony 
disenfranchisement while also providing empirical data (see for example Allard 
and Mauer, 2000; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Manza and Uggen, 2003).   Thus, 
although research on felony disenfranchisement has been conducted, theoretical 
explanations of this phenomenon are still inadequate. The lack of a theoretical 
framework for most empirical studies results in a collection of empirical data 
without explanations of the meaning of the data and why social phenomena exist.  
As Bourdieu (1988) states, “theory without empirical research is empty, empirical 
research without theory is blind” (p. 774).  Second, the empirical studies 
conducted to date shows the impact of disenfranchisement on minority offenders 
and on society generally, but there has not been a qualitative analysis of the laws 
themselves to attain a better understanding of the nature of disenfranchisement.  
A qualitative analysis of the laws should provide important insight into 
disenfranchisement.     
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To fill the gap in the literature on felony disenfranchisement, the present 
study examines state disenfranchisement and voting restoration laws in the 
United States to address these shortcomings.  Specifically, the study seeks to 
test the following hypotheses:   
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the 
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;  
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the 
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and  
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more 
difficult the voting restoration procedures.  
The group threat hypothesis of conflict theory, which will be discussed in Chapter 
3, and both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to answer these 
questions.  The research hypotheses and research methods are presented in the 
Chapter 4.     
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter is devoted to the establishment of a theoretical framework for 
the study of felony disenfranchisement legislation.  Towards that end, this 
chapter discusses the conflict perspective generally, and the group threat 
hypothesis specifically. 
Foundation of Conflict Theory 
The conflict perspective is rooted in Marxian ideas.  According to Marx, 
“the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” 
(1848/1998, p. 79).  Although Marx, who was essentially an economist, did not 
discuss the issue of crime in much detail, his concepts of class conflict, control, 
and power provided the foundation for the conflict perspective (Greenberg, 
1981).  Marx’s original formulation of conflict was based in economic terms, 
principally the capitalism economic system and the conflict between two classes, 
the bourgeoisie (who owned the means of production) and the proletariat 
(workers in the capitalist economy) (Marx, 1848/1998).  Because maximization of 
profits is the main goal of capitalism, those who own the means of production 
attempt to attain that goal through a variety of means (Marx, 1848/1998 and 
1859/1970).  One of the means of ensuring the maximization of profits utilized by 
the bourgeoisie was to either construct or to control the superstructure in society 
(Marx, 1859/1970 and 1867/1967).  The superstructure refers, not simply to the 
state or government, but also to law, religion, and the dominant values of the 
society as a whole (Marx, 1867/1967).  According to Marx, by controlling the 
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superstructure through influence on the law-making process and through the 
creation of laws designed to protect the capitalist economic system, the 
bourgeoisie is able to control production and the market (Marx, 1867/1967).  
Bourgeois control of the superstructure results in class conflict as the 
proletariat became more aware of the alienation and exploitation endemic in the 
capitalist economic system (Marx, 1848/1998).  As the proletariat became more 
class-conscious and determined to change the system, bourgeois control 
exercised became harsher to sustain the capitalist economic system (Marx, 
1848/1998).  Crime was the label applied to the proletarian struggle to overthrow 
the system.  In response, the bourgeoisie continued to increase criminal 
penalties and introduce laws designed to protect the capitalist economic system.  
The bourgeoisie, the ruling class as represented by the state, used the law to 
protect its interests and control the proletariat (Marx, 1848/1998, 1867/1967).   
Although conflict theory is fairly broad and several divergent views on the 
theoretical perspective can be found, the primary assumption held by all versions 
of conflict theory is that societies are characterized by the conflicts within them 
(Greenberg, 1981; Quinney, 1977; Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard, 
1986).  These conflicts drive many political, social, and legal decisions.  
According to Marx, conflict stems from the struggle for power, either to attain 
power or maintain power once it is achieved (cited in Greenberg, 1981).  Many 
theorists have viewed the concept of power and the need to attain and maintain 
power as the main factor that spurs many of society’s laws (Bonger, 1916/1969; 
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Dahrendorf, 1959; Quinney, 1977; Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard, 
1986).   
The work of Marx laid the foundation for a conflict perspective in 
criminology.  Bonger (1916/1969) for example, took many Marxian ideas 
regarding the capitalist mode of production and used them to explain how crime 
itself was an inevitable by-product of the economic system.  According to Bonger 
(1916/1969), crime was a result of egoism, which was directly tied to the 
capitalist mode of production that emphasized profits first and foremost.  
Because of this egoism, there was a greater emphasis placed on protecting 
those profits and therefore protecting the persons making those profits, the 
bourgeoisie (Bonger, 1916/1969).  Although Bonger’s approach is primarily 
socio-psychological in nature, he believed that the egoism of individuals in a 
capitalistic society helps to create conflict between groups and helps to create 
crime.  In regards to capitalism causing crime, Bonger argues, “as a 
consequence of the present environment, man has become very egoistic and 
hence more capable of crime, than if the environment had developed the germs 
of altruism” (p. 41).  Although crime coming from capitalism was not exclusively a 
problem of the proletariat, Bonger (1916/1969) argued that the law was designed 
to protect the bourgeoisie and crime, particularly crime committed by the 
proletariat, was seen as a threat to that power base in society.  It was Bonger’s 




Similar to Bonger, Dahrendorf (1959) utilized Marxian ideas to further 
establish the conflict perspective as a legitimate means of explaining social 
problems.  Unlike Marx’s emphasis on the means of production however, 
Dahrendorf (1959) argued that conflict was better explained by an individual’s 
exercise of authority over others.  Although the ability to exercise authority did 
include those who owned the means of production (Marx’s Bourgeoisie), it also 
included those individuals, such as managers and supervisors, who had some 
measure of authority over others (Dahrendorf, 1959).  Because of this emphasis 
on authority as opposed to means of production, Dahrendorf was able to explain 
conflict across societies regardless of what method of production was utilized.  
With the addition of authority to Marxian ideas of power, the conflict perspective 
expanded into areas other than the economic and political fields that had been 
Marx’s focus.  Authority, power, and control were all concepts that fed into the 
conflict perspective’s ability to explain law as a means managing conflict. 
Turk (1969) built on the conflict perspective by explaining that law itself is 
the manifestation of the dominant group’s need to control society.  Those with 
power in society need to protect their power and therefore create laws to control 
those they perceive as threatening to that power base.  Turk offers numerous 
examples of the creation of law to protect power.  For example, the creation and 
implementation of vagrancy laws in the United States in the 1800s demonstrates 
the use of criminal law to control a population deemed as threatening to the 
power structure (as cited in Maguire, 1990).  Other laws, ranging from alcohol 
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prohibition to the criminalization of marijuana, present additional examples of the 
use of law to protect society from a perceived threat to the social order (Turk, 
1969).  Vold (1958) provides another example, arguing that many laws geared 
towards juveniles and juvenile gangs were created because juveniles, even 
though they hold no real power, were seen as a threat to the “established world 
of adult values and power” (p. 211).  Vold saw the relationship of conflict, power, 
and law as coming from the divergent interest of competing groups – in the 
above case, between juveniles and adults.  Vold (1958) sums up this argument 
by explaining that “whichever group interest can marshal the greatest number of 
votes will determine whether or not there is to be a new law to hamper and curb 
the interests of some opposition group” (p. 208). 
Although Turk appeared to move away from Marxian ideas of the mode of 
production influencing conflict, Quinney (1977), like Marx, argues that the power 
that controls the law of a society cannot be separated from the capitalist mode of 
production in the society itself.  Capitalism itself creates conflict between groups 
seeking to maximize profit and control society for their own benefit (Quinney, 
1977).  According to Quinney, “an understanding of crime in our society begins 
with the recognition that the crucial phenomenon to be considered is not crime 
per se, but the historical development and operation of capitalist society” (1977, 
p. 39).  This argument is directly tied to Marxian ideas about the capitalist mode 
of production and the contradictions Marx believed were inherent in a capitalist 
society.  Quinney furthered the argument to include a more thorough 
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understanding of the connection of the power base in a capitalistic society to the 
order in that society.  Quinney argues that “when a society generates social 
problems (created by capitalism) it cannot solve within its own existence, policies 
for controlling the population are devised and implemented” (1977, p. 8). 
The conflict theory initially presented by Vold (1958), rather than focusing 
on the conflicts of capitalism, instead focused on conflicts of interests between 
groups in society.  According to Vold, humans are “fundamentally group-involved 
beings,” and therefore tend to form groups around related interests (1986, p. 
271).  Conflict occurs when there is either an overlap in group interests or if one 
group’s interests are encroached upon by another group.  The creation, 
implementation, and enforcement of law follow this same general pattern of 
conflicting group interests.  For example, when conflicts between two opposing 
groups occur, the group that is more able to influence the creation of law is more 
likely to control the will of the opposing groups.  This control is exercised, not 
merely in the creation of the law or in the enforcement of the law, but the control 
extends to control of the state.  Vold and Bernard (1986) argue, “those who 
produce legislative majorities win control of the police power of the state and 
decide the policies that determine who is likely to be involved in the violation of 
laws.  Thus the whole process of lawmaking, lawbreaking, and law enforcement 
directly reflects deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between group interest 
and the more general struggles among groups for control of the police power of 
the state.  To that extent, criminal behavior is the behavior of minority power 
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groups, in that these groups do not have sufficient power to promote and defend 
their interests and purposes in the legislative process” (p. 273-274).  These 
conflicts of interest result in the waging of a battle for control that is enforced 
through the creation and enforcement of law (Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard, 
1986).  Crime and crime control can not truly be understood without some 
reference to conflict, as criminal law is a reflection of the values and mores of 
power holders in society (Vold, 1958; Vold and Bernard, 1986).  Greenberg 
(1981) continues the argument that the criminal law can be seen as a result of 
“the relative power of groups determined to use the criminal law to advance their 
own special interests or to impose their moral preferences on others” (p. 4).  By 
utilizing law and the enforcement of law, control can be maintained.  It is, 
according to Greenberg (1981), this power that is critical in shaping not only the 
law, but also, the structures that enforce the law.   
Group Threat Hypothesis 
The group threat hypothesis is based on conflict theory.  In this section, 
the group threat hypothesis is explained and several studies that have tested the 
hypothesis are presented.  These studies tested the validity of the group threat 
hypothesis in various ways and are organized along four separate themes: crime 
as a race specific issue, minority population size and increases in diversity, 
police department size and deployment practices, and police brutality.  Prior to 
the discussion of the various tests of the group threat hypothesis, an explanation 
of Blalock’s hypothesis is presented.  
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The group threat hypothesis was originally formulated by Blalock in 1967 
as an expansion of the conflict perspective discussed above.  Ultimately, the 
creation of the group threat hypothesis came from Blalock’s attempt to formulate 
a theory of “minority-group relations” (1967, p. vii).  In his attempt to build a 
theory, Blalock (1967) brings together socioeconomic factors and the ideas of 
competition and power to explain how the increase in minority population, among 
other factors, leads to economic and/or political threat and ultimately prejudice 
and discrimination among the dominant group.  Blalock separates his ninety-
seven distinct theoretical propositions into four main categories: socioeconomic 
factors and discrimination, competition and discrimination, power and 
discrimination, and minority percentage and discrimination.  Each of these 
categories explains discrimination against minorities in different ways.  Under the 
category of socioeconomic factors, Blalock (1967) argues, that the “fear of loss of 
status” among the majority class leads to avoidance behavior (segregation) and 
discrimination against the minority (p. 71).  Similarly, Blalock’s second major 
category, competition and discrimination, involves a fear of loss by the majority, 
but rather than focusing primarily on economic terms, Blalock argues that 
competition from minorities leads to discriminatory behavior by the majority.  
Blalock (1967) argues that this competition could be a perception of competition 
or, simply, the visibility of minorities.  That is, the more visible the minority 
member, the more they are perceived to be in competition with the majority for 
limited resources.  According to Blalock (1967), this competition can be expected 
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to lead to increased discriminatory behavior and even violence: “forms of 
discriminatory behavior based on the threat of competition would entail 
considerably more violence and direct injury to the minority” (p. 106). 
One of the distinct differences between the group threat hypothesis and 
the conflict perspective is articulated by Blalock in his description of power and 
discrimination, his third theoretical category.  According to Blalock (1967), “one 
can think of race relations in terms of intergroup power contests.  The term 
‘power contest’ is used in preference to one such as ‘power struggle’ in order to 
emphasize that there need be no overt conflict” (p. 109).  The perspective that 
conflict need not be overt in order for power to be exercised opens up the 
analysis of race relations to include methods that are “certainly more complex … 
and usually much more subtle” than outright and overt racial domination by the 
majority class (Blalock, 1967, p.109).  In the case of power and discrimination, 
Blalock (1967) contends that power itself is a “multiplicative function of two very 
general types of variables, total resources and the degree to which these 
resources are mobilized” (p.110).  That is, the two variables work together to 
form an understanding of power and how it is exercised.  The more resources 
(including money, property, voting rights, etcetera) a group has combined with 
the ability to mobilize those resources results in greater power.  Discrimination 
may result if that power is threatened in some way or discrimination may act as 
an impediment to achievement of greater power.  Blalock provides an example of 
how discrimination can be an impediment to increasing a group’s power, by 
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discussing the lack of educational resources possessed by the black minority.  
Because black children had been denied equal education through discrimination, 
they were far less able to compete with whites after desegregation.  This inability 
to compete ultimately limits the ability to achieve a resource (higher education) 
thereby limiting the ability to mobilize that resource to gain power (Blalock, 1967).   
The last of the four main categories of Blalock’s group threat theoretical 
propositions is minority percentage and discrimination.  Essentially, Blalock 
argues that the greater the percentage of minorities in a given population the 
greater the perceived threat they pose to the dominant class.  The increase in 
minority population is particularly important, according to Blalock in the realm of 
economics.  That is, if minority groups threaten, or are perceived to threaten, the 
economic capabilities of the dominant class through competition for jobs, the 
greater the chance that the minority group will be discriminated against.  
According to Blalock (1967), population size is an important factor in examining 
competition, “the larger the relative size of the minority population, the more 
minority individuals there should be in direct or potential competition with a given 
individual in the dominant group.  As the minority percentage increases, 
therefore, we would expect to find increasing discriminatory behavior” (p.148).  
Ultimately then, “we must remember that there will generally be larger numbers 
of the minority in communities with high discrimination rates” (p. 181). 
Based on the four categories mentioned above, Blalock (1967) argues that 
minorities are more “likely to be selected as targets for aggression to the degree 
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that such aggression can serve as a means to other goals” (p. 205).  Among 
these goals are the reduction of competition and frustration among the majority 
class (Blalock, 1967).  However, aggression from the dominant class could also 
be exercised against the minority group simply based on the perception that 
minorities are the cause of frustration among the majority group (Blalock, 1967).  
Although there are ninety-seven distinct propositions, the propositions taken as a 
whole argue that if minorities are, or are perceived to be, a threat to employment, 
political power, education, or any resource controlled by the majority, the 
members of the dominant group will utilize whatever power they possess to 
control the minority group (Blalock, 1967).  This power often takes the form of 
aggressive actions against minorities, all in an effort to control the threat. 
It was the idea of perception of threat that was picked up on by Liska 
(1992) and the various authors in Liska’s edited text in their attempt to explain 
crime control policies.  These theorists argue that social control is more likely to 
be exercised against minority groups that are perceived to be a threat in some 
way (Blalock, 1967; Chamblin and Liska, 1992; Jackson, 1992; Liska, 1992).  
This threat can be economic, such as competition for employment, but threat can 
also be seen in the increase in civil liberties and political power of minority 
groups.  Essentially, when a subordinate group attempts to, or actually succeeds, 
at gaining some measure of power at the expense of the group in power, those in 
control perceive the subordinate group as a threat (Blalock, 1967). 
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The key to the group threat hypothesis is its reliance on perception of 
threat rather than actual threat.  That is, the threat does not have to be real.  The 
nature of the threat is not particularly important either.  Various factors can cause 
a threat to those in power; it simply depends upon what those in power perceive 
as threatening (Blalock, 1967; Jackson, 1992).  Threats can range from 
increases in size of minority populations, economic advancements by a minority 
group, and/or increased political representation among others (Blalock, 1967; 
Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Chamblin, 1992; Chamblin and Liska, 1992; 
Inverarity, 1992).  How the powerful handle these threats varies as well.  The 
powerful may create new legislation to limit minorities in some way, there may be 
enhanced penalties that effect minorities is a disproportionate way, or the 
powerful may use agents of state, law enforcement officials, to enhance 
enforcement on those that that are perceived as a threat (Arvanities, 1992; 
Chamblin and Liska, 1992; Inverarity, 1992).  The use of the criminal justice 
system as a control mechanism of the state is a prime example of how those in 
power can eliminate the threat (Liska, 1992).   
Utilizing the group threat hypothesis to examine control by the criminal 
justice system, however, does not necessarily imply that these laws are 
intentionally discriminatory.  In fact, “the key issue is result, not intent” (Georges-
Abeyie, 1990, p. 28).  Simply because the results of a law may indicate 
disparities in outcome, does not mean that there was any intent to discriminate.  
These laws may be seen as institutionalized discrimination, in that disparities in 
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outcomes are often the result of established legal factors (Georges-Abeyie, 1990; 
Petersilia, 1983; Wilbanks, 1987).  Minorities, particularly racial minorities, have 
felt the effect of institutional discrimination in education, employment, income 
distribution, and the criminal justice process to name but a few (Georges-Abeyie, 
1990; McCrudden, 1982).  Poorer schools, may be a historic remnant of 
segregation, which may lead to few prospects at the managerial or professional 
level of employment, which may, in turn, lead to less income for minorities as 
compared to whites can all be seen as a result of discrimination that has been 
institutionalized over decades. 
In the field of criminal justice, established legal factors may include the 
examination of an individual’s criminal history when making a sentencing 
decision.  An individual who has an extensive criminal history will be more 
harshly sentenced than an individual who, although they committed the same 
offense, has little or no criminal history.  Due to the history of overt discrimination 
when in comes to African Americans in this country, they are more likely to have 
multiple arrests and therefore a more extensive criminal history than whites.  So 
while utilizing an offender’s criminal history may result in racial disparities in 
outcomes (longer prison terms, increase minority percentage in prison), the use 
of those criminal histories is not discriminatory in intent.  The impact of utilizing 
legal factors that may result in institutional discrimination reaches far beyond 
increased numbers of minorities in prison.  For example, because drug laws* 
                                                 
* According to the 2004 Uniform Crime Report, drug law violations make up 12.5% of all arrests; 
Blacks represent 32.7% of those arrested for drug law violations. 
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disproportionately affect minority populations, these same minority populations 
consequently tend to become incarcerated and are disenfranchised as a result 
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; 
Pettus, 2002).  Further, bail and pretrial detention policies, which require full time 
employment for an individual to qualify for bail and avoid pretrial detention, while 
not overtly racially discriminatory has the result of discrimination in that minorities 
that appear before the court are less likely to possess full-time employment 
(Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005).  The quality of legal counsel is also impacted 
by established criminal justice policies that appear on the surface to be non-
discriminatory.  Because the quality of legal counsel often depends on a 
defendant’s ability to pay and most minority defendants are not able to afford 
quality counsel, they are forced to acquire an attorney from the public defenders 
office (Demuth, 2003; Schlesinger, 2005).  The massive caseloads of most 
members of a public defenders office inhibits their ability to provide a full quality 
defense, as a result the defendant tends to suffer the consequences (Demuth, 
2003; Schlesinger, 2005).  Each of these factors (criminal histories, drug laws, 
bail and pretrial detention, the quality of legal counsel) has an impact on 
minorities in the criminal justice system.  These forms of institutional 
discrimination cause disparities in criminal justice outcomes and subsequently in 




Ultimately, as the above cases show, institutional discrimination is about 
result and it requires no overt action for the result to be considered 
discriminatory.  Behavior of individuals and of institutions no longer needs to be 
discriminatory in order for discriminatory effects to occur.  According to Knowles 
and Prewitt (1969), “behavior has become so well institutionalized that the 
individual generally does not have to exercise choices to operate in a racist 
manner.  The rules and procedures of the large organization have already 
prestructured the choice.  The individual only has to conform to the operating 
norms of the organization and the institution will do the discriminating for him” (p. 
143).  Such is the case in the criminal justice system and the impact this system 
has on minority offenders.  However, simply because there is evidence of 
institutional discrimination does not preclude divergent explanations of 
discrimination, such as the examination of the group threat hypothesis.  In what 
follows, several studies testing the Group Threat Hypothesis in the field of 
criminal justice are presented along four separate themes: crime as a race 
specific issue, minority population size and increases in diversity, police 
department size and deployment practices, and police brutality. 
Although Blalock did not necessarily create the group threat hypothesis as 
an explanation of how the criminal justice system operates several researchers 
have tested the group threat hypothesis as it relates to crime and the criminal 
justice system.  Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz (2004), found support for the group 
threat hypothesis in their study examining the racial typification of crime (where 
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crime is viewed as race specific) and its effects on support for punitive measures.  
They used a national telephone survey of 885 randomly selected households and 
asked questions regarding respondent’s attitudes toward various types of 
punishment.  Using regression analysis, the responses were compared to a 
variety of dependent variables, including a black crime index (index of crimes 
committed by Blacks), fear of crime victimization, and racial prejudice among 
others.  They found that group threat was related not only to the proximity or the 
size of the minority population, but also to the perception of crime as a “black 
phenomenon” (2004, p. 380).  Specifically, because crime was typified as being 
committed by the black minority, the white majority, viewed the black minority as 
a threat (Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz, 2004).  Chiricos and his colleagues (2004) 
argued that this typification of crime was perhaps a better measure of perceived 
minority crime threat to the power of the white majority than was size of the 
minority population or even the location of the population – size and location of 
the minority population was irrelevant if blacks were not equated with crime in the 
first place.   
The concept of group threat was also examined in a study of racial 
profiling in the Richmond, VA police department (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 
2003).  Petrocelli and his colleagues (2003) examined traffic stops by police 
officers, vehicle searches incident to the traffic stop, and arrests occurring as a 
result of the initial traffic stop.  Additionally, the authors examined the percent of 
African Americans and other non-black minorities in the population, the percent 
62 
 
of families below the poverty level, mean family income, unemployment rate, and 
the Part I crime rate to determine if these variables influenced the number of 
traffic stops, searches, and/or arrests incident to the traffic stop.  Although the 
initial traffic stop was not found to be correlated with the racial make-up of the 
community or the result of the crime rate of the area, both searches and arrests 
were related to the number of blacks in the community (Petrocelli, Piquero, & 
Smith, 2003).  Thus they found support for the conflict view that increased 
numbers of racial minorities resulted in greater police action.     
Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002), examined three types of threat in 
relation to race: political, economic, and black crime.  They defined these types 
of threats as follows: political threat was when the percent of blacks in the 
population grew to a point where the state viewed them as a threat to the 
“political ascendancy” of whites; economic threat was when the percent of blacks 
in the population grew to a point that there was increased competition for finite 
economic resources (including employment); and black crime threat was when 
there was an increase (or a perception of an increase) of Whites being victimized 
by Blacks.  These threats were treated as independent variables to determine if 
they were correlated to the dependent variable of black to white arrest ratios.  
Eitle, et. al. used three different measures, one for each type of threat.  As a 
measure of political threat, the authors used county-level race specific voting 
data for the state of South Carolina (the number of blacks who voted).  To 
measure economic threat, the authors used a black to white unemployment ratio.  
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Lastly, to measure the black crime threat, the authors used South Carolina’s 
National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data to locate black on white 
crimes.   
In utilizing county-level data from the state of South Carolina, Eitle, 
D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002), attempted to discern if any of these three 
types of racial threat were correlated with increased social control over 
minorities.  Although two of the racial threats, political and economic, were not 
supported by the data, there was substantial support for the threat of black crime 
hypothesis.  According to the authors, “as the percent of violent felony offenses 
that involve a black perpetrator and a white victim rises, the likelihood that a 
black individual will be arrested for a felony crime also increases” (Eitle, 
D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002, p. 570).  The authors further contended that 
the same cannot be said for black-on-black crime, which was far more likely to 
occur (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002).  The findings of this study 
indicated strong support that black crime is an indicator of group threat.  That is, 
blacks, as a group, were perceived as a threat by the white majority and were 
therefore arrested more frequently and punished more severely (Eitle, D’Alessio, 
and Stolzenberg, 2002). 
Chamlin and Cochran (2000) examined the race riots in Cincinnati in 1967 
and robbery arrests in the months following the riots by using an interrupted time-
series analysis.  The authors based their study on Cincinnati Police Department 
data for monthly robbery arrests from 1961 through 1973.  They also included 
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data for other violent offenses (homicide, rape, and assault), although their 
primary focus was on robbery.  They focused specifically on robbery arrests 
because, given arrest data for all violent offenses, robbery “stands out as the 
offense most likely to involve Black offenders and White victims” (p. 90).  
Because of this, Chamblin and Cochran viewed robbery to be most indicative of 
racial threat against whites.  Although the aforementioned studies provided some 
support for the group threat hypothesis, Chamlin and Cochran’s study (2000) 
failed to support the hypothesis.  According to Chamlin and Cochran (2000), the 
race riots had no impact on the number of arrests for robbery, a crime they 
argued was “particularly threatening to the white majority” (p. 96).  However, 
even with this negative finding, Chamlin and Cochran (2000) argued that their 
findings must be examined with caution.  By examining only one crime (robbery) 
in one city (Cincinnati), they noted that they could not outright reject the group 
threat hypothesis (Chamlin and Cochran, 2000). 
 Ruddell and Urbina (2004) offered another test of the minority group threat 
hypothesis in their cross-national examination of population heterogeneity and 
punishment practices, which included the abolition of the death penalty.  Using 
regression analysis on data from 140 nations, the authors attempted to ascertain 
whether increased population diversity, economic stress, violent crime, and 
political stability influenced the punishment practices of that nation.  According to 
Ruddell and Urbina (2004), the group threat hypothesis suggests that 
punishment (including the use of the death penalty) was one way for the powerful 
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in society to control minority populations.  In this study, the concept of a minority 
group was extended beyond a black/white racial dichotomy.  Instead, a minority 
group was seen as any group that had a different ethnicity, culture, language, 
and/or religion than the majority.  Ruddell and Urbina (2004) argued that growing 
diversity in societies across the world resulted in increased conflict between 
groups as measured by increased rates of social problems, such as crime, which 
the majority population attempted to control.  Through their examination of the 
population diversity, based on national population data, and punishment 
practices, such as use of the death penalty, the authors found support for the 
group threat hypothesis.  The findings indicated that countries that are more 
diverse in population are also more punitive.  Ruddell and Urbina (2004) argued 
that crime and social problems were caused by population diversity, because 
population diversity causes crime and other social problems that must be dealt 
with by the state and the ruling class, increased population diversity could be 
perceived as a threat to the power of the ruling class in that, increased problems 
call for increased response from the ruling class.  The findings indicated that, 
when minority populations grew, the punitive actions of the government also 
increased, thus supporting the group threat hypothesis.  
 Cureton’s (2001) study provided an additional test of the group threat 
hypothesis as it related to minority population size.  Utilizing the 1990 U.S. 
Census and the Uniform Crime Reports for 435 U.S. cities with populations over 
25,000, Cureton (2001) contended that whites’ perception of threat is based 
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more upon the percentage of blacks in the population than the crime rate of 
blacks.  He used regression analysis to determine if various demographic 
variables (race, income, etc.) determined black and white arrest ratios.  Although 
the results of his study were mixed, there was support for the group threat 
hypothesis.  For example, Cureton (2001) found that black arrest ratios were 
higher than white arrest ratios for serious criminal offenses (crimes such as 
murder and robbery).  Cureton (2001) argued that, when one considers that 
arrest ratios and criminal conduct were independent of each other, as these data 
suggested, it seamed that “elites were able to persuade legal agents to exercise 
discretionary justice to constrain and repress minority populations” (p. 164).  
Despite the fact that crime was often an intra-class and intra-race phenomenon 
and that minorities were more likely than members of the ruling class to be 
victims of violent crimes, like murder and robbery, it was the perception that the 
ruling class may be in danger that drove the ruling class’s desire to impose harsh 
sanctions on minorities.  Additionally, Cureton (2001) hypothesized that, based 
upon the size of the minority population, the majority may offer some form of 
leniency towards the minority, if, in fact the size of the minority population was 
considered large.  This hypothesis was based on the idea that, “Blacks 
committed these crimes (violent crimes) so often that White governing elites 
chose to sanction only those serious cases that specifically threatened them” 
(Cureton, p. 164). This leniency was supported by the data presented in the 
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study, in that arrest differentials of blacks were related, not to the actual crime 
rate, but rather to the actual percent of blacks in the population.  
 Most research on the group threat hypothesis and police resources has 
found that the percentage of the minority group in the general population drives 
the allocation of resources for police agencies.  Using a panel design, Kane 
(2003) studied changes in New York police precincts across time.  The 
independent variables for this community-level study included police force size, 
police expenditures, and black and Hispanic population sizes within 74 precincts 
in New York City in 1975, 1982, and 1992.  Each of these variables was tested 
using correlation analysis to determine if they were connected to the deployment 
practices within each precinct.  The findings suggested that it was the change in 
Hispanic population that precipitated changes in police deployment (Kane, 2003).  
That is, as the Hispanic population increased, so too did police deployment.  No 
relationship was found between the black population and police deployment 
(Kane, 2003).  The lack of a significant finding for black population and police 
deployment, according to Kane (2003), was not surprising and was consistent 
with the group threat hypothesis.  Kane (2003) argued that, over the time period 
(1975 to 1992), the black population became highly concentrated in a few 
precincts while the Hispanic population increased across the city.  Therefore, 
“from a minority group-threat perspective, it may be that, while the black 
population of New York was perceived as ‘under control’ during the period 
studied, the Latino population may have been perceived as threatening because 
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of their significant increased representation across precincts” (Kane, 2003, pp. 
290-291).   
 In another study of the relationship between minority threat and police 
force size, Kent and Jacobs (2005) found that “population matters” when it 
comes to police deployment (p. 751).  Like the aforementioned study, Kent and 
Jacobs also used a panel design.  They examine U.S. cities with populations 
greater than 100,000 in three census years (1980, 1990, and 2000).   
Independent variables such as African-American and Hispanic population size, 
residential segregation, crime rates, and social disorganization variables were 
tested against police force size using correlation analysis.  After examining 
changes in police force size in these U.S. cities from 1980 to 2000, Kent and 
Jacobs (2005) found that the size of the minority population (either black or 
Hispanic) was positively related to the size of the city’s police force.  Additionally, 
like the Kane study mentioned above, they found a negative relationship between 
police deployment and increased size of the minority population when that 
population was highly segregated (Kent and Jacobs, 2005).  This negative 
relationship was found to be even stronger in the South, which, Kent and Jacobs 
argued, may be because “the police in the South are more likely to assume that 
black citizens want less law enforcement” (2005, p. 753).  Although the findings 
appear to indicate that police practices were consistent with the wishes of 
minority groups, this practice was not necessarily based on the wishes of 
minority communities.  Instead, the smaller law enforcement agency size was 
69 
 
based on the fact that the communities in question were highly segregated.  
Because of this high segregation, these minority communities were not perceived 
to be as threatening to the majority class as a community that was less 
segregated.  If their explanation was correct, highly segregated Southern cities 
would have smaller police departments, relative to similar size cities in other 
parts of the country.  According to their results, such was indeed the case (Kent 
and Jacobs, 2005). 
Along similar lines of minority population size driving police resources, 
Katz, Maguire, & Roncek (2002) utilized the group threat hypothesis to explain 
increases in the creation and use of police gang units.  They used data from 285 
U.S. police agencies with 100 or more sworn police officers to determine what 
compeled the creation and use of police gang units.  The authors examined 
arrest rates for those ages 12-24, percent of African Americans in the population, 
percent of Hispanics in the population, and income inequality, as possible causes 
for the creation of a police gang unit within each of the 285 cities.  Much like 
other studies discussed herein, there was support for the group threat hypothesis 
explanation for the creation of gang units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002).  
Although the number of blacks in a community appeared to be unrelated to the 
creation of specialized gang units, the number of Hispanics did have a significant 
influence on the creation of the units (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002).    In this 
case, Hispanics, not blacks, represented the minority group that caused the 
creation of gang units.  The increase in arrest rates of minority youths posed a 
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threat to the power of the ruling class in that, increased arrest were seen as 
indicative of an increased problem among a minority class.  The finding that 
increased arrest of Hispanic youth, as opposed to African American youth, led to 
the creation of specialized gang units, may be due in part to the stability of the 
size of the black population and the increased Hispanic population over the same 
time period (Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002).  The findings were supportive of 
the group threat hypothesis.  The relative size of a minority group caused 
increased use of power by the majority. 
The last of the four themes of research on the group threat hypothesis, 
studies of police brutality also indicated support for the group threat hypothesis.  
Although police brutality may not seem relevant here, Petrocelli, Piquero and 
Smith (2003) argued that police brutality was relevant to the group threat 
hypothesis because, “if law can be seen as the nails that hold society together, 
then police can certainly be viewed as the hammer of the state” (p. 2).  In one 
such study on police brutality, Holmes (2000) examined minority threat as it 
related to police brutality as measured by civil rights complaints over a period of 
five years (1985-1990).  This national study used data from the Department of 
Justice Police Brutality study, Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Census figures, and 
the number of civil rights complaints.  Using regression analysis, Holmes found 
the measures (percent black population, percent Hispanic population, and 
income inequality) used for “threatening people” were all positively related to the 
use of force by police.  However, crime rates, as measured by the UCR, were 
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unrelated to the use of force by police (Holmes, 2000).  These findings, 
according to Holmes (2000), provided support for the group threat hypothesis, in 
that the size of the minority population, rather than general crime rates, affected 
police use of force.   
In another examination of group threat and police brutality, Smith and 
Holmes (2003) studied 114 cities with populations of over 150,000 to determine if 
the number of civil rights complaints involving police brutality were correlated with 
minority population size, minority representation within the police departments, 
index crime rates, and the income inequality of the city.  Smith and Holmes 
(2003) found that the relative size of the black and Hispanic minority population 
“amplifies the police’s perception of minority threat and increases the use of 
coercive controls such as excessive force” (p. 1055).  The use of excessive force 
was found to be independent of overall crime rates.  The use of force by police 
was tied to the actual percentage of blacks and Hispanics in the population.  This 
finding supported the group threat hypothesis, in that the higher the minority 
population, the more force used to control that population. 
Most of the aforementioned studies provided support for the group threat 
hypothesis.  Although none of the studies directly argued that the ruling class 
willed the social control of threats, each of them implied such control.  That is, the 
dominant class utilized law and those who enforced the law as instruments of 
social control (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003).  The research findings 
presented above suggest the usefulness of the group threat hypothesis in 
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explaining criminal justice and dominant images of crime.  For example, the 
group threat hypothesis explained how crime is seen as a “black phenomenon” 
(Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004, p. 380); how the size of police departments and 
the allocation of resources to police departments were positively correlated to the 
size of the minority population (Kane, 2003; Katz, Maguire, & Roncek, 2002; Kent 
& Jacobs, 2005; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003); and how racial profiling and 
police brutality were instruments of aggression to control a perceived threat 
(Holmes, 2000; Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; Smith & Holmes, 2003).  Each 
of these studies provided support for Blalock’s initial threat hypothesis.  More 
specifically, these studies supported Blalock’s assertion that a perceived threat to 
the majority class would be met by aggression from the majority.  
Blalock’s original hypothesis assumed that an increase in minority 
population lead to economic and/or political threat and ultimately these threats 
lead to prejudice and discrimination.  Although only three of the studies cited 
above are specifically related to economic and political threats (Chamlin and 
Cochran, 2000; Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002; Petrocelli, Piquero, & 
Smith, 2003) the other studies presented do explain minority threat to the ruling 
class albeit from divergent angles (crime typification, the increase in crime and 






Group Threat and Felony Disenfranchisement  
Based upon the studies reviewed above, the group threat hypothesis has 
been useful in explaining law and the enforcement of law as a method of control.  
As such, the group threat hypothesis may be useful in explaining the nature of 
disenfranchisement legislation, or legislation designed to remove the voting rights 
of those convicted felons, because these laws can exert a measure of control 
over a population (criminal offenders) that are deemed a threat to the social 
order.  Although the group threat hypothesis suggests that criminal law, as 
implemented, constrains those who may threaten the power base through arrest 
and confinement, disenfranchisement legislation appears to go a step further to 
act as a method of control after arrest and confinement.  Although the group 
threat hypothesis may prove useful in explaining disenfranchisement, to date, 
only one study (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003) has applied the group threat 
hypothesis to the examination of the practice of disenfranchising criminal 
offenders. 
Behrens, Uggen and Manza (2003) did apply the group threat hypothesis 
to felony disenfranchisement arguing that disenfranchisement legislation was the 
result of a perceived threat to the powerful, the threat of the “menace of Negro 
domination” (p. 559).  Throughout the long history of slavery and racism, the 
“menace of Negro domination” became a perceived threat to the existing social 
and political order.  Over time, racial minorities have gained some economic and 
political power (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990), as seen in the increased number of 
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elected African American officials at all levels of government in the last century 
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  Reality was, 
however, less relevant to the concept of the “Negro menace,” than was the 
perception of the dominant class about the increased power of minority groups 
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003, Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992; 
Quillian, 1996). The perception that African Americans have increased power led 
to efforts to control members of this group to limit their power (Behrens, Uggen, 
and Manza, 2003).   
The control utilized by disenfranchisement legislation was viewed as more 
costly to the powerless, as a group, than other forms of punishment such as 
incarceration, because it prevented this group from voting and therefore inhibiting 
its ability to affect or change the society at the most fundamental level (Behrens, 
Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Mauer, 2002; Pettus, 2002).  
For minority communities, which already suffer limited political power, any 
additional dilution of that power may result in a community that is unable to effect 
substantive political change (Pettus, 2002).  As Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 
(2003) stated, this voter dilution caused by felony disenfranchisement was what 
control of the “menace of Negro domination” was referring to.  That is, because 
of the disproportionate racial make-up of American prisons, the effect of felony 
disenfranchisement has had a profound effect on the voting rights of racial 
minorities, thereby limiting the ability of minorities and enhancing the control that 
could be exercised against them.  Essentially, if those in power could control 
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those that may threaten that power, and could do so with the support of the 
general electorate, then power can be maintained and control of the threatening 
classes could be achieved with little effort. 
In summary, the concept of power based on the conflict perspective and 
the group threat hypothesis may be useful for understanding felony 
disenfranchisement policies in the United States.  While criminal laws are used to 
punish undesirable behavior committed by the lower class and racial minorities; 
disenfranchisement legislation appears to extend the power of the law beyond 
criminalization to perpetuate the subordinate status of minority groups.  In the 
following chapter, methods of how the group threat hypothesis can be tested by 
disenfranchisement legislation will be presented.  Specifically, the study seeks to 
test the following research hypotheses:   
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the 
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;  
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the 
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and  
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more 




Chapter 4: Research Methods 
The purpose of this research is to examine the nature and practices of 
felony disenfranchisement.  A qualitative analysis of each of the state laws is 
conducted to understand the nature of disenfranchisement and voting restoration 
laws across the United States.  Additionally, as this project is designed to test the 
group threat hypothesis data related to felony disenfranchisement legislation is 
utilized for that purpose.  This chapter begins with the research hypotheses 
followed by a description of methods used to test the research hypotheses. 
Research Hypotheses  
 It has been argued in Chapter 3 that the group threat hypothesis could be 
useful for understanding the nature and the practice of disenfranchising felony 
offenders.  Essentially, the group threat hypothesis argues that the larger a 
minority group, the more the majority group feels its power is threatened (Blalock, 
1967).  This perceived threat leads the majority attempting to exercise power and 
control over the minority group through the creation of legislation designed to 
limit the power of the minority group (Blalock, 1967).  Although there are many 
groups in the United States who have been classified as a minority, the main 
focus for this project is on African Americans as the minority group threatening to 
the white majority.  As discussed in previous chapters the history of African 
Americans in this country is one overt discrimination in the form of slavery and 
Jim Crow laws to more covert discriminatory practices, such as the institutional 
discrimination present in many social and economic systems, as well as in the 
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criminal justice system.  There are many examples of institutional discrimination 
in the criminal justice system, from the granting of bail to sentencing practices; 
the result of these practices has influenced the racial make-up of those arrested, 
convicted, and incarcerated.  An additional form of institutional discrimination is 
the creation of legal codes that are discriminatory in result while being legitimate 
in intent.  Along with arrest and incarceration, legal codes are methods of control 
used by the powerful in society to control those that may be seen as threatening.  
Among the legal codes created to reduce the power of a group perceived to be 
threatening are those that disenfranchise its members and not allow them to 
participate in the political process (Beren, Uggen, and Manza, 2003).   
Because Blalock’s group threat hypothesis argues that the relative size of 
a minority group is a primary determining factor in the perception of threat, this 
study examines variables related to the size of the African American population 
in a state and its connection to the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law.  
One of the main questions related to the idea of threat and the size of the 
threatening population is how that threat is measured.  Certainly, the relative size 
of the African American population in a state can be used as a measure of threat, 
but other population measures, such as African American arrest and 
incarceration rates may prove useful as well.  Although African American arrest 
and incarceration rates may not precisely fit with Blalock’s assessment of the 
size of the minority population, the increase in arrests and incarceration of 
African Americans may reflect, or may be a result of, the effort to control a 
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perceived threatening group.  The use of the police as a means to control certain 
undesirable populations of society, such as racial and ethnic minorities, through 
arrest is nothing new (Jackson, 1992).  In fact, Jackson (1992) argued, the “role 
of police officers in U.S. cities in recent decades have varied directly with the 
degree of ethnic antagonism” (p. 94).  If this argument holds, arrests or more 
specifically arrest rates of African Americans can be seen as a measure of racial 
threat – a threat that is controlled by law enforcement.  Similarly, incarceration 
rates of African Americans may also be seen as a way the criminal justice 
system handles the perception that African Americans are a threat to the white 
majority.  In Inverarity’s study of imprisonment as a measure of social control, he 
argued that “size, increase, or concentration of the underclass increases the level 
of social control independently of the crime rate” (1992, p. 126).  This being the 
case, rather than focusing solely on the size of the minority population, we can 
instead look at the size of the incarcerated population as a measure of societal 
social control over a perceived threat.  Based on the argument that arrest and 
incarceration rates of minorities may be indicative of increased social control of 
minorities, data on African American arrest and incarceration rates are included 
as a measure of group threat.   
Although disenfranchisement legislation typically relies upon felony 
convictions, the use of African American arrest and incarceration data was used 
as a measure of racial threat for this study.  That is, based upon Blalock’s (1967) 
concept of racial threat being related to the relative size of the African American 
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population, this study measures racial threat, in part, as the number of minorities 
arrested and incarcerated.  The argument is that as the number of minorities in a 
state increases, the perception among the dominant class is that of an increase 
of power of the minority class.  To diminish this perceived increase in power, the 
ruling class creates legislation aimed at controlling the minority class; this 
legislation is then enforced by the criminal justice system that acts as the control 
apparatus of the ruling class.  The criminal justice system is then utilized to 
control the minority class by enforcing the laws through arrest and then through 
incarceration of more and more members of the minority class.  Ultimately then, 
the criminal justice system generally, and felony disenfranchisement legislation 
specifically, act as control mechanisms over those considered a threat to the 
powerful class in terms of competition or simply number.  Therefore, the use of 
African American arrest and incarceration statistics is also important as a 
measure of power over this minority group.  The combination of African American 
arrest rates, African American incarceration rates, the strictness of the 
disenfranchisement code, and the difficulty level of the voting restoration process 
for each state provides measures of the exercise of power.  That is, African 
American arrests and incarceration rates measure threats and the strictness of 
disenfranchisement and voting restoration laws measure efforts to deal with 
these threats.  These measures, along with the African American population of 
the states being studied, provided an approach to testing the racial threat 
hypothesis.  Thus, the present study hypothesizes that: (1) the greater the 
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proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the more restrictive the state’s 
disenfranchisement laws; (2) the more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement 
laws, the higher the state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration; and 
(3) the higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration, the 
more difficult the voting restoration procedures.   
Conceptualization and Measurement  
The present study defines concepts in the study hypotheses as follows:  
1. Felony Disenfranchisement – For the present study, felony 
disenfranchisement is an all-encompassing term for the various legal 
codes that remove the voting rights of persons convicted of felony 
offenses. States vary in the legal definition of what makes a felony 
offender and what causes disenfranchisement. The present study 
conceptualizes the strictness of disenfranchisement legislation in terms of 
the point at which an individual becomes disenfranchised, the length of 
disenfranchisement, the association of the length of disenfranchisement 
with different types of criminal offenses, and the nature of the crimes 
leading to disenfranchisement.  A qualitative analysis of felony 
disenfranchisement laws in 49 states was performed to determine if the 
laws themselves were consistent or inconsistent with the theoretical 
framework that treats disenfranchisement as a tool for controlling a 
perceived dangerous class.  Further, the results of the qualitative analysis 
were quantified to create a scale of disenfranchisement used to measure 
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levels of strictness.  Eleven points from the laws were identified for 
quantification purposes: disenfranchisement for some misdemeanors, 
during pretrial detention, upon conviction, during probation and/or a 
suspended sentence, during incarceration, during parole, during an 
additional post-incarceration time period, and disenfranchisement on a 
permanent basis after the first offense, after the second offense, for 
certain crimes, and based on the time the crime occurred.  The process of 
this qualitative analysis is explained in the Analytical Procedures section 
of this chapter. 
2. Voting Rights Restoration – For this study, voting rights restoration is an 
all-encompassing term for the various legal codes that restore the voting 
rights of persons convicted of felony offenses.  All states vary in the 
process used to restore the voting rights of those who have been 
convicted of a felony offense.  The present study focuses on the 
procedures and the requirements of the various state codes related to 
voting rights restoration.  A qualitative analysis of the voting restoration 
procedures in 49 states was performed to determine whether or not the 
procedures were consistent with the theoretical framework established for 
this study.  Additionally, the results of a qualitative analysis of the 
restoration of voting rights procedures in 49 states were quantified to 
create a scale used to measure levels of difficulty in voting restoration.   
Eight points from the restoration requirements were identified for 
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quantification purposes: whether or not disenfranchisement was 
permanent, restoration after the payment of all fines, restoration after an 
investigation or review of records, after filing a petition with the court, an 
appeal to a board or Governor, providing a DNA sample, having no 
pending charges, waiting an additional waiting period or some other 
requirement.  The process of this qualitative analysis is explained in the 
Analytical Procedures section of this chapter. 
3. African American Arrest Rate – For the present study African American 
arrest rate is defined as the number of African Americans arrested per 
100,000 persons.  Information on the numbers of arrests for each state 
was obtained for the year 2004 by contacting the Criminal Justice 
Information Services (CJIS) Division of the FBI.  African American arrest 
rates were computed using arrest statistics for Part I offenses and 
statistics on the total African American population for each state.  Part I 
offenses were used in this research as they are serious felony offenses 
(murder, robbery, etcetera) and all states who disenfranchise do so for 
felony offenses.   
4. African American Incarceration Rate – African American incarceration rate 
is defined as the number of African Americans incarcerated in a state and 
federal prisons per 100,000 persons.  African American incarceration rates 
were computed using incarceration statistics obtained through the Bureau 
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of Justice Statistics and statistics on the total African American population 
for each state.    
5. African American Population – For this research project African American 
population is defined as the percentage of African Americans in the 
population for each state.   
Sample and Data  
All states except Maine and Vermont have some sort of felony 
disenfranchisement legislation currently in place that acts to control the voting 
ability of felons.  For the purposes of this research, the District of Columbia is 
treated as a state.  Therefore, the sample for this study consists of the 49 states 
that have felony disenfranchisement laws currently in place and, for comparison 
purposes, the two remaining states that do not have disenfranchisement 
legislation.   
Data for the study were drawn from several sources.  First, the 
disenfranchisement legislation of the 49 state statutes in the United States was 
obtained online through Lexis-Nexis (http://www.lexis.com).  Lexis-Nexis is a 
computerized data source of all state and federal legislation, state constitutions, 
executive orders, and court cases at both the federal and state levels.  In 
February 2006, the researcher accessed the Lexis-Nexis database of state and 
federal legislation and conducted a state-by-state search for state laws or state 
constitutions concerning felony disenfranchisement, using the following 
keywords:  voting, disenfranchisement, felon voting, elections, election law, voter 
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registration, and vote restoration.  The search resulted in three executive orders, 
102 state laws, and 31 state constitutions.  Each gubernatorial executive order, 
state law and/or state constitution regarding the disenfranchisement of offenders 
and the process needed to restore voting rights were added to an electronic file 
created in Adobe Acrobat.  A complete list of the state codes and/or constitutions 
is included in Appendix 1.   
Second, information on African American arrests for felony offenses was 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice.  In June 2006, the researcher 
attempted to obtain arrest data broken down by state and by race for the year 
2004 by utilizing the Sourcebook of Justice Statistics from the U.S. Department 
of Justice website.  Data from 2004 were utilized as it was the last year that 
complete records were available.  Unfortunately, arrest statistics broken down by 
race and by state were not available from the U.S. Department of Justice 
website.  Because of this, the researcher contacted the Criminal Justice 
Information Services (CJIS) Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
by phone to obtain the necessary data.  In June of 2006, the researcher called 
the CJIS Division and requested arrest data by state and race be sent to the 
researcher’s office.  These data were received in paper format in the mail 
approximately one month later as aggregate numbers of persons arrested by 
state by racial category.  As the data available was presented in aggregate form, 
the researcher computed arrest rates for African Americans for each state using 
the total number of arrests by racial category for Part I offenses in each state and 
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the population totals of African Americans for the state.  Further, arrest data for 
the state of Florida were not available from the Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division and were therefore obtained from the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement’s official website.  The arrest rate for Florida 
was computed using the same method described above.     
Third, African American incarceration rates for felony offenses were 
requested by phone as an additional measure of group threat.  Much like the 
problem with racial breakdown of arrest rates discussed above, African American 
incarceration rates broken down by state were also unavailable from the 
Sourcebook and were therefore attained by phone from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics.  The researcher contacted one of the authors of the Prisoners 2004 
report and requested the racial breakdown of prisoners by state.  The requested 
data was sent to the researcher via email.  The lone exception to the available 
data was for the District of Columbia.  According to the Sourcebook (2004), the 
jurisdiction over sentenced felons was transferred away from the District of 
Columbia as of December 2001.  As such, the District of Columbia no longer 
operates a prison system and therefore does not have an incarceration rate.  
Due to this, incarceration rate for the District of Columbia was listed as missing 
data in the data file.   
Finally, population data for each state were obtained from the 2000 
Census.  The U.S. Census Bureau data were gathered from the Bureau’s 
American FactFinder website (http://factfinder.census.gov) on June 17, 2006.  
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Utilizing the American FactFinder search mechanism, the researcher requested 
the total population data for each state and the total African American population 
for each state.  For each state, the numbers of total population, white population 
and African American population were used to compute the percentage of 
minorities.  The information used to calculate African American arrest rates and 
incarceration rates are presented in Appendix 3. 
Analytical Procedures 
This study used both qualitative and quantitative analyses.  For qualitative 
analysis, the disenfranchisement laws of the 49 states were examined to identify 
those characteristics that lead to disenfranchisement, as well as the various 
procedures for voting rights restoration.  Most important to the qualitative 
analysis however, each state law was analyzed to determine whether or not the 
law itself was consistent with the group threat theoretical framework.  Each of the 
state laws was examined to determine if there was evidence that would indicate if 
the disenfranchisement law or the voting restoration process were used as 
method of social control over African American populations perceived as 
threatening.  The nature of disenfranchisement law and the voting restoration 
process was explored by examining the laws purpose and/or the meanings of the 
stipulations of the law.  A qualitative analysis of disenfranchisement and voting 
restoration laws and procedures provides a deeper understanding of the nature 
of these laws, particularly in relation to African Americans.   
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Although qualitative analysis was a main focus of this research, an 
additional aspect is to test the research hypotheses, using quantitative methods. 
Qualitative data regarding the strictness of disenfranchisement and voting 
restoration laws were quantified to produce data for quantitative analysis.  Each 
state’s disenfranchisement law(s) were examined to determine the point at which 
disenfranchisement becomes effective in that state (e.g. during pretrial detention, 
upon conviction, or upon incarceration), the level of offense required to 
disenfranchise (e.g. misdemeanor or felony), the length of time of the 
disenfranchisement (e.g. during incarceration, parole, probation and/or a 
suspended sentence, or any additional post-release time after parole), and the 
permanence of the disenfranchisement (e.g. permanent for 1st offense, for 2nd 
offense, or permanent for certain crimes).  To quantitatively determine the 
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, one point was given for each 
indication of strictness found in the state’s laws.  These indications of strictness 
were counted and a score was attained that was used as a measure of strictness 
of that state’s law.  Additionally, to determine the difficulty of the restoration 
process, the laws for each state were examined to determine what was required 
of the offender to restore voting rights.  That is, restoration processes were 
examined to determine if the restoration was automatic or if some additional 
requirement was mandated (e.g. the payment of all fines, an investigation or 
review, a petition or an appeal to a court or board, or additional requirement).  To 
quantitatively determine the difficulty of a state’s restoration process, one point 
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was given for each indication of voting restoration difficulty.  The indications of 
restoration difficulty were counted and a score was attained that was used as a 
measure of difficulty of that state’s restoration process.  Two charts were created 
that illustrate the point totals for strictness level and restoration difficulty; both 
charts are presented in the next chapter.  A working data file for quantitative 
analysis was created in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
and included the following variables: disenfranchisement strictness, voting 
restoration difficulty, African American arrest rates, African American 
incarceration rates, and proportion of the African American population.  The 
results of all data analysis are reported in Chapter 5.   
The study uses both univariate and bivariate analysis.  First, univariate 
analysis was utilized to produce descriptive statistics of the sample.  Second, 
bivariate analysis was utilized to test the research hypotheses. Specifically, 
bivariate analysis was used to determine the relationship between the 
percentage of minorities in the population (and arrest and incarceration rates) 
and the strictness of the disenfranchisement laws on the one hand and the 
difficulty of the voting restoration process on the other.  Details of the statistical 
procedures and the statistical tests of the three hypotheses are provided under 
each hypothesis stated below. 
Due to the sample size, the study uses non-parametric statistics and exact 
methods.  Standard methods (Asymptotic methods) compute significance tests 
under the assumption that the sample size is large and that the sample is drawn 
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from a normally distributed population.  Unfortunately, the study sample includes 
only 51 cases (including the District of Columbia), and the sample size even 
reduces further for several statistical tests, the assumptions for the asymptotic 
methods cannot be met.  Two statistical procedures, the exact method or the 
Monte Carlo method, do not require the assumption of normal distribution and 
can provide more reliable results for the tests using small sample sizes.  The 
exact method computes the significance test based on the exact distribution of 
data as opposed to a normal distribution and is therefore not reliant upon the 
assumptions required of the asymptotic methods.  Similarly, Monte Carlo 
methods do not need a normal distribution, nor is sample size relevant.  The 
difference between the exact and Monte Carlo methods is that while exact 
methods always provide accurate the results of significance test, Monte Carlo 
methods produce an estimation of the exact p value based upon random subsets 
of the data.  This difference is important because, while exact methods are 
preferable, they are not always possible due to either a sample size that is too 
large or due to time and computer memory limitations.  Monte Carlo methods are 
utilized primarily when the exact p values cannot be attained due to the size of 
the data set or the amount of memory in the computer used to perform such 
tests.  As such, the exact and Monte Carlo methods were used to provide the 
most accurate results possible.   




Hypothesis 1  The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, 
the more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws.  The 
hypothesis assumes that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of strictness of disenfranchisement legislation 
and the size of state African American.  That is, states with 
strict disenfranchisement laws have higher African American 
populations than states with less restrictive laws.  Bivariate 
analysis was used to determine the relationship between the 
size of the African American population and the strictness of 
disenfranchisement laws.  African American population was 
defined as the percentage of African Americans in each state.  
The percentage of African Americans in a state was treated as 
the independent variable and the strictness level of the laws 
were treated as the dependent variable.  To determine the 
relationship between the size of African American population 
and the strictness of disenfranchisement laws, two bivariate 
analyses were performed: 1) the relationship between African 
American population size and the existence of 
disenfranchisement laws which is used as a measure of 
strictness of legal sanctions against African Americans, and 2) 
the relationship between African American population size and 
the strictness of disenfranchisement.   
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1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the African 
American population sizes in states with 
disenfranchisement laws and those in states without such 
laws.  Prior to conducting any analysis, the strictness 
level of the laws was recoded into two variables: 
strictness2 (states with a disenfranchisement law and 
states without a disenfranchisement law) and strictness3 
(low, average, or high strictness).  After recoding the 
variables, the Mann-Whitney U test statistic was used to 
determine whether or not there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the percentage of 
minorities in a state and whether or not that state had a 
disenfranchisement law.  For this test, the variable 
PercentBlack is an interval level variable which indicates 
the percentage of blacks in each state and is treated as 
the independent variable.  The dependent variable for 
this test is the recoded variable, strictness2, a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a state 
has a disenfranchisement law.  A significant Mann 
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these 
variables are indeed related.  It is expected that states 
with a larger percentage of African Americans in the 
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population will have disenfranchisement laws while states 
with smaller African American populations will not.  A 
comparison of means will confirm the directionality of any 
significant effect. 
2) The second analysis involves the analysis of the 
relationship between the sizes of African American 
population and levels of disenfranchisement strictness.  It 
is hypothesized that states with greater African American 
population have stricter disenfranchisement laws.  To 
conduct this analysis, the variable determining the 
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law was 
recoded into a trichotomous variable strictness3 which 
indicates whether the state law was of low strictness, 
average strictness, or high strictness.  Using the recoded 
variable, the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test whether 
there is a statistical relationship between the percentage 
of African Americans in a state and the strictness level of 
the state’s disenfranchisement law.  The Kruskal-Wallis 
H, like the Mann Whitney U, is a non-parametric 
statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if 
there is a difference between variables.  In this case, the 
Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine if the size of the 
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African American population in a state affected the 
strictness of the state’s disenfranchisement law.  For this 
test, the variable PercentBlack is an interval level 
variable which indicates the percentage of blacks in each 
state and is treated as the independent variable.  The 
dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable, 
strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether a 
state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, 
average strictness, or of high strictness.  A significant 
Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that the 
strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with 
the size of that state’s African American population.  A 
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that 
differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus 
indicate support for the hypothesis presented.  A 
comparison of means will confirm the directionality of any 
significant effect.   
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing 
the Exact method to determine the relationship between the 
level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state 
and the percentage of minorities in the population of the 
state.  The exact method was used first, and if the exact test 
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could not be performed due to either the size of the sample 
or the amount of memory in the computer then the Monte 
Carlo method was used.   
Hypothesis 2  The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the 
higher the state’s rate of African American arrest and 
incarceration.  This hypothesis assumes that there is a positive 
relationship between the level of strictness of 
disenfranchisement legislations and state African American 
incarceration and arrest rates.  That is, it is hypothesized that 
states that have stricter disenfranchisement laws also have 
higher rates of African American arrest and African American 
incarceration than states with less strict disenfranchisement 
laws.  Bivariate analysis was used to determine the relationship 
between the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law and 
the rates of African American arrest and incarceration.  For this 
hypothesis, the recoded ordinal-level variable, strictness3 (low, 
average, and high strictness) was treated as the independent 
variable and the African American arrest and African American 
incarceration rates were treated as dependent variables. To 
determine the relationship between the strictness of 
disenfranchisement laws and the African American rates for 
arrest and incarceration, two bivariate analyses were 
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performed: 1) the relationship between the strictness of the 
disenfranchisement law and the rate of African American 
arrests for that state, and 2) the relationship between the 
strictness of the disenfranchisement law and the rate of African 
American incarceration for that state.   
1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the different 
levels of disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law 
with the African American arrest rate.  Using the recoded 
variable discussed in the first hypothesis, strictness3 
(low, average, high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis H, was 
used to test whether there is a statistical relationship 
between the strictness level of the state’s 
disenfranchisement law and the African American arrest 
rate.  The Kruskal-Wallis H is a non-parametric statistical 
test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if there is a 
difference between variables.  For this analysis, the 
Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine if the arrest rate 
of African Americans in a state affected the strictness of 
the state’s disenfranchisement law.  For this test, the 
variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating 
whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low 
strictness, average strictness, or of high strictness is 
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treated as the independent variable.  The dependent 
variable for this test is BArrestBl, an interval-level 
variable indicating the African American arrest rate for 
each state.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would 
indicate that the strictness of a state’s 
disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that state’s 
African American arrest rate.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis 
H statistic would indicate that differences in means are 
not due to sampling error, thus indicate support for the 
hypothesis presented.  A comparison of means will 
confirm the directionality of any significant effect.   
2) The second analysis involves the comparison of the 
different levels of disenfranchisement strictness of a 
state’s law with the African American incarceration rate.  
Using the recoded variable, strictness3 (low, average, 
high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test 
whether there is a statistical relationship between the 
strictness level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and 
the African American incarceration rate.  The Kruskal-
Wallis H is a non-parametric statistical test which utilizes 
mean ranks to determine if there is a difference between 
variables.  For this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis H was 
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used to determine if the incarceration rate of African 
Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s 
disenfranchisement law.  For this test, the variable 
strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether a 
state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, 
average strictness, or of high strictness is treated as the 
independent variable.  The dependent variable for this 
test is BIncarB, an interval-level variable indicating the 
African American incarceration rate for each state.  A 
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that 
the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies 
with the size of that state’s African American 
incarceration rate.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic 
would indicate that differences in means are not due to 
sampling error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis 
presented.  A comparison of means will confirm the 
directionality of any significant effect.   
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing the 
Exact method to determine the relationship between the level of 
strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and the 
arrest and incarceration rates of minorities of the state.  The 
exact method was used first, and if the exact test could not be 
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performed due to either the size of the sample or the amount of 
memory in the computer then the Monte Carlo method was 
used.   
Hypothesis 3  The higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and 
incarceration, the more difficult the voting restoration 
procedures.  The hypothesis assumes that there is a positive 
relationship between the difficulty in state voting restoration 
procedures and the size of state African American populations, 
state African American arrest rates and state African American 
incarceration rates.  That is, states with more difficult voting 
restoration procedures have higher African American 
populations, and higher African American arrest and African 
American incarceration rates than states with more lenient 
voting restoration procedures.  Bivariate analysis was used to 
determine the relationship between the size of state African 
American populations, the state African American arrest rate 
and the state African American incarceration rate and the 
difficulty of the state’s voting restoration process.  For this 
hypothesis, the percentage of minorities in a state, the African 
American arrest rate of a state, and the African American 
incarceration rate of a state were treated as independent 
variables and the difficulty level of the restoration process was 
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treated as the dependent variable.  To determine the 
relationship between the size of African American population 
and the difficulty of the restoration process, two bivariate 
analyses were performed: 1) the relationship between African 
American population size and whether or not restoration was 
automatic or required a petition, and 2) the relationship 
between African American population size and the difficulty of 
the restoration process. 
1) The first analysis involves the comparison of the African 
American population sizes of states (population, arrest 
rate, and incarceration rate) with states with automatic 
restoration and states requiring some form of petition for 
restoration.  Prior to conducting any analysis, the 
difficulty level of the voting restoration process was 
recoded into two variables: restoration2 (states with 
automatic restoration and states requiring some sort of 
petition for restoration) and restoration4 (low, average, or 
high difficulty).  After recoding the variables, the Mann-
Whitney U test statistic was used to determine whether or 
not there was a statistically significant relationship 
between the percentage of African Americans in a state, 
the African American arrest rate, and the African 
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American incarceration rate of a state and whether or not 
that state required a petition for vote restoration 
(restoration2).  For this test, the variable PercentBlack is 
an interval level variable which indicates the percentage 
of blacks in each state, BArrestBl is an interval-level 
variable indicating the African American arrest rate for 
each state, and BIncarB is an interval-level variable 
indicating the African American incarceration rate for 
each state.  Each of the aforementioned variables 
(PercentBlack, BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as 
independent variables.  The dependent variable for this 
test is the recoded variable, restoration2, a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not a state requires a 
petition for restoration of voting rights.  A significant Mann 
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these 
variables are indeed related.  It is expected that states 
with a larger percentage of African Americans in the 
population (in general population, arrest rates, and 
incarceration rates) will require a petition for vote 
restoration while states with smaller African American 
populations will not.  A comparison of means will confirm 
the directionality of any significant effect.  
101 
 
2) The second analysis involves the comparison of the sizes 
of African American population in states with different 
levels of voting rights restoration difficulty.  To conduct 
this analysis, the variable determining the difficulty of a 
state’s vote restoration process was recoded into a 
trichotomous variable restoration4 which indicates 
whether the restoration process was of low difficulty, 
average difficulty, or high difficulty.  Using the recoded 
variable, the Kruskal-Wallis H, was used to test whether 
there is a statistical relationship between the difficulty 
level of the voting restoration process and percentage of 
African Americans in a state, the arrest rate of African 
Americans, and the incarceration rate of African 
Americans in a state.  The Kruskal-Wallis H is a non-
parametric statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to 
determine if there is a difference between variables.  For 
this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis H was used to determine 
if the percentage of African Americans in a state, the 
arrest rate of African Americans, and the incarceration 
rate of African Americans in a state affected difficulty 
level of the voting restoration process.  For this test, the 
variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable which 
102 
 
indicates the percentage of blacks in each state, 
BArrestBl is an interval-level variable indicating the 
African American arrest rate for each state, and BIncarB 
is an interval-level variable indicating the African 
American incarceration rate for each state.  Each of the 
aforementioned variables (PercentBlack, BArrestBl, 
BIncarB) were treated as independent variables.  The 
dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable, 
restoration4, an ordinal-level variable indicating whether 
a state’s restoration process is of low difficulty, average 
difficulty, or of high difficulty.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis 
H statistic would indicate that the difficulty level of a 
state’s restoration process varies with the size of that 
state’s African American population (in general 
population, arrest rate, or incarceration rate).  A 
significant Kruskal-Wallis H statistic would indicate that 
differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus 
indicate support for the hypothesis.  A comparison of 
means will confirm the directionality of any significant 
effect.   
Each of the aforementioned tests were performed utilizing the 
Exact method to determine the relationship between the 
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difficulty level of voting restoration process of the state and the 
percentage of minorities in the population of the state as well as 
the arrest and incarceration rates of minorities in the state.  The 
exact method was used first, and if the exact test could not be 
performed due to either the size of the sample or the amount of 
memory in the computer then the Monte Carlo method was 
used.    




Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings 
 This chapter reports qualitative and quantitative analyses and the findings.  
The first section of this chapter is devoted to the qualitative analysis of each of 
the 49 state disenfranchisement laws.  For qualitative analysis, the 
disenfranchisement laws of the 49 states were examined to identify their nature 
and characteristics to determine how they might relate to the group threat 
theoretical framework discussed earlier.  Among other aspects examined by the 
researcher to determine if the group threat hypothesis was supported by 
disenfranchisement legislation was the emphasis on the strictness of these 
legislation in terms of the point at which an individual becomes disenfranchised, 
the length of disenfranchisement, the association of the length of 
disenfranchisement with types of criminal offenses, the nature of the crimes 
leading to disenfranchisement, and voting restoration procedures.  The 
researcher obtained all the gubernatorial executive orders, state laws and/or 
state constitutions related to either the disenfranchisement of offenders or the 
process needed to restore voting rights from the online Lexis-Nexis database 
(http://www.lexis.com).  Once obtained, the documents were analyzed and the 
researcher highlighted sections of the documents related to either the causes of 
disenfranchisement and/or the requirements for restoration of voting rights.  This 
process was used to determine if the nature and characteristics of the laws 
supported the contention of the group threat hypothesis, that minorities that are 
seen as a threat are controlled by those in power.  The second part of this 
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chapter is devoted to the report of quantitative analysis and results of hypothesis 
testing. 
Qualitative Analysis Results 
 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia (treated as a state in this 
research) all disenfranchise felony offenders for some period of time after the 
commission of a criminal offense.  Each state has a variety of laws, constitutions, 
and/or executive orders related to the disenfranchisement of felony offenders.  
These laws, constitutions, and executive orders were examined to determine the 
nature and extent of felony disenfranchisement in the United States.  The 
purpose of this examination was to understand the meaning of 
disenfranchisement laws in terms of race and class and relate the nature of these 
laws to the group threat hypothesis, in an attempt to either confirm or refute the 
hypothesis.  After a thorough examination of state disenfranchisement legislation 
two major themes became apparent and in both of these themes there is a 
connection to the group threat hypothesis.  The first theme deals with the criteria 
for disenfranchisement in state laws and how these criteria may have a greater 
impact on minorities.  That is, this analysis is to determine if the criteria in the 
laws themselves act as a control mechanism over a segment of the population 
that is perceived to be a threat to those in power.  The second of the two major 
themes entails the voting restoration procedures and the impact these 
procedures have on minority offenders.  Much like the discussion related to the 
criteria for disenfranchisement, an examination of the restoration procedures is 
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undertaken to determine whether or not support for the group threat hypothesis 
exists.  In essence, both the criteria for disenfranchisement and the voting 
restoration procedures are examined to determine if they act to limit the ability of 
minorities from exercising their right to vote.  By limiting the ability of minorities to 
vote, first through disenfranchising offenders and then with restrictive voting 
restoration procedures, there appears to be an argument that 
disenfranchisement laws may act as a mechanism of control over a perceived 
threatening group and therefore may be supportive of the group threat 
hypothesis.  In what follows, the nature of the criteria for disenfranchisement, the 
procedures for voting restoration, as well as the impacts of each of these has 
upon offenders are discussed in detail in how they support or refute the group 
threat hypothesis. 
Criteria of Disenfranchisement 
 The disenfranchisement of offenders is generally based upon a set of 
criteria established in state law and some commonalities do exist.  Incarceration, 
for example, is the most common criterion for disenfranchisement, with all of the 
forty-nine states mandating a loss of voting rights when an offender is actually 
incarcerated in a prison and/or jail.  However, short of disenfranchisement during 
actual incarceration, few states have the same criteria.  Conviction, types of 
crimes for which person is convicted, the number of convictions, probation/parole 
and/or a suspended sentence, and even the time frame of the crime for which the 
individual was convicted are also utilized as disenfranchisement criteria 
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depending upon the state.  Each of these criteria for disenfranchisement will be 
discussed separately in what follows.  These criteria for disenfranchisement, 
particularly basing disenfranchisement on number of convictions and types of 
convictions, are supportive of the group threat hypothesis in that, offenders who 
commit a certain type of crime or offenders with prior criminal histories can be 
perceived as an increased threat to the social order and to the dominant majority.  
Given the history of African Americans and the criminal justice system, African 
Americans are more likely to have criminal histories and are more likely to be 
convicted of the offenses that cause disenfranchisement (Tonry, 1995).  What 
occurs then is that African Americans are more likely to be disenfranchised which 
may be perceived as another method of controlling African Americans as a group 
threat. 
The main criterion for disenfranchisement is that offenders lose their 
voting rights based upon incarceration.  In fact, every state that has a 
disenfranchisement law disenfranchises offenders during incarceration.  
However, a second major criterion for disenfranchisement is conviction of a 
criminal offense.  Twenty-seven states base disenfranchisement on the time of 
conviction rather than the time the offender actually enters a correctional facility.  
For example, Alaska Statute § 15.05.030 states that an individual is 
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony.  Similarly, Kansas law states that the 
disenfranchisement period begins upon conviction and continues until the 
completion of the sentence (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615).  In fact, none 
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of the states who base disenfranchisement upon the conviction of an offense 
distinguish whether or not the offender needs to be incarcerated for the 
disenfranchisement to take effect.  This distinction may not seem important, 
however, it becomes important when one considers the group threat hypothesis 
and how it may explain such a distinction.  Much like cases in which bail is 
denied, those convicted and then immediately incarcerated tend to be minorities 
who cannot afford outside legal counsel who can delay incarceration for either a 
limited time (for a few months to get affairs in order) or during lengthy appeals 
processes (Bridges, 1997).  The conviction criterion then has a larger impact on 
those individuals who cannot afford to delay incarceration.  Overwhelmingly, 
those who cannot afford such a delay are minorities of class and subsequently 
race (Bridges, 1997). 
 Although each of the forty-nine states that disenfranchise do so during 
incarceration and the majority (27) do so upon conviction, one state, Kentucky, 
disenfranchises even before conviction in certain cases.  In Kentucky, any 
individual who, although not convicted, is being held “in confinement under the 
judgment of a court for some penal offense” during an election may not vote in 
that election (Kentucky Constitution, § 145).  This provision of the state 
constitution appears to include all persons being held in jail or prison awaiting 
trial.  Therefore, those unable to post bail, or not provided bail, would be 
disenfranchised for that election.  This criterion in Kentucky law is unique, in that 
although all states remove voting rights during incarceration, no other state 
109 
 
mandates disenfranchisement prior to actual conviction.  This provision appears 
to have broad consequences among those who cannot post bail or to those not 
granted bail as they are disenfranchised without having been convicted in a trial.  
Because the majority of persons who cannot post bail are racial minorities 
(Bridges, 1997), one can see that this criterion for disenfranchisement has a 
dramatic effect on minority offenders in particular.  This provision in Kentucky law 
then clearly supports the contention of the group threat hypothesis of increased 
control of a perceived threat.  That is, even without conviction, which could be 
argued as proof of a threat to society and to those that control society, those that 
cannot post bail are perceived as threatening and are disenfranchised as a 
result. 
 Although Kentucky may be alone in using pre-trial detention as a 
requirement for disenfranchisement criterion, the state is among the eight that 
disenfranchise due to a conviction of a misdemeanor offense.  These eight states 
(Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and South 
Carolina), however, all vary on details about what groups of misdemeanor 
offenders qualify for disenfranchisement.  Four of the eight, Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, and South Carolina make no distinction between levels of crime 
(misdemeanor of felony), as any individual convicted of any crime is 
disenfranchised.  The remaining four states (Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, and 
Maryland) all specify types of misdemeanors for which a person is 
disenfranchised.  For example, under Maryland law, anyone convicted of an 
110 
 
“infamous or other serious crime” is disenfranchised (Maryland Constitution, 
Article I, § 4).  According to the definition, some misdemeanors, such as perjury, 
theft, and prostitution are considered infamous crimes in the state of Maryland 
(Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101).  In Iowa, conviction of an 
aggravated misdemeanor results in disenfranchisement (Iowa Constitution, 
Article II, § 5; Iowa Code § 48A.6).  Although, not clearly defined, an aggravated 
misdemeanor appears to be one that involves serious bodily injury to the victim, 
where if the crime did not involve serious bodily injury, it would be considered a 
misdemeanor (Iowa Code, Title XVI).  The “serious bodily injury” clause may 
sound like aggravated assault, a felony in the list of Index Crimes; however, the 
state of Iowa makes a distinction between aggravated misdemeanors and felony 
offenses (Iowa Code, Title XVI).  Crimes such as domestic violence and driving 
under the influence fall under this category (Iowa Code, Title XVI).  For example, 
driving under the influence which resulted in no injuries to the public would be 
considered a misdemeanor, while driving under the influence which resulted in a 
wreck with injuries would be considered an aggravated misdemeanor leading to 
disenfranchisement.  Lastly, the Constitution of the state of Kentucky states that 
any person convicted “of such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly may 
declare” is unauthorized to vote (Kentucky Constitution, § 145).  However, there 
does not appear to be any complete list of what qualifies as a high misdemeanor 
in the state of Kentucky. 
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 In addition to utilizing misdemeanors as a type of crime criterion, nine of 
the twelve states that permanently disenfranchise offenders do so based on the 
type of offense committed (Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Nevada, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming).  Mississippi, for example, 
lists the crimes of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods 
under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, and bigamy disqualifying 
in the state constitution (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241).  However, 
since the court decision in Cotton v. Fordice, which stated that the state 
constitution was to be narrowly read, the Attorney General of Mississippi has 
expanded upon the list of theft-related crimes that are disqualifying while 
simultaneously limited such thefts to felony cases only.  In West Virginia, a 
conviction for the bribery of a state official is the only offense for which 
disenfranchisement is permanent unless granted a gubernatorial pardon (West 
Virginia Constitution, Article VII, § 11).  Similarly, in Wyoming recidivist and/or 
violent offenders must apply for a gubernatorial pardon or the restoration of rights 
in order to regain the right to vote (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105 and § 7-13-803 
through 806).  Although permanent disenfranchisement may seem a misnomer 
based on this discussion, the one state that truly disenfranchises permanently is 
the state of Tennessee where any conviction for the crime of murder, rape, 
treason, or voter fraud results in permanent disenfranchisement with no 
possibility of restoration (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105).   
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The type of crime criterion for disenfranchisement has, like other criterion 
discussed herein, is related to the group threat hypothesis.  Whether a state 
specifies certain types of crimes (such as murder, rape, or violent felonies) or 
merely includes some or all misdemeanor offenses as disenfranchisement 
qualifiers, the impact is to increase the number of individuals affected by 
disenfranchisement legislation.  However, by including some misdemeanors (e.g. 
theft and prostitution) and specifying certain felony offenses for permanent 
disenfranchisement (e.g. violent felonies), the laws in these states appear to be 
focusing on minority offenders as they are more often arrested and incarcerated 
for the offenses specified (US Department of Justice, 2003).  Whether or not the 
intent is to focus on minorities the impact on minority offenders is more profound 
in that the result of these laws minorities leads to increased numbers of 
disenfranchised minorities.  Utilizing the group threat hypothesis, it can be 
argued that the type of crime criterion, since it focuses on crimes of a group that 
is already perceived to be threatening, racial minorities, is utilized by the powerful 
in society to further control minorities by preventing them from gaining any power 
through the ability to vote.    
 An additional criterion that appears to have a greater impact on minorities 
is basing permanent disenfranchisement on the number of convictions an 
offender has.  In essence, permanent disenfranchisement is based, in part, upon 
the criminal history of the offender.  Of the twelve permanent disenfranchisement 
states, six (Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia) 
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disenfranchise after the first offense and four states (Arizona, Maryland, Nevada, 
and Wyoming) disenfranchise based upon conviction of the second offense.  For 
example, although first time felony offenders in the state of Arizona are 
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony until unconditional discharge, a 
secondary felony conviction results in lifetime disenfranchisement. (Arizona 
Revised Statute § 13-904, 13-912).  The same can be said of Nevada where 
offenders who have been convicted of a violent felony or have been convicted of 
more than one felony offense are permanently disenfranchised (Nevada Revised 
Statute § 213.090).  The inclusion of the number of offenses or criminal histories 
of offenders as a criterion for disenfranchisement certainly fits into the group 
threat argument in two ways.  First, including criminal histories disenfranchises 
those that have proven, through repeat criminal acts that they are threat to 
society and are therefore in need of greater control.  Second, including criminal 
histories also manages to capture minority offenders at a greater rate, primarily 
because minority offenders are often the focus of the criminal justice system and 
as such are more likely to have criminal histories (Tonry, 1995).  Because of this 
criterion then, a perceived threat, both from repeat offenders and minority 
offenders with criminal histories can be controlled through legislation.  Controlling 
this population by limiting voting capability reduces any political power that can 
be attained by minorities and therefore could reduce the threat perceived by the 
powerful in society. 
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 An additional disenfranchisement criterion of interest is presented by the 
state of Tennessee and is perhaps the most unusual case in disenfranchisement.  
Tennessee is the only state that bases disenfranchisement not only on type of 
offense, and number of offenses, but also when the crime was committed.  For 
example, a person convicted of a felony before 1973, or between 1981 and 1986, 
or after 1996 must request a gubernatorial pardon or petition the circuit court of 
the county in which they reside for the restoration of their civil rights (Tennessee 
Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).  However, individuals convicted 
of a felony (other than the permanent disqualifiers) between 1973 and 1981 
and/or between 1986 and 1996 are automatically eligible to vote upon completion 
of their sentence (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).  
Tennessee is the only state that has such a formula for determining the type of 
permanent disenfranchisement.  At first glance, the time frame criterion does not 
appear to fit with the group threat framework.  However, examining the time 
frame specified for permanent disenfranchisement, the crime rates during those 
periods, and what felony offenses were classified as permanent disqualifiers it 
appears that there may have been an attempt to utilize disenfranchisement law 
to further control populations perceived as threatening.  For example, prior to 
1973 when the Tennessee disenfranchisement law mandated permanent 
disenfranchisement for all felony offenses, crime rates were high and the country 
had been through numerous protests for civil rights.  During that time, protest 
populations, specifically racial minorities, were seen as attempting to gain a 
115 
 
measure of power and could be perceived as threatening to the dominant white 
power base in society.  Preventing an increase in political power of African 
Americans through permanent disenfranchisement for committing criminal 
offenses could therefore be seen as an attempt to further control the perceived 
threat posed by the civil rights movement by eliminating the ability of some 
African Americans to vote.  As such, it is conceivable that the time frame criterion 
for disenfranchisement could be explained by the group threat hypothesis. 
 Up to this point each of the criteria discussed dealt with offenders who 
were incarcerated.  However, disenfranchisement criteria often extend beyond 
incarceration to include parole, probation, and even suspended sentences that 
carry no prison time.  Parole, as a criterion of disenfranchisement, is common in 
that thirty-five of the forty-nine states disenfranchise during a period of parole.  Of 
these thirty-five states, however, nine have additional post-release time 
requirements (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Virginia and Wyoming).  For example, in Arizona, an individual 
sentenced to a prison term for a second offense, must wait for a period of two 
years after an unconditional discharge before applying for restoration of voting 
rights, where an unconditional discharge includes discharge from parole (Arizona 
Revised Statute § 13-906).  In Delaware, for felony offenses, the restoration of 
voting rights is possible upon completion of the sentence and a five-year waiting 
period (Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701).   And in Nebraska, the 
disenfranchisement period last for the time of incarceration, probation, parole, 
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and for a two-year time period after final discharge of incarceration, probation, or 
parole (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-112 and § 29-2264).  Of the six 
remaining states that require post-release time, all permanently disenfranchise 
offenders based on a variety of factors.  Probation (and use of suspended 
sentences) as a disenfranchisement criterion is common as well.  Thirty-two 
states mandate that offenders be disenfranchised for any period of probation 
and/or if the sentence was suspended.  Of the thirty-two states that 
disenfranchise during probation and/or a suspended sentence, only South 
Dakota actually articulates that disenfranchisement occurs at the time of 
conviction and includes those whose term of incarceration has been suspended 
(South Dakota Codified Laws § 23A-27-35).  Simply put, if a person is convicted 
of a felony offense, but the judge suspends the prison sentence, the offender still 
cannot vote until the entire period of the suspended sentence has passed.  Not 
allowing offenders who are no longer incarcerated to vote does fit with the group 
threat theoretical framework.  Much like the incarceration argument, offenders on 
probation or parole have already proven that they constitute a threat to the 
dominant social order, therefore all probationers and parolees could be 
considered threatening population.  However, because race continues to play a 
major role in the criminal justice system, the impact of this criterion is felt more so 
by racial minorities.  That is, because race is a factor in arrest, conviction, and 
incarceration it is a factor in probation and parole.  By continuing to 
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disenfranchise offenders after they are released from prison, the laws continue to 
act as a controlling factor over offenders and subsequently racial minorities. 
 As discussed throughout permanent disenfranchisement is a factor in 
twelve states.  Criteria for permanent disenfranchisement of offenders differ 
across states and rely on a variety of factors previously discussed, including: 
number of offences, type of crime, and even time period in which the crime was 
committed.  Of the twelve states that permanently disenfranchise felony 
offenders, six disenfranchise on the first felony offense (Alabama, Florida, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia).  For example, in Florida, all 
persons who have been convicted of a felony offense permanently forfeit all civil 
rights, unless granted a pardon or restoration of those civil rights by the Governor 
(Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4; Florida Statute 97.041(2)(b); Florida Statute, 
Chapter 944.292(a)).  In Florida, disenfranchisement becomes effective upon 
conviction and is not tied to any specific felony, but rather all felony offenses.  
Under Virginia law, any individual who has been convicted of a felony offense 
loses their right to vote (Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1; Virginia Code 
Annotated § 8.01-338 and § 24.2-101).  In Virginia, the period of 
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and is permanent unless the former 
offender is granted a restoration of rights or a pardon by the Governor (Virginia 
Constitution, Article V, § 12; Virginia Code Annotated § 24.2-101).  As can be 
seen from these two examples permanent disenfranchisement is a bit misleading 
when one considers that in each of the twelve states, with the exception of 
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certain crimes (e.g. there is no restoration for the offense of murder in 
Tennessee), there is a method for restoration of voting rights.  However 
misleading the actual word permanent may be, the reality of these permanent 
disenfranchisement states is that rarely do voting rights become restored 
(Portugal, 2003).  The restoration of voting rights will be discussed in the next 
section; however, the impact of permanently disenfranchising offenders can be 
viewed as supportive of the group threat hypothesis in that control continues to 
be exercised over offenders well after there time has been served.  The impact 
these laws have on minority offenders is to permanently remove them from the 
voting rolls of the state.  By reducing the number of minorities allowed to vote, 
the power base in society acts to reduce any political power these groups can 
attain.  Therefore, while the law is racially neutral in wording the effect of the law 
is the reduction of eligible minority voters, as these minorities are the same ones 
most likely to be incarcerated to begin with.  The group threat hypothesis is then 
supported by permanent disenfranchisement, in that a group that is perceived to 
be threatening is controlled by the powerful in society through legal means.   
Some of the crimes for which one can be disenfranchised particularly 
misdemeanor drug offenses, theft, and prostitution appears to be aimed at 
minority offenders as they are typically the ones incarcerated for those offences 
(Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2004).  In Maryland, for example, prostitution, a 
crime where minorities tend to be arrested more often than whites, can lead to 
disenfranchisement, while patronizing prostitution has no effect on voting rights.  
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Additionally, the inclusion of misdemeanor offenses as a criterion for 
disenfranchisement increases the opportunity to disenfranchise a variety of 
criminal offenders regardless of race/ethnicity, class, and gender.  Inclusion of 
misdemeanor offenses means that many street-level crimes, such a drug 
possession, petty thefts, and prostitution, among others would lead to those 
street-level offenders being disenfranchised.  These street crimes tend to be the 
focus of the criminal justice system and are generally seen as those that 
represent disorder in society (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2004).  It is this threat 
of societal disorder that is viewed as threatening to those who control society 
(Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003).  Because the vast majority of these street-
level misdemeanor offenders are minorities, the inclusion of misdemeanor 
offenses as a disenfranchisement criterion would appear to have a 
disproportionate impact on minority offenders.  That is, because more minorities 
are incarcerated, more minorities are disenfranchised.  The larger impact is that 
of increased social control over minorities by limiting, through 
disenfranchisement, their opportunity to vote which could ultimately increase the 
power of minorities as the ability to vote would allow for the ability to shape the 
political landscape in society.  The disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement 
on minorities then supports the contention of the group threat hypothesis that 
social control will be exercised over any group (in this case minorities) perceived 
to be a threat to the ruling class or the state. 
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The criteria for disenfranchisement in state laws are quite varied.  The 
effect of these criteria is varied as well, depending upon the state and how these 
laws are enforced.  Despite the variation, however, each of these criteria appears 
to have more of an impact upon minorities than they do upon the controlling 
majority class.  Because of this, the group threat hypothesis appears to be 
supported by the criteria for disenfranchisement.   
Voting Restoration Procedures 
 The word permanently is misleading in the respect that of the twelve 
states that permanently disenfranchise felony offenders, eleven have some type 
of restoration procedure for regaining the right to vote, regardless of the offense.   
Even the lone dissenter among the twelve permanent disenfranchisement states, 
Tennessee, allows for restoration on most, but not all, felony offenses.  Like 
disenfranchisement criteria, restoration procedures also vary depending on the 
state.  Much like the theme regarding the criteria of disenfranchisement laws 
discussed previously, there appears to be support for the group threat hypothesis 
when one examines the various restoration procedures.  That is, when state laws 
specifying the criteria for restoring the voting rights of offenders are examined, it 
becomes apparent that the concept of controlling a threat may indeed be a part 
of voting rights restoration for offenders. 
A majority of states (twenty-eight) allow for the automatic restoration of 
voting rights upon the completion of the sentence.  The remaining twenty-one 
states specify requirements for voting restoration.  Of these states, sixteen 
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require the payment of all fines and/or court costs associated with the offense.  
Of those sixteen states that require payment of fines, only six (Georgia, Indiana, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Washington) have only that additional 
requirement for vote restoration.  In those six states, once the fines and/or court 
costs have been paid former offenders are eligible to vote.  Two additional states, 
Connecticut and North Carolina, only have two requirements, to pay all fines 
associated with the offense and to file some form of documentation indicating 
release with the court of conviction demonstrating that they have been 
unconditionally discharged.  The remaining thirteen states have additional 
requirements which will be discussed in more detail in what follows.  The 
requirement to pay all fines and/or court costs as a condition of regaining the 
right to vote can be construed as an example of class and racial bias.  That is, if 
offenders cannot afford to pay, they do not get their voting rights restored.  As 
has been established previously (Barak, Flavin, & Leighton, 2001; Bridges, 1997; 
Cole, 1999; Tonry, 1995), class and therefore racial minorities for the most part 
cannot afford these fines and are therefore prevented from restoring voting 
rights.  Intention or not, the result of the requirement to pay all fines and/or court 
costs does support the group threat hypothesis, in that control, through financial 
requirements, is exercised over a minority group. 
Of the twenty-one states requiring some form of petition to restore voting 
rights, thirteen require the completion and approval of either an application or 
some other state governmental forms.  For example, Arizona requires an 
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application for restoration be filed out and filed along with a “certificate of 
absolute discharge” and sent to the discharging judge for final decision (Arizona 
Revised Statute § 13-906).  In Delaware, as long as the offense charged is not a 
permanent disqualifying offense the application is made to the local election 
board (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2; Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, 
§ 1701).  Under Virginia law, the process for restoration depends on the nature of 
the offense.  For non-violent offenders, a one-page application is required 
although violent and/or drug offenders are required to complete an extensive 
thirteen-page application, both applications must be sent to the Secretary of 
Commonwealth (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).  In many cases the 
paperwork required of offenders to regain their voting rights is extensive and 
difficult.  Because of this, offenders often require the assistance of legal counsel 
to traverse the requirements.  Offenders who cannot afford counsel to assist with 
the petition are unable to regain their voting rights.  The difficulty of the forms 
and/or petitions can be seen as an additional control mechanism in that the forms 
do often require legal assistance that most criminal offenders cannot afford.  
Rather than simply returning voting rights automatically upon release, states that 
require these petitions appear to be attempting to limit the number of offenders 
who regain the right to vote.  As limiting the right to vote acts to control offending 
populations far beyond the prison cell, petitions can be seen as fitting into the 
threat hypothesis.  That is, these petitions ultimately impact minority populations 
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at a greater rate as they are the ones most likely not to be able to afford legal 
representation. 
Another form of restoration involves the petitioning of the court of 
conviction for the return of voting rights.  Four states (Arizona, Nevada, 
Tennessee, and Virginia) all state that offenders may petition the court of 
conviction or the circuit court in the offender’s area of residence to regain the 
right to vote.  For example, in Nevada, a former offender may either appeal to the 
Board of Pardons Commissioners for a pardon or may seek restoration of their 
civil rights by filing an appeal with the court in which they were convicted 
(Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090).  In order to seek restoration of civil rights 
from the court of conviction, the former offender must petition the court, 
requesting the sealing of all records pertaining to the conviction, if granted, the 
sealing of the court records means that the conviction never occurred and the 
former offender is then able to vote (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090 and § 
179.245).  The Tennessee statute is similar in regards to the effect of vote 
restoration.  In Tennessee, for full restoration of the right to vote, the offender 
must meet the requirements, regarding time frame and crime type, and must 
petition the circuit court in the county of residence (Tennessee Code Annotated § 
40-29-101 through § 40-29-105).  The petition to the circuit court for full 
restoration must be made after notice is provided to both the federal and state 
prosecutors (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102 through § 40-29-104).  
Additionally, the petition must be accompanied by proof that the former offender 
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“has sustained the character of a person of honesty, respectability and veracity, 
and is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner’s neighbors” (Tennessee 
Code Annotated § 40-29-102).  Once the petition is filed, the court determines 
eligibility for restoration of the right to vote.  Much like the requirement for filing 
written petition and forms, petitioning the court to regain voting rights is often 
more difficult for minority offenders who cannot afford the assistance of legal 
counsel.  Because criminal offenders are often of class and racial minorities the 
impact of the requirements of petitions often have a more intense affect on these 
minority offenders, often preventing them from regaining their voting rights.  
Therefore, much like previous arguments, the requirement of petitioning the court 
ultimately acts as a control mechanism to keep minority offenders from voting. 
As an additional requirement, ten of the states requiring some form of 
petition conduct a background investigation or review of the offender prior to the 
restoration of voting rights.  Some of these background investigations amount to 
merely a review of the offender’s records to ensure compliance with state laws, 
although others are more in-depth.  In Wyoming, for first time, non-violent 
offenders, the parole board conducts an investigation merely to determine 
eligibility and then, if eligibility is verified, the board issues the restoration 
certificate (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105).  Along similar lines, the parole board in 
the state of Kentucky determines whether or not the former offender is eligible for 
vote restoration and then forwards the request to the Governor (Kentucky 
Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045).  The state of Maryland is an additional 
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example, as the parole board reviews and investigates the cases of offenders 
and determines eligibility and then forwards the request to the Governor for final 
decision (Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).  The requirement for 
a background investigation of the offender is not uncommon as a requirement for 
voting rights restoration.  However, the requirement of an often extensive 
background investigation is time consuming and often requires the offender to 
ensure all fines and/or court costs be paid and that legal counsel to assist with 
the petition prior to any investigation into the offenders background.  This 
additional requirement puts additional strain on offenders, particularly financially.  
The financial aspect is often not something that offenders, especially minority 
(class and racial) offenders can necessarily afford.  Because of this aspect of the 
restoration process, it can be seen as a requirement that often eliminates the 
possibility of vote restoration.  As minority offenders are more likely to be 
eliminated due to these requirements the requirements can be viewed as an 
additional control mechanism over minority offenders after their release and 
therefore is supportive of the threat hypothesis contention that minorities will be 
controlled by the dominant class if they are perceived as a threat. 
The use of the parole board for reviews and/or investigation is not 
unusual, particularly given the role that many parole boards play in the 
restoration process.  Eleven of the twelve permanent disenfranchisement states, 
in fact, require that offenders appeal either directly to a parole or other type of 
board of appeals or directly to the Governor of the state in order to be considered 
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for voter restoration.  In Wyoming for example, for those individuals requesting a 
pardon, must wait for ten years after completion of the sentence before applying 
directly to the governor.  The governor’s office is required to notify the 
prosecuting attorney to determine the particulars of the case prior to making any 
decision regarding executive pardon (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-803 through 806).  
Although West Virginia statue requires permanent disenfranchisement for only 
one offense, bribery of an elected official, in a case of a conviction for such a 
charge the only alternative for the restoration of voting rights is to apply for a 
gubernatorial pardon through application to the state parole board (West Virginia 
Constitution, Article VII, § 11).  Lastly, under Mississippi law, the only method for 
regaining the right to vote is by Gubernatorial pardon or by a two-thirds vote of 
the Mississippi legislature (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 253; Mississippi 
Code Annotated § 99-19-37).  Once all requirements are met by the offender, the 
formal pardon is sent to the Governor, via the Parole Board, for investigation and 
final decision (Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124).  Like many of the other 
restoration requirements discussed herein, any sort of appeal, either to a board 
or directly to the Governor of the state, often requires legal assistance that must 
be paid for by the offenders.  Again, the requirement of legal counsel often 
places an additional burden on class and therefore racial minorities in that legal 
fees often far exceed anything these former offenders can afford.  The 
requirements then end up acting as an impediment, preventing minority offenders 
the opportunity to regain their voting rights.  If they cannot regain their rights they 
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are limited in the amount of power they can exercise through the election of 
political officials.  Therefore, there is the affect of further control of minorities by 
limiting their voting potential.  By limiting the rights of former offenders, the 
dominant group in society can further control the offenders and therefore protect 
the dominant social system. 
Although appeal to a board or to the Governor appears to be the 
restoration method of choice for most of the permanent disenfranchisement 
states, there are eleven states that place either additional requirements and/or 
time periods upon the offender.  The most common of these additional 
requirements is the addition of some waiting period after final discharge of a 
sentence.  Arizona, for example, requires two years after discharge before an 
offender can even apply for restoration (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906).  
Delaware also requires an additional waiting period of either five years for felony 
offenses and ten years for misdemeanors involving a violation of election law 
(Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701).  Under Maryland law the time 
requirements are five years for a misdemeanor, ten years for a felony, and for 
those requesting a pardon who have been convicted of a violent crime or of a 
crime involving drugs the waiting period is twenty years (Maryland Regulations 
Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).  Time is not the lone additional requirement, 
however.  For example Alabama, requires that any offender who seeks 
restoration of voting rights, be free of any pending charges and for a serious 
violent offense and/or a sexual offense the offender must submit a DNA sample 
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to the Alabama DNA database (Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f)).  Lastly, Mississippi 
requires offenders seeking restoration to not only wait a period of seven years 
after the completion of their sentence, but then mandates that the offender place 
a notice of the pardon request, along with a statement of why the pardon should 
be given, in the newspaper of the county where the conviction took place 
(Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124 and Article 12, § 253).  Although most 
of these additional requirements do not appear to intentionally block minority 
offenders, much like the petition requirements discussed above these 
requirements may ultimately block minority offenders from regaining the vote.  
The requirements themselves do not appear to limit minorities, but due to the 
expense of legal fees that often accompany these requirements the affect is to 
limit the ability of minority offenders to regaining their rights.  Because of this, it 
can be argued that these requirements do act to further control minorities in that 
they prevent minorities from regaining the vote, which may ultimately assist in 
offenders gaining more power.  The affect then fits into the theoretical framework 
that minorities are further controlled, in this case by limiting voting rights, 
because they are perceived as a threat to society.  Although racial bias may not 
be intentional the effect is substantial. 
The state of Iowa provides an example of change that has taken place 
due some perceived racial bias.  Concerned that the state’s disenfranchisement 
statute was racial biased in result, the governor of Iowa, by executive order, 
changed the law from permanently disenfranchising felony offenders to one that 
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allows for automatic restoration of the right to vote (Iowa Executive Order 
Number 42, July 24, 2005).  In addition, other states, like Washington, have 
come under fire in recent years for perceived racial bias in their restoration 
procedures (Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003); 
United States v. Loucks, 149 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Circuit, 1998)).  In these 
cases, the court stated that the financial provision of the statute could be 
challenged as “racially discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act” (Farrakhan v. 
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003).  The Washington statute 
states, however, that if the former offender cannot pay the fines associated with 
the offense, they can either petition the court for a reduction or complete 
elimination of the fine, as long as “manifest hardship” can be proven (Washington 
Revised Code § 10.73.160).  Additionally, the former offender may request a 
restoration of civil rights or an outright pardon from the governor in cases where 
the fines cannot be paid (Washington Revised Code § 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020).  
Along the same lines, Nevada statutes normally require the payment of all fines 
associated with the criminal offense in order for voting rights to be restored; 
however, this requirement may be waived if the former offender is indigent 
(Nevada Revised Statute § 176A.850, § 213.155, and § 213.157).   
Much like the criteria used to determine who becomes disenfranchised, 
the requirements for voting rights restoration indicate support for the group threat 
hypothesis in a variety of ways.  As previously discussed, the requirement to pay 
all court costs and fines as a condition of voting rights restoration is perhaps the 
130 
 
clearest support for the group threat hypothesis.  That is, the group threat 
hypothesis argues that a group that is perceived to be threatening to the powerful 
in society will be subject to a variety of control mechanisms.  A clear mechanism 
of control is to reduce the possibility of regaining voting rights through the 
imposition of high court costs and/or fines and then conditioning restoration of 
voting rights on the payment of such fines.  As established (Barak, Flavin, & 
Leighton, 2001; Bridges, 1997; Cole, 1999), the large majority of criminal 
offenders come from the lowest socioeconomic classes.  Additionally, racial 
minorities, particularly African Americans, are overwhelming represented in the 
lowest of socioeconomic classes.  What results then is that African Americans 
are impacted by the requirement to pay fines that they cannot afford in order to 
regain voting rights lost due to a criminal conviction.  This requirement to pay 
fines and/or court cost then acts as a control mechanism over African Americans 
and therefore exemplifies the group threat hypothesis.  An additional example of 
restoration criteria that appears supportive of the group threat hypothesis is the 
often complicated legal petitions that must be filed in order for voting rights to be 
restored.  The complicated legal petitions may require attorneys that can fill out 
the requisite forms and file the petitions with the appropriate government officials 
(different depending on the state).  The clear implication here is that if former 
offenders cannot afford to pay fines and/or court costs they are also unlikely to 
be able to afford legal counsel to assist in the restoration process.  Without 
assistance then, it can be assumed the restoration process is too difficult to 
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traverse by criminal offenders that are most likely poor and undereducated.  It 
appears then that restoration requirements in disenfranchisement laws also 
support the group threat hypothesis in that they are another means of controlling 
a population deemed threatening to the majority. 
Summary: Disenfranchisement and the Group Threat Hypothesis 
Despite the differences noted above, not a single state law made any 
indication of a bias toward any particular group, other than criminal offenders.  
This statement should be fairly obvious, in that no state could possibly defend a 
law that is outwardly racially biased.  Unlike the laws in the post-Civil War era, 
the current state statutes are racially neutral in their language.  However, it 
should be clear that they can be detrimental for, or have negative effects on, 
African Americans.  The previous discussion of institutional discrimination 
articulated that what mattered in the law was not the intent, but rather the result 
(Georges-Abeyie, 1990).  That is, simply because the results of a law may 
indicate disparities in outcome, does not mean that there was any intent to 
discriminate.  These laws may be seen as institutionalized discrimination, in that 
disparities in outcomes are often the result of criminal justice policies established 
without racist intent (Georges-Abeyie, 1990; Petersilia, 1983; Wilbanks, 1987).  
Income plays a major role in the criminal justice system, for example, the 
issuance of bail, the payment of court costs, the ability to hire a quality attorney, 
and the like are all related to one’s social class status.  Those without financial 
wherewithal tend to be impacted more by criminal justice sanctions in that 
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because they cannot afford bail, court costs, or a quality attorney they are often 
unable to avoid jail.  Given that the racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, often overlap with issues of class, it comes as no surprise that 
African Americans are often overrepresented as offenders in the criminal justice 
system.  With the increased numbers of African Americans incarcerated in 
prisons across the country the impact of disenfranchisement laws on African 
Americans is substantial.  Although the laws themselves are racially neutral in 
intent, the result of increased incarceration of African Americans results in the 
increased disenfranchisement of African Americans.  That being the case it can 
be argued that disenfranchisement laws are an example of institutional 
discrimination and do therefore support the group threat hypothesis.   
Although states such as Iowa, Washington, and Nevada have seemingly 
identified adverse impacts on certain groups, such as racial minorities and the 
poor, most of these adverse impacts appear to be ignored by most other states.  
Whether or not these racial differences are ignored by the most states because 
these states belief their laws to be racially neutral is irrelevant.  What is clearly 
evident is that despite the racially neutral intent of the laws, the results of the 
laws are clearly indicative of racial bias.  Because of this bias, it appears clear 
that the group threat hypothesis, that argues that a perceived threat is controlled 





Quantitative Analysis Results 
This section deals with the quantitative analysis of data as a test of the 
group threat hypothesis.  Specifically, this section tests the following hypotheses: 
1) The greater the proportion of minorities in a state’s population, the 
more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;  
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the 
state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration; and  
3) The higher a state’s rate of minority arrest and incarceration, the more 
difficult the voting restoration procedures.  
This section is broken down into several subsections: the creation of data 
for quantitative analysis, three subsections discussing the tests of three 
aforementioned hypotheses, and a summary of quantitative analysis, and a 
discussion of the limitations of the study. 
Creation of Data File for Quantitative Analysis  
Based on the qualitative analysis discussed previously, two variables, the 
strictness of disenfranchisement legislation (strictness) and the difficulty of the 
restoration process (restoration), were created by quantifying information 
obtained from state disenfranchisement laws and regulations.  The qualitative 
analysis of these documents resulted in two categories: the strictness of 
disenfranchisement laws and the difficulty of the voting restoration process, with 
two separate coding schemes. 
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1. Strictness of Disenfranchisement Scale – Each state’s disenfranchisement 
law(s) were examined to determine the point at which disenfranchisement 
becomes effective in that state (e.g. during pretrial detention, upon 
conviction, or upon incarceration), the level of offense required to 
disenfranchise (e.g. misdemeanor or felony), the length of time of the 
disenfranchisement (e.g. during incarceration, parole, probation and/or a 
suspended sentence, or any additional post-release time after parole), and 
the permanence of the disenfranchisement (e.g. permanent for 1st offense, 
for 2nd offense, or permanent for certain crimes).  To quantitatively 
determine the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law, one point 
was given for each indication of strictness found in the state’s laws.  
These indications of strictness were counted and a score was attained 
that was used as a measure of strictness of that state’s law.  Based on the 
above a variable measuring the strictness of disenfranchisement was 
created based on eleven distinct criteria: 1) conviction of some 
misdemeanor offenses, 2) pretrial detention, 3) conviction of a felony 
offense, 4) probation and/or a suspended sentence, 5) incarceration, 6) 
parole, 7) additional post-release time after or in addition to parole, 8) 
permanence based on conviction of first offense, 9) permanence based on 
conviction of a second offense (recidivism), 10) permanence for a 
conviction for certain types of crimes, and 11) permanence dependent 
upon when the crime was committed (for example, the State of Tennessee 
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has different requirements based upon the time period the crime was 
committed; a person convicted of a felony before 1973, or between 1981 
and 1986, or after 1996 is permanently disenfranchised, restoration is 
automatic for any other time period).  Each category was assigned a point, 
and a total score for a state, which ranges between 0 to 11 represents the 
level of disenfranchisement strictness in that state, and the higher the 
score the stricter the disenfranchisement law.  The result of this analysis is 
represented in Table 5-1.   
2. Restoration Difficulty Scale – There are two major categories of 
restoration of voting rights: 1) automatic restoration and 2) restoration 
through petition.  To determine the difficulty of the restoration process, the 
laws for each state were examined to determine what was required of the 
offender to restore voting rights.  That is, restoration processes were 
examined to determine if the restoration was automatic or if some 
additional requirement was mandated (e.g. the payment of all fines, an 
investigation or review, a petition or an appeal to a court or board, or 
additional requirement).  To quantitatively determine the difficulty of a 
state’s restoration process, one point was given for each indication of 
voting restoration difficulty.  The indications of restoration difficulty were 
counted and a score was attained that was used as a measure of difficulty 
of that state’s restoration process.  The variable measuring the difficulty 
for voting rights restoration (restoration through petition) was created  
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Table 5-1: Criteria of Disenfranchisement Based on State Law 















































































































































Alabama          0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
Alaska           0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Arizona          0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 
Arkansas         0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
California       0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Colorado         1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Connecticut      0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Delaware         1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 7 
D.C.             0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Florida          0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
Georgia          0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Hawaii           0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Idaho            0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Illinois         1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Indiana          0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Iowa             1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Kansas           0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Kentucky         1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 9 
Louisiana        0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland         1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 8 
Massachusetts    0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Michigan         1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Minnesota        0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Mississippi      0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
Missouri         0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Montana          0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nebraska         0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Nevada           0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
New Hampshire  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
New Mexico  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
New York  0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
North Carolina  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
North Dakota  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ohio             0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oklahoma         0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
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Table 5-1: Criteria of Disenfranchisement Based on State Law (Continued) 















































































































































Oregon           0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pennsylvania     0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhode Island  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
South Carolina  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
South Dakota  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Tennessee        0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Texas            0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Utah             0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vermont          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia         0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
Washington       0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
West Virginia  0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Wisconsin 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 












based on seven different requirements including: 1) payment of all fines, 
2) a background investigation and/or review, 3) petition to the court of 
conviction, 4) appeal to a review board or to the Governor for a pardon, 5) 
submission of a DNA sample, 6) having no pending charges, and 7) any 
additional waiting period and/or requirement.  Each of the seven sub-
categories was given a value of one.  The scores range from 0 to 5, and 
the higher score, the more difficult the voting restoration process.  States 
that apply automatic restoration have a score of 0. The results of this 
analysis are represented in Table 5-2. 
Distribution of State Disenfranchisement Laws 
The sample used for this study consisted of 51 states (the District of 
Columbia was treated as a state) and the 49 state disenfranchisement laws.  Of 
the 51 states, 49, or 96% had disenfranchisement legislation.  Among the 49 with 
these laws 22, or 45%, had some sort of petition for restoration requirement.  The 
remaining 27 states with disenfranchisement legislation, 55% of the total had an 
automatic restoration process.   
In addition, three other variables were created and included in data 
analysis.  First, percent African American in the population by state 
(PercentBlack) was calculated by taking the total number of African Americans in 
a state and dividing by the total population of that state.  Based on this 
calculation the range of percentage of African Americans in states was 0.3% to 
60%.  Second, African American incarceration rates by state (BIncarB) were 
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Table 5-2: Voting Restoration Requirements Based on State Law 
(Higher total indicates a more difficult restoration process) 
 





























































































Alabama          1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Alaska 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona          1 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 
Arkansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut      1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Delaware         1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
D.C. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida          1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Georgia          1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hawaii 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho            1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Illinois 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky         1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Louisiana 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland         1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Massachusetts 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota        1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Mississippi      1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Missouri 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska         0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Nevada           0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
New Hampshire 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Mexico  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New York 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Carolina  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North Dakota 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 5-2: Voting Restoration Requirements Based on State Law 
(Continued) 
(Higher total indicates a more difficult restoration process) 
 





























































































Oklahoma         1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oregon 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhode Island 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Carolina 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Dakota 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee        1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
Texas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 2  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia         0 1 1 1 0 0 1 4 
Washington       1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
West Virginia  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Wisconsin 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming       0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
 
1 Indicates Automatic Restoration 











calculated by taking the total number of African Americans incarcerated in a 
state, dividing that number by the total number of African Americans of that state 
and then multiplying the result by 100,000.  Based on this calculation the range 
of values for African American incarceration was 780 to 4244 per 100,000 
population.  Third, African American arrest rates by state (BArrestBl) were 
calculated by taking the total number of African Americans arrested in a state, 
dividing that number by the total number of African Americans in that state and 
then multiplying the result by 100,000.  Based on this calculation the range of 
values for African American arrest was 1249 to 25811 per 100,000 population.  
Table 5-3 summarizes the profile of state legislation on disenfranchisement.  The 
variables used in data analysis are summarized in Table 5-4.  
Table 5-3: Distribution of State Disenfranchisement Laws 
 Disenfranchisement Restoration Petition 
Yes 49 (96%) 22 (45%) 
No 2 (4%) 27 (55%) 
Total 51 (100%) 49 (100%) 
 
Table 5-4: Variables used in Data Analysis 
 













0 - 9 
0 - 5 
 
Independent Variables 
Percentage of African Americans  
African American Incarceration Rates  







0.3 - 60.0 
780 - 4244 
1249 - 25811 
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Data Analysis and Results 
 In the following sections, statistical procedures utilized for data analysis 
are presented and the results are reported and discussed at length.  This section 
is broken down by the three hypotheses established in Chapter 4. 
Hypothesis 1 
The study hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between the 
level of strictness of disenfranchisement legislation and the size of state African 
American populations.  There are two ways to test this hypothesis.  First, the 
study examined if states with disenfranchisement laws have significant higher 
proportion of African American population than states without disenfranchisement 
laws.  Then, the study examined if states that have higher proportions of African 
Americans have stricter disenfranchisement laws than states that have lower 
proportions of African Americans.  To determine if there is a significant difference 
in percent of African American population between states that have 
disenfranchisement laws and states that do not, the Mann-Whitney statistic was 
used.     
The first analysis involves the comparison of the African American 
population sizes in states with disenfranchisement laws and those in states 
without such laws.  For this test, the variable PercentBlack is treated as the 
independent variable, and strictness as the dependent variable.  The original 
variable of disenfranchisement strictness (strictness) was recoded to prepare for 
the use of exact statistical methods.  For this analysis the researcher used the 
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Mann Whitney U test which is used to test whether or not, given two samples, 
one variable tends to have higher values than the other.  In this case, the Mann 
Whitney U is used to test whether states with disenfranchisement laws tend to 
have a higher proportion of African Americans in the population than those states 
without a disenfranchisement law.  Because the Mann Whitney test compares 
means of two groups the researcher first had to recode the dependent variable 
(strictness) into a dichotomous ordinal-level variable (strictness2).  To recode, 
the researcher assigned strictness2 two values: 1 = states with 
disenfranchisement laws and 0 = states without disenfranchisement laws.  The 
Mann-Whitney U test was used to determine whether or not there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of minorities in a state 
and whether or not that state had a disenfranchisement law.  A significant Mann 
Whitney U test statistic would indicate that these variables are indeed related.  
The statistics should show states with disenfranchisement laws have significantly 
higher percentages of African Americans.  A comparison of means will confirm 
the directionality of any significant effect. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate strong support for a 
difference in percent of African American population based upon whether or not a 
state has a disenfranchisement law.  For states with no disenfranchisement law, 
the mean rank of proportion of African Americans in the state’s population is 
3.50.  For states with disenfranchisement law, the mean rank of African American 
population is 26.92.  The Mann Whitney U test statistics (Z=-2.184, p=0.013) 
144 
 
reveals that the difference in the mean ranks is statistically significant.  That is, 
states with a disenfranchisement law have a significantly higher proportion of 
African Americans in the state population than states without a 
disenfranchisement law.  The hypothesis is therefore supported.  Table 5-5 
summarize the results of the relationship analysis between proportion of African 
Americans and disenfranchisement laws. 
The second analysis involves the analysis of the relationship between the 
sizes of African American population and levels of disenfranchisement strictness.  
It is hypothesized that states with greater African American population have 
stricter disenfranchisement laws.  For this test, the variable PercentBlack is 
treated as the independent variable, and strictness as the dependent variable.  
The original variable of disenfranchisement strictness (strictness) was recoded to 
prepare for the use of exact statistical methods.  For this analysis the researcher 
used the Kruskal-Wallis test which is used to test the variance by ranks by 
comparing several independent samples.  In this case, the Kruskal-Wallis is used 
to test whether states with a higher proportion of African Americans in the 
population had stricter disenfranchisement laws than states with a lower  
 
  Table 5-5: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between Proportions of 
African Americans and Disenfranchisement Laws 
 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Z Statistic 
Exact 
Significance 
States without disenfranchisement law 2 3.50 7.00 





proportion of African Americans in the population.  Because the Kruskal-Wallis 
test compares ranks of independent samples and requires ordinal-level data the 
researcher first had to recode the dependent variable (strictness) into a 
trichotomous ordinal-level variable (strictness3).  Like the earlier test, to conduct 
this analysis, the variable determining the strictness of a state’s 
disenfranchisement law was recoded into a trichotomous variable strictness3 
which indicates whether the state law was of low strictness, average strictness, 
or high strictness.  The researcher created a third strictness variable, strictness3, 
which had three values: 1 = low strictness, 2 = average strictness, and 3 = high 
strictness.  Values created represented the lowest 25% of the scaled scores of 
the original disenfranchisement strictness variable (a score of 0-1 was recoded 
into a value of 1 for low strictness), the middle 50% (a score of 2-4 was recoded 
into a value of 2 for average strictness), and the highest 25% (a score of 5-9 was 
recoded into a value of 3 for high strictness).  Using the recoded variable, the 
Kruskal-Wallis, was used to test whether there is a significant relationship 
between the percentage of African Americans in a state and the strictness level 
of the state’s disenfranchisement law.  The Kruskal-Wallis, is a non-parametric 
statistical test which utilizes mean ranks to determine if the relationship between 
two variables.  In this case, it tests if the states with a higher proportion of African 
Americans have higher scores on disenfranchisement strictness.  For this test, 
the variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable which indicates the 
percentage of blacks in each state and is treated as the independent variable.  
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The dependent variable for this test is the recoded variable, strictness3, an 
ordinal-level variable indicating whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of 
low strictness, average strictness, or of high strictness.  A significant chi-square 
statistic would indicate that the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law 
varies with the size of that state’s African American population.  A significant chi-
square statistic would indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling 
error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis presented.  A comparison of 
means confirms the directionality of any significant effect. 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the 
proportion of African Americans in states with different levels of 
disenfranchisement strictness are significantly different.  The mean rank of the 
percentage of African Americans in the population for states with 
disenfranchisement laws that are the least strict is 18.19, for average strictness 
the mean is 26.21, and for high strictness the mean is 32.89.  A significant chi-
square statistic (x2 = 6.602; p = 0.032) indicates that these differences are not 
due to sampling error, thus indicating support for hypothesis 1.  Statistics from 
the Monte Carlo method of the Kruskal-Wallis test was obtained due to 
insufficient computer memory.  The results the Kruskal-Wallis test are presented 
in Table 5-6. 
Based on the findings reported above the data appears to support the 
hypothesis that states with strict disenfranchisement laws have a higher African 
American population than states with less restrictive laws. 
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  Table 5-6: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between Proportion of 
African Americans and Level of Strictness 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square 
Exact 
Significance 
Disenfranchisement - low strictness 13 18.19 
Disenfranchisement - average strictness 24 26.21 
Disenfranchisement - high strictness 14 32.89 
2 6.602 0.032 
 
Hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis states that there is a positive relationship between the level of 
strictness of disenfranchisement legislation and state African American 
incarceration and African American arrest rates.  That is, states that have stricter 
disenfranchisement laws also have higher rates of African American arrest and 
incarceration than states with less strict disenfranchisement laws.  To test this 
hypothesis, the strictness3 (level of disenfranchisement strictness) variable was 
tested against the state African American incarceration rates as well as state 
African American arrest rates.  To determine if there is a significant difference 
between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and 
state African American incarceration and African American arrest rates the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used.   
 The first analysis involves the comparison of the different levels of 
disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law with the African American 
incarceration rate.  For this test, the variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable 
indicating whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, average 
strictness, or of high strictness is treated as the independent variable.  The 
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dependent variable for this test is BIncarB, an interval-level variable indicating 
the African American incarceration rate for each state.  Using the recoded 
variable strictness3 (low, average, high strictness) described above, the Kruskal-
Wallis, was used to test whether there is a statistical relationship between the 
strictness level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and the African American 
incarceration rate.  The Kruskal-Wallis is a non-parametric statistical test which 
utilizes mean ranks to determine if there is a difference between variables.  For 
this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the incarceration rate of 
African Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s 
disenfranchisement law.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that 
the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that 
state’s African American incarceration rate.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic 
would indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus 
indicate support for the hypothesis presented.  A comparison of means confirms 
the directionality of any significant effect.  
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is not a significant 
difference between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the 
state and state African American incarceration rate.  The mean rank of African 
American incarceration rates in states with disenfranchisement laws that are the 
least strict is 25.08, for average strictness the mean is 25.90, and for high 
strictness the mean is 23.27.  A Kruskal-Wallis statistic (x2 = 0.285; p = 0. 868) 
indicates no support for the hypothesis presented.  Exact methods were not 
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reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient computer memory 
for the performance of the exact method.  The results the Kruskal-Wallis test are 
presented on Table 5-7. 
The second analysis involves the comparison of the different levels of 
disenfranchisement strictness of a state’s law with the African American arrest 
rate.  For this test, the variable strictness3, an ordinal-level variable indicating 
whether a state’s disenfranchisement law is of low strictness, average strictness, 
or of high strictness is treated as the independent variable.  The dependent 
variable for this test is BArrestBl, an interval-level variable indicating the African 
American arrest rate for each state.  Using the recoded variable discussed in the 
first hypothesis, strictness3 (low, average, high strictness), the Kruskal-Wallis, 
was used to test whether there is a statistical relationship between the strictness 
level of the state’s disenfranchisement law and the African American arrest rate.  
For this analysis, the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the arrest rate of 
African Americans in a state affected the strictness of the state’s 
disenfranchisement law.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that  
   
 
Table 5-7: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African American 
Incarceration Rate and Level of Strictness 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square 
Exact 
Significance 
Disenfranchisement - low strictness 12 25.08 
Disenfranchisement - average strictness 24 25.90 
Disenfranchisement - high strictness 13 23.27 




the strictness of a state’s disenfranchisement law varies with the size of that 
state’s African American arrest rate.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would 
indicate that differences in means are not due to sampling error, thus indicate 
support for the hypothesis presented.  A comparison of means confirm the 
directionality of any significant effect.   
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the 
percentage of African American in states with different levels of 
disenfranchisement strictness are not significantly different.  The mean 
percentage of African American arrest rates in states with disenfranchisement 
laws that are the least strict is 27.17, for average strictness the mean is 24.17, 
and for high strictness the mean is 26.36.  A Kruskal-Wallis statistic (x2 = 0.406; p 
= 0. 817) indicates no support for the hypothesis presented.  Again, exact 
methods were not reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient 
computer memory for the performance of the exact method.  The results the 
Kruskal-Wallis test are presented on Table 5-8. 
Based on the findings reported above, the data fails to support the 
hypothesis.  That is, there is no support for the relationship between the level of 
strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the state and the state African 
American incarceration rate.  Additionally, the data also fails to support the 
relationship between the level of strictness of the disenfranchisement law of the 






Table 5-8: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African American 
Arrest Rate and Level of Strictness 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square Significance 
Disenfranchisement - low strictness 12 27.17 
Disenfranchisement - average strictness 24 24.17 
Disenfranchisement - high strictness 14 26.36 
2 0.406 0.817 
 
Hypothesis 3 
This study hypothesizes that there is a positive relationship between the 
difficulty in state voting restoration procedures and the size of a state’s African 
American population, state African American arrest rates, and state African 
American incarceration rates.   That is, states with more difficult voting 
restoration procedures have a higher African American population, and higher 
African American arrest and incarceration rates than states with more lenient 
voting restoration procedures.  This hypothesis was tested in two ways.   
First, the study examined if states that require a petition for vote restoration have 
a significantly higher proportion of African Americans in the population, have 
significantly higher African American arrest rates, and have significantly higher 
African American incarceration rates than states that have automatic vote 
restoration.  Then the study examined if states with significantly higher proportion 
of African Americans in the population, significantly higher African American 
arrest rates, and significantly African American incarceration rates have more 
difficult restoration procedures than states with a lower proportion of African 
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Americans in the population and lower African American arrest and incarceration 
rates. 
The first analysis involves the comparison of the African American 
population sizes of states (population, arrest rate, and incarceration rate) with 
states with automatic restoration and states requiring some form of petition for 
restoration.  For this test, the variable PercentBlack is an interval level variable 
which indicates the percentage of blacks in each state, BArrestBl is an interval-
level variable indicating the African American arrest rate for each state, and 
BIncarB is an interval-level variable indicating the African American incarceration 
rate for each state.  Each of the aforementioned variables (PercentBlack, 
BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as independent variables.  The dependent 
variable for this test is restoration.  For this analysis the researcher used the 
Mann Whitney U test which is used to test whether or not, given two samples, 
one variable tends to have higher values than the other.  In this case, the Mann 
Whitney U is used to test whether states that require a petition for the restoration 
of voting rights tend to have a higher proportion of African Americans in the 
population (general, arrest, and incarceration) than those states with an 
automatic restoration process.  Because the Mann Whitney test compares 
means of two groups the researcher first had to recode the dependent variable 
(restoration) into a dichotomous ordinal-level variable (restoration2).  To recode, 
the researcher assigned restoration2 two values: 0 = automatic restoration and 1 
= petition required for restoration.  After recoding the variables, the Mann-
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Whitney test statistic was used to determine whether or not there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the percentage of African Americans 
in a state, the African American arrest rate, and the African American 
incarceration rate of a state and whether or not that state required a petition for 
vote restoration (restoration2).  A significant Mann Whitney test statistic would 
indicate that these variables are indeed related.  It is expected that states with a 
larger percentage of African Americans in the population (in general population, 
arrest rates, and incarceration rates) will require a petition for vote restoration 
while states with smaller African American populations will not.  A comparison of 
means confirm the directionality of any significant effect. 
The results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate no support for a difference 
in percent of African American population based upon whether or not a state 
restoration law requires a petition.  For states with automatic restoration, the 
mean rank of African American in the state’s population is 24.09.  For states that 
require a petition for vote restoration, the mean percentage of African American 
is 26.11.  The Mann Whitney test statistics (Z=-0.493, p=0.629) reveal that any 
difference in means is not statistically significant.  The hypothesis is therefore not  
supported.  Table 5-9 illustrates the findings of the Mann-Whitney test.   
 
Table 5-9: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between Proportions of 
African Americans and Restoration Petition 
 
 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Z Statistic Significance 
Automatic restoration 27 24.09 650.50 




Additionally, the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicates no significant 
difference in African American arrest rates based upon whether or not a state 
disenfranchisement law requires a petition for vote restoration.  For states with 
automatic restoration, the mean rank of African American arrest rates is 23.77.  
For states that require a petition for vote restoration, the mean rank for African 
American arrest rates is 25.36.  The Mann Whitney test statistics (Z=-0.393, 
p=0.700) reveal that any difference in means is not statistically significant.  The 
hypothesis is therefore not supported.  Exact methods were not reported for the 
Mann-Whitney test, as there was insufficient computer memory for the 
performance of the exact method.  Table 5-10 illustrates the findings of the 
Mann-Whitney test utilizing the Monte Carlo method. 
Lastly, the results of the Mann-Whitney test indicate no significant 
difference in African American incarceration rates based upon whether or not a 
state disenfranchisement law requires a petition for vote restoration.  For states 
with automatic restoration, the mean rank of African American incarceration rates 
is 24.52.  For states that require a petition for vote restoration, the mean rank for 
African American incarceration rates is 23.36.  The Mann Whitney test statistic 
(Z=-0.289, p=0.778) reveals that any difference in means is not statistically 
significant.  The hypothesis is therefore not supported.  Exact methods were not 
reported for the Mann-Whitney test, as there was insufficient computer memory 
for the performance of the exact method.  Tables 5-11 illustrate the findings of  
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Table 5-10: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between African American 
Arrest Rates and Restoration Petition 
 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Z Statistic Significance 
Automatic restoration 26 23.77 618.00 





  Table 5-11: Mann-Whitney Test for Relationship between African American 
Incarceration Rates and Restoration Petition 
 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks Z Statistic Significance 
Automatic restoration 26 24.52 637.50 




the Mann-Whitney test utilizing the Monte Carlo method. 
Secondly, this study involves the analysis of the relationship between the 
sizes of the African American population (in general population, arrest rates, and 
incarceration rates) and the level of difficulty of vote restoration.  It is 
hypothesized that states with greater African American population have more 
difficult vote restoration procedures.  For this test, the variable PercentBlack is an 
interval level variable which indicates the percentage of blacks in each state, 
BArrestBl is an interval-level variable indicating the African American arrest rate 
for each state, and BIncarB is an interval-level variable indicating the African 
American incarceration rate for each state.  Each of the aforementioned variables 
(PercentBlack, BArrestBl, BIncarB) were treated as independent variables.  The 
dependent variable for this test is restoration.  To conduct this analysis, the 
variable determining the difficulty of a state’s vote restoration process was 
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recoded into a trichotomous variable restoration4 which indicates whether the 
restoration process was of low difficulty, average difficulty, or high difficulty.  The 
researcher created an additional restoration variable, restoration4, which had 
three values: 1 = low restoration difficulty, 2 = average restoration difficulty, and 3 
= high restoration difficulty.  Values created represented the lowest 25% of the 
scaled scores of the original restoration difficulty variable (a score of 0-1 was 
recoded into a value of 1 for low restoration difficulty), the middle 50% (a score of 
2-3 was recoded into a value of 2 for average restoration difficulty), and the 
highest 25% (a score of 4-7 was recoded into a value of 3 for high restoration 
difficulty).  Using the recoded variable, the Kruskal-Wallis, was used to test 
whether there is a statistical relationship between the difficulty level of the voting 
restoration process and percentage of African Americans in a state, the arrest 
rate of African Americans, and the incarceration rate of African Americans in a 
state.  The Kruskal-Wallis is a non-parametric statistical test which utilizes mean 
ranks to determine if there is a difference between variables.  For this analysis, 
the Kruskal-Wallis was used to determine if the percentage of African Americans 
in a state, the arrest rate of African Americans, and the incarceration rate of 
African Americans in a state affected difficulty level of the voting restoration 
process.  A significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that the difficulty 
level of a state’s restoration process varies with the size of that state’s African 
American population (in general population, arrest rate, or incarceration rate).  A 
significant Kruskal-Wallis statistic would indicate that differences in means are 
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not due to sampling error, thus indicate support for the hypothesis.  A 
comparison of means confirm the directionality of any significant effect. 
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean ranks of the 
proportion of African Americans in states with different levels of vote restoration 
difficulty are not significantly different.  The mean rank for African Americans in 
the population for states with restoration procedures that are the least difficult is 
9.18, for average difficulty the mean is 10.00, and for high difficulty the mean is 
15.25.  The chi-square statistic (x2 = 4.232; p = 0.121) indicates that these 
differences are not significant and therefore fail to support the hypothesis 
presented.  The results the Kruskal-Wallis test is presented in Table 5-12. 
Additionally, to test whether or not states with more difficult voting 
restoration procedures have higher African American arrest rates than states with 
less difficult restoration procedures, the researcher attempted to determine the 
relationship between the level of difficulty of voter restoration of the state and the 
African American arrest rates of the state.  The mean rank of African American 
arrest rates in states with restoration procedures that are the least difficult is 
12.27, for average difficulty the mean is 10.67, and for high difficulty the mean is 
10.75.  The chi-square statistic (x2 = 0.312; p = 0. 870) indicate no support for the 
hypothesis presented.  Exact methods were attempted, but there was insufficient 
computer memory to attain results, therefore they are not presented here.  The 




  Table 5-12: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between Proportion of 
African Americans and Level of Restoration Difficulty 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square Significance 
Restoration - low difficulty 11 9.18 
Restoration - average difficulty 3 10.00 
Restoration - high difficulty 8 15.25 




  Table 5-13: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African 
American Arrest Rate and Level of Restoration Difficulty 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square Significance 
Restoration - low difficulty 11 12.27 
Restoration - average difficulty 3 10.67 
Restoration - high difficulty 8 10.75 
2 0.312 0.870 
 
Lastly, to test whether or not states with more difficult voting restoration 
procedures have higher African American incarceration rates than states with 
less difficult restoration procedures, the researcher attempted to determine the 
relationship between the level of difficulty of voter restoration of the state and the 
African American incarceration rates of the state.  The mean rank of African 
American incarceration rates in states with restoration procedures that are the 
least difficult is 11.09, for average difficulty the mean is 15.67, and for high 
difficulty the mean is 8.86.  The chi-square statistic (x2 = 2.534; p = 0. 298) 
indicates no support for the hypothesis presented.  Exact methods were not 
reported for the Kruskal-Wallis test, as there was insufficient computer memory 
for the performance of the exact method.  The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test is 
presented on Table 5-14. 
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  Table 5-14: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Relationship between African 
American Incarceration Rate and Level of Restoration 
Difficulty 
 
 N Mean Rank df Chi-Square 
Exact 
Significance 
Restoration - low difficulty 11 11.09 
Restoration - average difficulty 3 15.67 
Restoration - high difficulty 7 8.86 
2 2.534 0.298 
 
 
Based on the findings reported above, the hypothesis that states with 
more difficult voting restoration procedures have higher African American 
populations, and higher African American arrest and African American 
incarceration rates than states with more lenient voting restoration procedures is 
not supported. 
Summary 
Based on the findings reported above, the data appear to support hypothesis 
one and fail to support either hypothesis two or three.  That is, there is a relationship 
between the strictness of state disenfranchisement laws and the proportions of African 
Americans.  However, there is no connection between the strictness of the 
disenfranchisement law and African American arrest and incarceration rates.  There is 
also no support for the hypothesis that there is a relationship between difficulty in 
restoration procedures and proportion of African Americans or African American 
arrest and incarceration rates.  As such, the test of the group threat hypothesis by 
utilizing felony disenfranchisement legislation is also only partially supported.  
Discussion of the research results is in the final chapter of this project 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
 This study was designed to test the group threat hypothesis by utilizing 
felony disenfranchisement legislation.  The group threat hypothesis, based on the 
conflict perspective, states that the law is designed to control those who are 
perceived threatening to the powerful in society (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958).  
Qualitative and quantitative analyses of disenfranchisement legislation in 48 
states and the District of Columbia were performed to determine if the group 
threat hypothesis was supported by the study’s data. 
Qualitative analysis indicates that the group threat hypothesis is supported 
by two main aspects of the laws: first, the criteria for disenfranchisement and 
second, the vote restoration procedure.  Various criteria for disenfranchisement, 
including, conviction, incarceration, the type of crime committed, criminal history, 
and whether or not the offender was granted probation, parole, or received a 
suspended sentence, have been identified.  Each one of these criteria appears to 
have a greater impact on minorities, particularly African Americans.  Literature 
indicates that African Americans are more likely than whites to have criminal 
histories because of past and current race relations in the United States and are 
also more likely than whites to be convicted of felony criminal offenses (Tonry, 
1995).   Uniform Crime Report statistics support this by indicating that while 
African Americans make up approximately 12 percent of the United States 
population, they represent nearly 27 percent of all arrests, 47 percent of all arrest 
for homicide, 32 percent for rape, and 53 percent of all arrests for robbery (U. S. 
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Department of Justice, 2004).  Additionally, the incarceration rate for African 
Americans in the United States was substantially higher (4,919 per 100,000) than 
for whites (717 per 100,000) during the same time period (U. S. Department of 
Justice, 2004).  Further, based on government statistics, African American males 
have a 1 in 4 chance of going to prison at some point during his lifetime, while 
white males face a 1 in 23 chance of prison time (Bonczar and Beck, 1997).  
Since criminal histories, which are based on number of criminal convictions, 
sentencing and incarceration, and type of offense (e.g. felony offenses) are 
representative of the criteria for disenfranchisement it appears that African 
Americans are disproportionately impacted by these laws.  More generally, as a 
large proportion of those individuals entering the criminal justice system (through 
conviction and incarceration) are African American it follows that African 
Americans are more likely to be effected.  As such, African Americans are more 
likely to be disenfranchised which, following the group threat hypothesis, can be 
viewed as another method of controlling African Americans as a group threat.   
Secondly, the analysis of voting restoration procedures also shows 
support for the group threat hypothesis.  An examination of voting restoration 
procedures in the twenty-one states that require some sort of petition to restore 
voting rights, indicate various requirements including the full payment of all 
related fines, the completion of extensive legal forms that often requires 
assistance of legal counsel, and the often complex appeal or pardon process that 
requires the assistance of legal counsel to traverse the process.  Each of these 
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aspects of the vote restoration process appears to hamper offenders who have 
limited economic resources.  If they cannot afford to pay the fines and/or hire an 
attorney to assist in the process the opportunity to regain voting rights is limited.  
Because African American ex-offenders often come from the lower class 
(Western, 2002; Western and Pettit, 2000) they are most likely to face difficulties 
in satisfying the financial requirements for voting right restoration and are the 
least able to hire legal counsel due to those same economic conditions.  
Therefore, because the requirements for vote restoration often necessitate 
financial means unavailable to former offenders it is difficult for them to regain 
their voting rights. As such, voting restoration procedures appear to act as a legal 
control mechanism over former offenders by controlling and/or limiting their ability 
to vote.     
Quantitative analysis involved testing the following three hypotheses:  
1) The greater the proportion of African Americans in a state’s population, 
the more restrictive the state’s disenfranchisement laws;  
2) The more restrictive a state’s disenfranchisement laws, the higher the 
state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration; and  
3) The higher a state’s rate of African American arrest and incarceration, 
the more difficult the voting restoration procedures.  
The results of data analysis support Hypothesis #1, showing a significant 
relationship between the strictness of state disenfranchisement laws and the 
proportions of African Americans in a particular state (states with greater 
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proportion of African Americans have stricter disenfranchisement laws).  
However, Hypothesis #2 and Hypothesis #3 are not supported by the study’s 
data.  There is no significant relationship between disenfranchisement strictness 
and the state’s arrest and incarceration rates for African Americans.  Neither is 
there a significant relationship between a state’s rate of African American arrest 
and incarceration and the difficulty level of the state’s voting rights restoration 
procedure. 
Prior research indicates that African Americans are more impacted by 
disenfranchisement than are whites (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner 
and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer, 2004).  This 
impact is believed to be primarily due to the number of African Americans under 
criminal justice supervision (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and 
Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Harvey, 1994; King and Mauer, 2004).  Much of the 
previous research makes the argument that because African Americans are 
overrepresented among criminal offenders in the criminal justice system that they 
are therefore more damaged by felony disenfranchisement (Behrens, Uggen, 
and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King 
and Mauer, 2004; Mauer, 2004b; McLeod, White, and Gavin, 2003).  Additional 
research regarding race and disenfranchisement indicates that aside from the 
criminal justice system population, there is a correlation between the numbers of 
African Americans in the general population of a state and disenfranchisement 
legislation (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998).  
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Hypothesis #1 confirms previous findings in this regard by demonstrating that the 
proportion of African Americans in a state’s population is significantly correlated, 
not merely to whether or not a state utilizes felony disenfranchisement, but also 
to the strictness of the state’s disenfranchisement law.  Because this study 
quantified the strictness of the disenfranchisement laws in each state rather than 
merely utilizing the existence of such a law the significant finding of hypothesis 1 
represents a better measure of impact of disenfranchisement on African 
Americans. 
Although prior research has indicated that African Americans are more 
likely to suffer the consequences of disenfranchisement due to disproportionately 
high rates of arrest, conviction, and incarceration (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 
2003 Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer, 
2004; Mauer, 2004b) the results of this study, particularly the testing of 
hypotheses #2 and #3, challenge those findings.  In other words, the testing of 
hypotheses #2 and #3 revealed no support for the contention that higher rates of 
African American arrest and/or incarceration are correlated with 
disenfranchisement.  Nor did this study find a significant relationship between 
African American arrest and incarceration rates and the difficulty of the vote 
restoration process.  There are a few possible explanations for the lack of 
support of hypotheses #2 and #3 and the challenge this presents to previous 
research in the area.  First, this study quantified both the strictness of the laws 
and the difficulty of the restoration process as opposed to previous research that 
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merely observed that because African Americans were overrepresented in the 
criminal justice system that they were more likely to be impacted by the laws 
(Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; Fellner and Mauer, 1998; Fletcher, 1999; 
Harvey, 1994; Hench, 1998; King and Mauer, 2004; Mauer, 2004b).  By 
quantifying the strictness of the law and the difficulty of the restoration process, 
this study was able to clarify the extent of the relationship between race and 
disenfranchisement and determine that the relationship found in previous studies 
may not fully explain the nature of the relationship.   
The second of the possible explanations for a non-significant finding for 
hypotheses #2 and #3 is perhaps due to a lack of a connection between the civil 
sanction of disenfranchisement and criminal arrest and incarceration rates.  That 
is, disenfranchisement is a civil sanction, not a criminal sanction like arrest or 
incarceration.  Although the sanctions of criminal laws primarily function to punish 
criminal activity and to deter future criminal acts, civil sanctions act primarily to 
restore or “make-right” an injured party, typically through financial awards 
(Fletcher, 1998; Hall, 2002; Mousourakis, 2003).  The differences in the function 
of these two types of law (criminal and civil) makes finding a correlation between 
the two types of sanctions difficult.  A third possible explanation, and one related 
to the second, is that lawmakers have no control over arrest or incarceration 
rates, they merely make laws, they do not make arrests, nor do they adjudicate 
criminal trials.  Additionally, law enforcement officials who make arrests and 
judicial officials who punish criminal offenders neither make arrest for nor punish 
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individuals for civil offenses.  There is no evidence to state that 
disenfranchisement laws created by lawmakers have a direct impact on arrest 
and incarceration rates.  There is also no evidence to state that arrest and 
incarceration rates have any impact on whether these laws are created in the first 
place.  In essence, there appears no way to connect the laws and arrest and 
incarceration rates; any causal relationship found would appear to be spurious.  
Despite the lack of support for hypotheses #2 and #3 this study has improved the 
understanding, not only of the applicability of the group threat hypothesis, but 
also the limitation of the hypothesis as well.  That is, although the hypothesis can 
explain why laws may be created in the first place, as an indication of the need to 
control a perceived threat to the ruling class (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza, 2003; 
Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958) and can therefore be applied to law making, the 
hypothesis is limited in its ability to explain the impact these laws have in terms of 
outcomes such as arrest and incarceration rates.  
Although this study improved on the research of Behrens, et.al. (2003) by 
utilizing rates of arrest and incarceration as opposed to using actual numbers of 
arrests and incarceration, the reason for the failure of this study to find support 
for hypothesis #1 and hypothesis #2 may lie in using arrest and incarceration as 
a measure of group threat.  Utilizing arrest and incarceration rates as a measure 
of group threat presupposes that the rates of arrest and incarceration are known 
to those in power and that they view the disproportionate arrest and confinement 
of African Americans as a threat to society at large.  An alternative explanation 
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for group threat and its relationship to arrest and incarceration is that the 
population deemed as threatening to the powerful in society is dealt with by the 
arrest and conviction.  If this is the case, utilizing arrest and incarceration rates 
as a measure of group threat would fail to show any significance as was the 
case.  Therefore, arrest and incarceration are not measures of threat, but rather 
an indication that the threat has been dealt with. 
 The use of the group threat hypothesis to understand the nature of 
disenfranchisement legislation provides a better understanding of the social 
problems associated with these legal codes.  Social problems associated with 
being disenfranchised, such as the inability to vote, inability to voice community 
concerns, and the inability to affect change can be seen as consequences of the 
desire to control a perceived threat to the majority in society.  That is, if the 
majority can control a population by disenfranchising a significant portion of the 
population, it becomes easier for the majority to control all of society because it 
reduces the ability of those not in power to affect change.  Therefore, social 
problems present in minority communities, for example, poverty, social 
disorganization, poor or non-existent education opportunities, among others, are 
more readily understood by appreciating how the idea of a group threat is 
perceived and how it is subsequently dealt with.  Disenfranchisement then not 
only contains the consequences of individual offenders losing their right to vote, 
the effect of disenfranchisement reaches into the community or society as a 
whole.  The democratic ideals of justice and equality are damaged by policies 
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that disenfranchise entire segments of the population in that, not everyone is 
equally represented (Altman, 2005; Dhami, 2005; Ochs, 2006).  Dealing with 
social problems, such as those mentioned above, becomes increasingly difficult 
for those communities if they do not share in the constitutional rights afforded 
other segments of society.   
  The social consequences of disenfranchisement go deeper than merely 
not being able to exercise the constitutional right to vote.  Disenfranchisement 
impacts community cohesion and the general investment people have in their 
community (Ochs, 2006).  By not being able to vote, individuals have little reason 
to be concerned with their community and have less reason to foster community 
ties.  This is not only unfortunate, but likely to further damage communities by 
increasing the chance of criminal activity (Braithwaite, 1989).  Braithwaite (1989), 
for example, argued that individuals and groups with strong social ties are less 
likely to commit criminal offenses.  If this is the case, “people who are a part of 
the decision making process not only have a greater investment in the decisions, 
but a greater investment in society as well” (Ochs, 2006, p. 89).  
Disenfranchisement damages any attempt to foster stronger community ties and 
may in turn lead to further criminal activity because there is little need to invest 
oneself in a society that continues to deny the right to vote.  
 The findings presented in this study have social justice policy implications.  
In this case, social justice means that all persons, regardless of class, race, 
gender, and the like, have an equal opportunity to live and be productive 
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members of society; justice is about equal opportunities stipulated in the United 
States Constitution (Miller, 1979; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo, 1997).  In 
other words, justice is not only for the rich or powerful, it is supposed to be for all 
members of society (Miller, 1979; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, and Huo, 1997).  
The ability to vote enhances the very ideas of social justice.  According to 
Reinman (2005), “what is important here is not so much that voting gives me 
power to govern others, but that voting gives me as much power over them as 
they have over me” (p. 13, emphasis in the original).  In essence, the ability to 
vote establishes equality and equal opportunity.  The concepts imbedded in the 
group threat hypothesis, perceived threat and control of threat, however, are 
contrary to very ideals of social justice.  Understanding that disenfranchisement 
laws are supportive of the group threat and reflect social injustice is an important 
first step.  Eradicating disenfranchisement will not, of course, automatically make 
American society equal in all regards; however, it is worth considering that of all 
other democratic nations, the United States remains the most stringent when it 
comes to disenfranchisement even while reprimanding other countries for human 
rights violations (Ispahani, 2006).  In fact, “disenfranchisement of people with 
criminal convictions is not the democratic norm … [m]any nations which share 
the same Western philosophical foundations as the United States have opted for 
dramatically different policies” (Ispahani, 2006, p. 33).  Many of the policies from 
other democratic nations articulate narrow guidelines for the disenfranchising of 
those convicted of offenses, such as disenfranchising only those who have 
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violated election law as opposed to the often blanket disenfranchisement policies 
of many American states (Easton 2006; Ispahani, 2006).  In order to bring 
American policies in line with both the ideas of social justice and with policies of 
other democratic nations, disenfranchisement laws should be reconstructed 
along the same narrow lines exhibited by other democratic nations.  Included in 
this, should be the alteration of American laws to disenfranchise “only those it 
makes sense to bar,” such as those convicted of an election law offense 
(Ispahani, 2006, p. 4).   
The ideas of democracy, community, social justice and constitutional 
rights should be central to any argument for the eradication of 
disenfranchisement.  Writing in dissent in the case of Richardson v. Ramirez, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall epitomized this argument and simultaneously 
dismissed the argument that there is a need to disenfranchise offenders because 
“their likely voting pattern might be subversive to the interests of an orderly 
society” (Marshall in dissent, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 1974).  
According to Marshall: 
The process of democracy is one of change.  Our laws are not  
frozen into immutable form, they are constantly in the process  
of revision in response to the needs of a changing society.  The  
public interest, as conceived by the majority of the voting public, 
is constantly undergoing reexamination.  This Court’s holding in  
Davis, supra, and Murphy, supra, that a State may disenfranchise  
a class of voters to “withdraw all political influence from those who  
are practically hostile” to the existing order, strikes at the very  
heart of the democratic process.  A temporal majority could use  
such a power to preserve inviolate its view of the social order  
simply by disenfranchising those with different views.  Voters who 
opposed the repeal of prohibition could have disenfranchised  
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those who advocated repeal “to prevent persons from being  
enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws of the country.”   
The ballot is the democratic system’s coin of the realm.  To  
condition its exercise on support of the established order is to  
debase that currency beyond recognition (Richardson v. Ramirez,  
418 U.S. 24, 1974). 
 
Although Marshall’s main concern was with the democratic process, there 
are other far reaching effects.  The ability to vote impacts many aspects of our 
society.  Voting affects our ability not just to voice our concerns, but it legitimately 
impacts the society in which we live.  The ability to vote gives an individual as 
well as individual groups power to make changes that might enhance the quality 
of life.  For example, a poor neighborhood (or voting district) could vote for more 
school funds for better educational opportunities or vote to get better garbage 
service or increased police patrols.  Whatever the needs may be for any 
individual or group, the ability to voice those needs is an important aspect of 
social justice.  To be more in tune with the ideals of social justice then, as 
opposed to the ideas of social threat, serious examination of disenfranchisement 
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Appendix 1 – Legislation Referenced 
(All state laws, constitutions, and executive orders obtained online from http://www.lexis.com) 
 
Alabama Constitution, Amendment 579 
Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1 
Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f) 
Alaska Statute § 15.05.030 
Alaska Statute § 15.60.010 
Arizona Revised Statute §§ 13-904 through 13-906, 13-912 
Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 51, § 11(a)(4) 
California Constitution, Article II, § 4 
California Election Code § 2101 
Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10 
Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103 
Connecticut General Statute Annotated § 9-46a 
Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2 
Delaware Constitution, Article VII, § 2 
Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701 
District of Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7) 
District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title 3, § 500.3 
Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4 
Florida Statute § 97.041(2)(b) 
Florida Statute, Chapter 944.292(a) 
Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a) 
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Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b) 
Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1) 
Idaho Code § 18-310 
Illinois Constitution, Article III, § 2 
730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5 
Indiana Constitution, Article 2, § 8 
Indiana Code Annotated § 3-7-13-5 
Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5 
Iowa Code, Chapter 914 
Iowa Code, Title XVI, § 701.7 
Iowa Code § 48A.6(1) 
Iowa Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005 
Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615 
Kansas Statute Annotated § 22-3722 
Kentucky Constitution §§ 77, 145 and 150 
Kentucky Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045 
Louisiana Constitution, Article I, § 10 and § 20 
Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 18:102 
Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101 
Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102 
Maryland Constitution, Article I, § 4 
Massachusetts Constitution, Article III 
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Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 51, § 1 
Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2 
Michigan Complete Laws Annotated § 168.758b 
Minnesota Constitution, Article VII, § 1 
Minnesota Statute § 201.014 and § 609.165 
Mississippi Constitution, Article 5, § 124 
Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241 and § 253 
Mississippi Code Annotated § 23-15-11 
Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-37 
Missouri Revised Statute § 115.133 
Montana Constitution, Article IV, § 2 
Montana Code Annotated § 13-1-111 
Nebraska Revised Statute §§ 29-112, 29-2264, and 32-313 
Nevada Constitution, Article 2, § 1 
Nevada Revised Statute §§ 176A.850, 179.245, 213.020, 213.090, 213.155, 
213.157  
New Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated § 607-A:2 
New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1 
New Mexico Constitution, Article VII, §§ 1, 2 
New Mexico Statute Annotated § 1-4-27.1 and § 31-13-1 
New York Election Law § 5-106 
North Carolina Constitution, Article VI, § 2 
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North Carolina General Statute § 163-55 and § 13-1 
North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01 
Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01 
Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title 26, § 4-101 
Oregon Revised Statute § 137.275 and § 137.281 
Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinion 186 (number 47), 1974 
25 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statute Annotated § 1301 
Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2, § 1 
Rhode Island State Bill 458, 2005-2006 Legislative Session, R.I., 2005 
Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida 
South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120 
South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 12-4-18, 23A-27-35, 24-5-2 and 24-15A-7 
Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, § 5 
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-20-112, §40-29-101 through § 40-29-105 
Texas Constitution, Article 6, § 1 
Texas Election Code Annotated § 11.002 and § 13.001 
Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101 and § 20A-2-101.5 
Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1 and Article V, § 12 
Virginia Code Annotated §§ 8.01-338, 24.2-101, 53.1-231.1, 53.1-231.2, 53.1-
136 
Washington Constitution, Article 6, § 3 
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Washington Revised Code §§ 9.94A.030, 9.94A.637, 9.94A.885, 9.96.010, 
9.96.020, 10.73.160, 29A.04.079  
West Virginia Constitution, Article IV, § 1 
West Virginia Code § 3-1-3 and § 3-2-2 
51 West Virginia Attorney General Opinion 182 (1965) 
Wisconsin Statute § 6.03 and § 304.078 
Wyoming Constitution, Article 4, § 5 
Wyoming Statute §§ 6-10-106, 7-13-105, 7-13-803 through 7-13-806, 22-3-102 
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Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (1988) 
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003) 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) 
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Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American  





# African American 
Arrests 
# African American 
Incarcerations 
Alabama 1155930 13469 12630 
Alaska 21787 2236 1022 
Arizona 158873 8363 6311 
Arkansas 418950 7752 5828 
California 2263882 63850 33872 
Colorado 165063 6043 3010 
Connecticut 309843 6813 3847 
Delaware 150666 3431 1755 
D.C. 343312 30259 1 
Florida 2335505 65652 28768 
Georgia 2349542 21914 30535 
Hawaii 22003 5022 2714 
Idaho 5456 338 233 
Illinois 1876875 27047 32166 
Indiana 510034 11773 7904 
Iowa 61853 3606 1756 
Kansas 154198 2663 2204 
Kentucky 295994 3654 5658 
Louisiana 1451944 21983 20423 
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Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American  
Arrest and Incarceration Rates for 2004 (Continued) 
 
State African American Population 
# African American 
Arrests 
# African American 
Incarcerations 
Maine 6760 333 77 
Maryland 1477411 28294 12023 
Massachusetts 343454 3559 2794 
Michigan 1412742 20059 21169 
Minnesota 171731 7504 2607 
Mississippi 1033809 9375 11806 
Missouri 629391 20426 12925 
Montana 2692 2 2 
Nebraska 68541 2950 993 
Nevada 135477 6522 2558 
New 
Hampshire 9035 179 136 
New Jersey 1141821 19376 10518 
New Mexico 34343 1665 928 
New York 3014385 22203 21443 
North Carolina 1737545 30402 13523 
North Dakota 3916 641 340 
Ohio 1301307 15203 15554 




Appendix 3 – Data Used to Calculate African American  
Arrest and Incarceration Rates for 2004 (Continued) 
 
State African American Population 
# African American 
Arrests 
# African American 
Incarcerations 
Oregon 55662 4991 1745 
Pennsylvania 1224612 29082 14983 
Rhode Island 46908 1265 409 
South Carolina 1185216 19654 11475 
South Dakota 4685 1005 1238 
Tennessee 932809 17882 9216 
Texas 2404566 43381 37533 
Utah 17657 1697 491 
Vermont 3063 98 134 
Virginia 1390293 17232 15714 
Washington 190267 8698 2947 
West Virginia 57232 762 543 
Wisconsin 304460 8110 4827 
Wyoming 3722 277 173 
 
1  The District of Columbia does not operate a prison and therefore does not have incarceration 
statistics 
2  No data was available for Montana for the year 2004 
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Appendix 4 – Summary of State Disenfranchisement Laws 
Alabama 
 Alabama Constitution, amendment 579, which amends Article VIII of the 
1901 Constitution of Alabama states, “No person convicted of a felony involving 
moral turpitude … shall be qualified to vote” (AL Constitution, Amend 579, (b)).  
The Alabama Supreme Court has identified crimes that are not disqualifiers, such 
as assault, felony drug possession, and felony DUI offenses.  Additionally, 
several crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, drug possession for resale, and 
bigamy have been identified as crimes that would disenfranchise under Alabama 
law.  There is however, no actual comprehensive list of the felonies that 
disenfranchise an individual.  The disenfranchisement becomes effective once an 
individual is convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude.  
The State of Alabama disenfranchises those convicted of felonies for life.  
There is no difference in length of disenfranchisement based on type of crime.  
However, Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1 states that a disenfranchised individual 
may apply to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a certificate, which would 
reinstate voting rights to some ex-felons.  This reinstatement is authorized to 
those who have completed their entire sentence (includes parole), paid all fines 
associated with the crime and court proceedings, and are free of any pending 
felony charges.  While this reinstatement includes most crimes, it excludes other 
serious crimes such as murder, rape, and sodomy (Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1).  
If an individual is convicted of a serious violent offense or of a sexual offense, 
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they must seek a pardon from the Board of Pardons and Parole and meet all 
other aforementioned requirements (Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1).  As an 
additional requirement to attain a pardon for a serious violent offense and/or a 
sexual offense the offender must submit a DNA sample to the Alabama DNA 
database (Alabama Code § 36-18-25(f)).   
Despite Alabama’s lifetime disenfranchisement, voting rights restoration is 
attainable.  The State of Alabama updated the restoration process in 2003 in an 
attempt to expedite the restoration of voting rights.  With the updating, the 
process currently takes approximately one year for those individuals eligible to 
apply.   
Alaska 
 Alaska Statute § 15.05.030 states that an individual is disenfranchised 
upon conviction of a “felony involving moral turpitude.”  These felonies are 
considered, by state law, as “those crimes that are immoral or wrong in 
themselves” (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(7)).  While there is not a list of non-
disqualifying felonies, the list of those felonies involving moral turpitude is quite 
extensive.  These crimes include murder, sexual assault, promoting prostitution, 
bribery, promoting gambling, criminal mischief, drug offenses, and theft, among 
others (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(7)).   
The disenfranchisement period extends from the time of conviction until 
the sentence is complete.  The completion of the sentence requires the 
“unconditional discharge” of those who have been convicted of a felony offense 
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under Alaskan law (Alaska Statute § 15.60.010(34)).  Essentially, once a person 
has served their entire sentence, including any period of parole or probation, they 
are automatically eligible to vote.  There is no additional documentation 
necessary to register to vote for those who have received an unconditional 
discharge. 
Arizona 
 Under Arizona law, a felony conviction results in the suspension of the 
right to vote (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-904).  For first time felony offenders, 
the disenfranchisement period begins upon conviction of a felony and ends upon 
an unconditional discharge of probation, imprisonment, parole, and the payment 
of any fines and/or related court costs (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-904, 13-
912).  Much like the Alaskan statute, once an individual has completed their 
entire sentence, their voting rights are automatically restored. 
A secondary felony conviction results in lifetime disenfranchisement.  
Much like other lifetime disenfranchisement states, however, Arizona does have 
a process for restoration.  A second felony conviction requires the offender to 
apply for the restoration of voting rights.  The application for restoration depends 
upon the sentence.  That is, a person sentenced to probation for a second felony 
offense, may apply, to the discharging judge, immediately upon the discharge of 
the probation sentence (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-905).  An individual 
sentenced to a prison term for a second offense, must wait for a period of two 
years after an unconditional discharge before applying for restoration of voting 
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rights (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906).  The application for those imprisoned 
for a second felony, must be accompanied by a “certificate of absolute discharge” 
from the Arizona Department of Corrections (Arizona Revised Statute § 13-906).  
Although it is not clear in state law, the restoration of voting rights appears to be 
based upon judicial discretion.  There is no clear state law mandating restoration 
of voting rights upon the completion of a sentence for a second felony offense.  
Arkansas 
 Arkansas has one of the clearest state laws regarding disenfranchisement 
and restoration.  Simply, once convicted of a felony offense, offenders are not 
eligible to vote until they complete their sentence.  Upon completion of any 
sentence for a felony conviction, whether probation, imprisonment, or parole, an 
offender’s voting rights are automatically restored (Arkansas Constitution, 
Amendment 51, § 11(a)(4)). 
California 
 Similar to the disenfranchisement law in Arkansas, California’s 
disenfranchisement statute is straightforward.  Under California law, an individual 
may not vote while in “prison or on parole for the conviction of a felony offense” 
(California Constitution, Article II, § 4; California Election Code § 2101).  
Disenfranchisement occurs from the time the offender enters prison until they are 
released from prison and/or any period of parole (California Constitution, Article 
II, § 4; California Election Code § 2101).  Therefore, a person convicted of a 




 Unlike the other states discussed herein, Colorado disenfranchisement 
law also prevents incarcerated misdemeanor offenders from voting.  According to 
Colorado law, any individual confined in either a prison or jail is prevented from 
voting (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-
103).  Additionally, someone who is on parole, is considered to be under some 
form of state confinement and is, therefore, not authorized to vote (Colorado 
Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103).  However, an 
individual sentenced to probation, and not any other sentence, is eligible to vote.  
The determining factor in Colorado law, is “detention or confinement” other than 
probation (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-
2-103).  The disenfranchisement due to detention, however, does not include 
pretrial detention.  Individuals held in custody awaiting trial, who have not been 
convicted are eligible to vote by mail (Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-103).  
Restoration of voting rights is automatic upon release from state custody.  Once 
a person has exited prison or has been released from parole they may register to 
vote (Colorado Constitution, Article 7, § 10; Colorado Revised Statute, § 1-2-
103).  
Connecticut 
 Connecticut law disenfranchises felony offenders for the period of 
confinement and any period of parole (Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)).  
Under Connecticut law the confinement for a felony, includes prison 
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incarceration, confinement in a community residence, and any period of parole 
(Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)).   
The restoration of voting rights in Connecticut is not automatic.  In order to 
have voting rights reinstated, former offenders must have served out their entire 
sentence (including parole), must pay all fines associated with the criminal case, 
and must submit written documentation to the registrar of voters that all 
requirements have been met (Connecticut General Statute, § 9-46(a)).  The 
written documentation requirement consists of a document from the 
Commissioner of Correction certifying that the offender has been discharged 
from a period of confinement and/or parole (Connecticut General Statute, § 9-
46(a)).  There is no additional requirement.  Restoration is granted if all proper 
documentation is provided to the registrar. 
Delaware 
 Delaware law states that an individual convicted of a felony offense forfeits 
the right to vote (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2).   Disenfranchisement in 
Delaware begins at conviction.  The voting prohibition is permanent for some 
offenses, such as murder, sexual offenses, and certain public corruption charges 
(Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2).  In addition to the felony offenses listed 
above, misdemeanors involving election law also result in disenfranchisement, 
but disenfranchisement is limited to ten years after the completion of a sentence 
(Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701).  For all other felony offenses, the 
restoration of voting rights is possible upon completion of the sentence and a 
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five-year waiting period (Delaware Code Annotated, Title 15, § 1701).   Much like 
the other states mentioned, Delaware considers a sentence to be incarceration, 
probation, and any period of parole.  The completion of a sentence also requires 
full payment of all related fines.   
 While the time requirement for the voting restoration process varies 
depending on the nature of the offense, the process, for all non-permanent 
offenses, is the same.  An offender, after completing the sentence, paying all 
related fines, and waiting the mandatory time period (either five or ten years), 
may apply to the local election board for restoration.  Once an application is 
made and the board establishes eligibility, voting rights are restored to the ex-
offender (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2; Delaware Code Annotated, Title 
15, § 1701).  For those convicted of a permanent offense (murder, sexual 
offenses, and public corruption) disenfranchisement is for life, unless granted a 
pardon by the Governor (Delaware Constitution, Article V, § 2).  Each request for 
pardon is reviewed by the Board of Pardons and then sent to the Governor for 
final decision (Delaware Constitution, Article VII, § 2).   
District of Columbia 
 The District of Columbia’s disenfranchisement statute requires the 
suspension of voting rights for the period of incarceration only (District of 
Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7); District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title 
3, § 500.3).  Once released from incarceration for commission of a felony 
offense, voting rights are automatically restored to the offender (District of 
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Columbia Code § 1-1001.02(7); District of Columbia Municipal Regulations, Title 
3, § 500.3).   
Florida 
 Florida is a permanent disenfranchisement state.  In fact, Florida’s state 
law is one of the strictest in terms of both disenfranchisement, as well as 
restoration, in the country.  All persons who have been convicted of a felony 
offense, forfeit all civil rights, unless granted a pardon or restoration of those civil 
rights by the Governor (Florida Constitution, Article VI, § 4; Florida Statute 
97.041(2)(b); Florida Statute, Chapter 944.292(a)).  Disenfranchisement 
becomes effective upon conviction and is not tied to any specific felony, but 
rather all felony offenses.   
 Like other states with permanent disenfranchisement legislation, Florida 
does have a restoration process.  There are two methods that may be used to 
reestablish voting rights.  First, upon completion of a sentence, including the 
payment of all fines associated with the crime, an individual may seek the 
restoration of rights, which restores some civil rights, including the right to vote 
(Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida).  Second, an individual, ten years after 
the completion of their sentence and payment of all associated fines, may apply 
for a pardon (Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida).  Regardless of which 
method is used the Governor, assisted by the Clemency Board, makes the final 
determination (Rules of Executive Clemency of Florida). 
The process for attaining either restoration of rights or a pardon is 
essentially the same.  Upon completion of the sentence, the Florida Department 
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of Corrections sends the name of the former offender to the Parole Commission 
to determine whether or not a hearing for restoration is necessary (Rules of 
Executive Clemency of Florida).  If a hearing is necessary, the Clemency Board 
may request to hear evidence of rehabilitation and whether or not the former 
offender has met all the requirements for restoration of rights (Rules of Executive 
Clemency of Florida).  The former offender is allowed to speak at the hearing, but 
is limited to five minutes and may be questioned, by the board, on matters 
related to the individual’s character, among other items (Rules of Executive 
Clemency of Florida).  Once a hearing is complete, or if a hearing is not deemed 
necessary, the Clemency Board determines whether or not to grant the 
restoration of rights or an outright pardon.     
Georgia 
 The right to vote in the state of Georgia may be removed for the conviction 
of any felony offense “involving moral turpitude” (Georgia Constitution, Article II, 
§ 1 paragraph III(a); Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b)).  Georgia state law 
and the Georgia Constitution unfortunately have a problem similar to other state 
laws in this area, the concept of “moral turpitude” is not clearly defined.  In other 
words, while a felony offense involving moral turpitude will result in 
disenfranchisement, it is not clear what that crime might be. 
 Georgia law disenfranchises felony offenders for the period of 
confinement, probation, and any period of parole (Georgia Constitution, Article II, 
§ 1 paragraph III(a); Georgia Code Annotated § 21-2-216(b)).  The period of 
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disenfranchisement ends automatically and voting rights are restored upon the 
completion of the sentence (Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a)).  
This completion includes the payment of any fines associated with the crime 
(Georgia Constitution, Article II, § 1 paragraph III(a)). 
Hawaii 
 Hawaii suspends the voting rights of those convicted of a felony offense 
from the time the sentence begins, rather than from the time of conviction 
(Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1)).  This distinction allows those individuals 
convicted of a felony, but not sentenced, to vote in elections.  Additionally, once 
an offender is released from prison and placed on parole and/or they are given 
probation in lieu of a prison sentence the offender is authorized to vote.  Once 
the period of incarceration has been completed, voting rights are automatically 
restored (Hawaii Revised Statute § 831-2(a)(1)). 
Idaho 
 A conviction of a felony offense in the state of Idaho results in a period of 
disenfranchisement from time of conviction to time of “final discharge” (Idaho 
Code § 18-310).  According to state law, final discharge means that the offender 
is no longer incarcerated, no longer on parole, or probation, and that all fines 
related to the offense have been paid (Idaho Code § 18-310).  Additionally, once 






 An individual convicted of a felony offense is prohibited from voting in the 
state of Illinois for only the period of incarceration (Illinois Constitution, Article III, 
§ 2; 730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5).  Under Illinois law, misdemeanor 
offenders are also, if incarcerated to a prison term, impacted by 
disenfranchisement for any period of incarceration (Illinois Constitution, Article III, 
§ 2; 730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5).  The restoration of the right to vote is 
automatic upon release from confinement, thereby allowing those offenders on 
parole and/or probation to vote in elections (Illinois Constitution, Article III, § 2; 
730 Illinois Complete Statute 5/5-5-5).  
Indiana 
 Under the Indiana Constitution, any person convicted of an “infamous 
crime” is deemed ineligible to vote (Indiana Constitution, Article 2, § 8).  An 
“infamous crime” has, for the purpose of the Indiana Code, been defined by state 
case law as a felony offense (Taylor v. State Election Board, 616 N.E. 2d 380; 
Indiana Code § 3-7-13-5(a)).  Disenfranchisement is for the time of incarceration 
and any time period where the offender is “subject to lawful detention” (Indiana 
Code § 3-7-13-5(a)(2)).  Although not clearly defined, it appears evident, from 
state law, that the phrase “subject to lawful detention” means any period of 
incarceration, probation, and parole (Indiana Code § 3-7-13-5).  Voting rights are 
restored automatically upon completion of the sentence (Indiana Constitution, 




 Article II, § 5 of the Iowa Constitution states that any individual convicted 
of an “infamous crime” is ineligible to vote.  For the purposes of this section, 
“infamous crime” has been defined in state law as any felony offense (Iowa 
Constitution, Article II, § 5).  Further, conviction of an aggravated misdemeanor 
also results in disenfranchisement (Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5; Iowa Code § 
48A.6).  Although, not clearly defined, an aggravated misdemeanor appears to 
be one that involves serious bodily injury to the victim, where if the crime did not 
involve serious bodily injury, it would be considered a misdemeanor (Iowa Code, 
Title XVI).  Crimes such as domestic violence and driving under the influence fall 
under this category (Iowa Code, Title XVI).  The time period of 
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and, unless granted restoration of 
civil rights or a pardon from the Governor, continues through the lifetime of the 
offender (Iowa Constitution, Article II, § 5; Iowa Code § 48A.6).  
While there has been no other means of retaining voting rights other than 
through restoration or Gubernatorial pardon, a recent decision by the Iowa 
Governor has resulted in automatic restoration of voting rights (Executive Order 
Number 42, July 24, 2005).  Utilizing authority granted him under Iowa Code, 
Chapter 914, the Governor restored “citizenship rights” for all individuals who 
have completed their sentence (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005).  
The completion of sentence includes imprisonment, probation, parole, or any 
version of supervised release (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005).  The 
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Governor stated that one reason for granting such an order was due to evidence 
indicating that the “disenfranchisement of offenders has a disproportionate racial 
impact” which has resulted in “diminishing the representation of minority 
populations” (Executive Order Number 42, July 24, 2005).  This Executive Order 
is currently in effect and will remain so, until otherwise overturned by a future 
Governor or by the courts.  There is a challenge to this order, made by the 
District Attorney of Muscatine County, currently working its way through the Iowa 
Courts.  
Kansas 
 In the state of Kansas, a person who commits a felony offense is ineligible 
to vote (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615).  The disenfranchisement period 
begins upon conviction and continues until the completion of the “authorized 
sentence” (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615).  The authorized sentence 
includes, confinement in prison, probation, parole, and any other sentence 
placed upon an offender by the court (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615).  
Once the authorized sentence has been completed, voting rights are 
automatically restored with the issuance of a certificate of discharge, issued by 
the parole board (Kansas Statute Annotated § 21-4615, § 22-3722).   
Kentucky 
 The Constitution of the state of Kentucky states that any person convicted 
of a felony offense, or of “bribery in an election, or of such high misdemeanor as 
the General Assembly may declare” is unauthorized to vote (Kentucky 
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Constitution, § 145).  This period of disenfranchisement is permanent upon 
conviction of one of the aforementioned offenses (Kentucky Constitution, § 145).  
Additionally, any individual who, although not convicted, is being held “in 
confinement under the judgment of a court for some penal offense” during an 
election may not vote in that election (Kentucky Constitution, § 145).  This 
provision of the state constitution appears to include all persons being held in jail 
or prison awaiting trial.  Therefore, those unable to post bail, or not provided bail, 
would be disenfranchised for that election.   
 Although Kentucky does disenfranchise for life, the Governor may issue a 
full or partial pardon, either of which would result in the reinstatement of voting 
rights (Kentucky Constitution, § 77, § 150).  In order to receive a pardon, a 
former offender, after completion of the entire sentence, including any fines, must 
appeal to the parole board and submit three letters of reference (Kentucky 
Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045).  The parole board determines whether or 
not the former offender is eligible and then forwards the request to the Governor 
(Kentucky Revised Statute Annotated, § 196.045). 
Louisiana 
 Louisiana disenfranchises those individuals who have been convicted of a 
felony offense only for the period of incarceration (Louisiana Constitution, Article 
I, § 10; Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated § 18:102).  Once an offender is 
released from custody their “basic rights,” including the right to vote are 
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automatically restored with no further action required (Louisiana Constitution, 
Article I, § 10). 
Maryland 
 Maryland’s felony disenfranchisement statute is one of the most complex 
in the country.  Under Maryland law, anyone convicted of an “infamous of other 
serious crime” is disenfranchised (Maryland Constitution, Article I, § 4).  Maryland 
law defines an infamous crime as “any felony, treason, perjury, or any crime 
involving an element of deceit, fraud, or corruption” (Maryland Annotated Code, 
Election Law, § 1-101).  According to the definition, all felony offenses, and some 
misdemeanors, such as perjury, theft, and prostitution are considered infamous 
crimes (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 1-101).   
 The period of disenfranchisement depends upon the type of crime, 
whether it is a first or subsequent offense, and whether or not the entire sentence 
has been completed (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  
“Completion of the sentence” means, completion of any time on probation or 
parole and the payment of any fines associated with the crime (Maryland 
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  For a first time offender, the right to 
vote is restored automatically upon the completion of the sentence (Maryland 
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  In the case of a subsequent conviction 
of an infamous crime, the offender must complete the sentence, as described 
above, and wait for three years before being eligible to vote (Maryland Annotated 
Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  Once the sentence is complete, and the three-
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year time period has expired, voting rights are restored automatically (Maryland 
Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  Those offenders who are convicted of 
two or more violent crimes are permanently disenfranchised unless they receive 
a pardon from the Governor (Maryland Annotated Code, Election Law, § 3-102).  
Additionally, individuals “convicted of buying or selling votes” or of bribery or 
attempted bribery are also disenfranchised for life unless pardoned (Maryland 
Constitution, Article I, § 6 and Article III, § 50; Maryland Annotated Code, 
Election Law, § 3-102). 
 Eligibility for a pardon depends on the type of crime and the time since 
completion of the sentence.  To receive a pardon, a felony offender, must not 
have committed a crime for ten years, whereas a misdemeanor offender must 
have five years free of crime (Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).  
For those requesting a pardon who have been convicted of a violent crime or of a 
crime involving drugs the waiting period is twenty years (Maryland Regulations 
Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).  Once the time period has been met, the former 
offender may appeal to the Maryland Parole Commission, who determines 
eligibility and forwards the pardon request to the Governor for final decision 
(Maryland Regulations Code, Title 12, § 08.01.16).   
Massachusetts 
 Under Massachusetts law an individual convicted of a felony offense is  
disenfranchised only for the period of incarceration (Massachusetts Constitution, 
Article III; Massachusetts Annotated Law, Chapter 51, § 1).  Once an individual is 
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released from incarceration voting rights are automatically restored with no 
further documentation (Massachusetts Annotated Law, Chapter 51, § 1).   
Michigan 
 Michigan law states that any individual who has been convicted of a crime 
“for which the penalty imposed is confinement in jail or prison” is disenfranchised 
only for that period of confinement (Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2A; 
Michigan Complete Laws § 168.758b).  As confinement in jail is a disqualification 
for voting, those persons convicted of misdemeanors are also disenfranchised 
until their release from custody (Michigan Constitution, Article 2, § 2A; Michigan 
Complete Laws § 168.758b).  Upon release from jail or prison, voting rights are 
restored automatically. 
Minnesota 
The right to vote in Minnesota is removed from those individuals convicted 
of “treason or felony” (Minnesota Constitution, Article VII, § 1; Minnesota Statute 
§ 201.014).  The disenfranchisement period lasts until the conviction has been 
discharged, which includes the completion of incarceration, probation, parole, 
and any fines associated with the court case (Minnesota Statute § 609.165).  
Upon discharge of the sentence all civil rights are automatically restored without 
any further action necessary (Minnesota Statute § 609.165).   
Mississippi 
The Mississippi Constitution lists all the crimes for which an individual will 
be disenfranchised (Article 12, § 241).  The crimes of murder, rape, bribery, theft, 
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arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, 
embezzlement, and bigamy are the only crimes listed as disqualifying in the state 
constitution (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 241).  However, since the 
court decision in Cotton v. Fordice, which stated that the state constitution was to 
be narrowly read, the Attorney General of Mississippi has expanded upon the list 
of theft-related crimes that are disqualifying while simultaneously limited such 
thefts to felony cases only.  The disenfranchisement period for a conviction of 
any of the aforementioned crimes is for the lifetime of the offender (Mississippi 
Constitution, Article 12, § 241; Mississippi Code Annotated § 23-15-11). 
The only method for regaining the right to vote is by Gubernatorial pardon 
or by a two-thirds vote of the Mississippi legislature (Mississippi Constitution, 
Article 12, § 253; Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-37).  In order to receive a 
pardon, the former offender must wait a period of seven years after the 
completion of their sentence (Mississippi Constitution, Article 12, § 253).  Once 
the seven years have passed, the offender must place a notice of the pardon 
request, along with a statement of why the pardon should be given, in the 
newspaper of the county where the conviction took place (Mississippi 
Constitution, Article 5, § 124).  This requirement must be completed at least thirty 
days prior to making a formal pardon request of the Governor (Mississippi 
Constitution, Article 5, § 124).  Once those requirements are met the formal 
pardon is sent to the Governor, via the Parole Board, for investigation and final 




 An individual convicted of any felony in the state of Missouri is 
disenfranchised for the period of incarceration, probation, and parole (Missouri 
Revised Statute § 155.133).  Once the sentence is complete, however, voting 
rights are restored to the former offender automatically (Missouri Revised Statute 
§ 155.133).   
Montana 
 Offenders incarcerated in a Montana prison for a felony offense are not 
allowed to vote (Montana Constitution, Article IV, § 2; Montana Code Annotated 
§ 13-1-111).  The period of disenfranchisement for a felony conviction is only for 
the time the offender is actually incarcerated; once released from prison all voting 
rights are automatically restored with no further requirements (Montana 
Constitution, Article IV, § 2; Montana Code Annotated § 13-1-111). 
Nebraska 
 The state of Nebraska mandates that all persons convicted of a felony 
offense forfeit their right to vote upon conviction (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-
112 and § 32-313).  The disenfranchisement period last for the time of 
incarceration, probation, parole, and for a two-year time period after final 
discharge of incarceration, probation, or parole (Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-
112 and § 29-2264).  Once the two-year waiting period has passed no further 





 An individual who has been convicted of “treason or felony in any state” is 
not authorized to vote in the state of Nevada (Nevada Constitution, Article 2, § 1).  
The time period of the disenfranchisement depends on the conviction.  For first 
time non-violent felony offenders, the disenfranchisement period begins upon 
conviction and ends upon the completion of the sentence, whether the sentence 
is incarceration, probation, or parole (Nevada Revised Statute § 176A.850, § 
213.155, and § 213.157).  The completion of the sentence normally includes all 
payments of fines associated with the criminal offense; however, this requirement 
may be waived if the former offender is indigent (Nevada Revised Statute § 
176A.850, § 213.155, and § 213.157). 
 For offenders who have been convicted of a violent felony or have been 
convicted of more than one felony offense, disenfranchisement is permanent 
(Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090).  In cases of permanent 
disenfranchisement, a former offender may either appeal to the Board of Pardons 
Commissioners for a pardon or may seek restoration of their civil rights by filing 
an appeal with the court in which they were convicted (Nevada Revised Statute § 
213.090).  To seek a pardon the former offender must notify, in writing, at least 
30 days in advance, the county attorney, the convicting court, and the 
department of corrections (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020).  Once this thirty-
day period has passed, the former offender sends the request for pardon to the 
Board of Pardons Commissioners, who investigates and makes the final 
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determination regarding pardon (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020).  In order to 
seek restoration of civil rights from the court of conviction, the former offender 
must petition the court, requesting the sealing of all records pertaining to the 
conviction (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.090 and § 179.245).  Although not 
specified in state law, regardless of which method a former offender chooses, 
pardon or restoration, a significant time period must have passed for either 
method to be considered (Nevada Revised Statute § 213.020, § 213.090 and § 
179.245). 
New Hampshire 
 Under New Hampshire law an individual convicted of a felony offense is 
disenfranchised only for the period of incarceration (New Hampshire Revised 
Statute Annotated § 607-A:2).  Once an individual is released from incarceration 
voting rights are automatically restored with no further documentation (New 
Hampshire Revised Statute Annotated § 607-A:2).   
New Jersey 
 A conviction of a felony offense in the state of New Jersey results in a 
period of disenfranchisement from time of conviction to time of sentence 
completion (New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1).  Sentence 
completion means that the offender is no longer incarcerated, on parole, or on 
probation (New Jersey Statute Annotated § 2C:51-3 and § 19:4-1).  Additionally, 





 An individual convicted of “a felonious or infamous crime” in the state of 
New Mexico is disenfranchised (New Mexico Constitution, Article VII, § 1).  More 
clearly defined, a disenfranchising crime is one that is considered a felony 
offense under state law (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 1-4-27.1 and § 31-13-
1).  The period of disenfranchisement begins upon conviction of a felony offense 
and ends upon completion of the sentence (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 31-
13-1).  To complete the sentence the former offender must have been released 
from prison, completed any period of parole, not be on probation, and must have 
paid all fines associated with the offense (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 31-
13-1).  Once the sentence is complete, restoration of voting rights is automatic 
with no further action necessary (New Mexico Statute Annotated § 31-13-1).   
New York 
 Any person convicted of a felony offense and is sentenced to 
imprisonment is ineligible to vote in the state of New York (New York Election 
Law § 5-106).  Under this provision, even if an individual is convicted of a felony, 
they are still eligible to vote as long as they are not imprisoned (New York 
Election Law § 5-106).  Voting rights are automatically restored to those 
offenders who have either completed the “maximum sentence of imprisonment” 
or has been released from any period of parole, whichever is longer (New York 





 Conviction of a felony offence, in the state of North Carolina, results in 
disenfranchisement from the time of conviction (North Carolina Constitution, 
Article VI, § 2; North Carolina General Statute § 163-55).  To restore the 
franchise the offender must be “unconditionally discharged” from their sentence, 
which includes the release from prison, parole, probation, and the payment of 
any fines associated with the crime (North Carolina General Statute § 13-1).  
Although restoration is automatic upon an unconditional discharge, the former 
offender must file a “certificate,” with the court of conviction, indicating that they 
have been unconditionally discharged before their voting rights are restored 
(North Carolina General Statute § 13-1).   
North Dakota 
 Those convicted of a felony offense and sentenced to imprisonment, in the 
state of North Dakota, are prohibited from voting during the period of 
incarceration (North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01).  Once the offender is 
released from prison their voting rights are automatically restored with no further 
requirements (North Dakota Central Code § 12.1-33-01).  The voting prohibition 
is only for the period of actual incarceration, thereby allowing the offenders to 
vote while on probation and/or any period of parole. 
Ohio 
 Ohio’s disenfranchisement statute requires the suspension of voting rights 
for the period of incarceration only (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01).  
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Once released from incarceration, for commission of a felony offense, voting 
rights are automatically restored to the offender with no additional requirement 
placed on the offender (Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 2961.01).   
Oklahoma 
In the state of Oklahoma, an individual who has been convicted of a felony 
offense is denied the right to vote “for a period of time equal to the time 
prescribed in the judgment and sentence” (Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title 26, 
§ 4-101).  This means that an offender convicted of a felony may not vote while 
in prison, on parole, on probation, or if any fines associated with the crime are 
outstanding.  Once the sentence has been completed voting rights are restored 
automatically with no further action needed (Oklahoma Statute Annotated, Title 
26, § 4-101).    
Oregon 
 An individual convicted of a felony offense is prohibited from voting in the 
state of Oregon for only the period of incarceration (Oregon Revised Statute § 
137.275 and § 137.281).  The restoration of the right to vote is automatic upon 
release from confinement, thereby allowing those offenders on parole and/or 
probation to vote in elections (Oregon Revised Statute § 137.275 and § 
137.281).  
Pennsylvania 
 Pennsylvania law states that any individual “confined to a penal institution” 
is unauthorized to vote (25 Pennsylvania Constitution Statute Annotated § 1301).  
224 
 
“Confined to a penal institution” has been interpreted to mean a conviction of a 
felony offense (Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinion 186 (number 47) 1974).  
Once an offender is released from prison and placed on parole and/or they are 
given probation, the offender is authorized to vote.  Once the period of 
imprisonment has been completed, voting rights are automatically restored (25 
Pennsylvania Constitution Statute Annotated § 1301). 
Rhode Island 
Once convicted of a felony offense in Rhode Island, offenders are not 
eligible to vote until they complete their sentence.  In order for the sentence to be 
complete the sentence of the offender must be “served or suspended” and the 
offender must not be on probation or parole (Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2, 
§ 1).  Upon completion of the sentence, voting rights are automatically restored 
(Rhode Island Constitution, Article 2, § 1).  However, an additional amendment to 
the Rhode Island Constitution is currently working its way through the legislature 
that would disenfranchise felony offenders only for the time of incarceration 
(State Bill 458, 2005-2006 Legislative Session, R.I., 2005).  This amendment is 
expected to be voted on, by the citizens of Rhode Island, in November of 2006 
(Milkovits, 2005). 
South Carolina 
Any individual convicted of a crime in the state of South Carolina is 
disenfranchised (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120).  The state code 
makes no distinctions as to the type of crime, be it misdemeanor or felony 
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offense.  The only statement made in regards to a felony offense, states that a 
person “convicted of a felony or offense against the election laws” is not allowed 
to vote (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120).  Therefore, a person 
convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term of incarceration loses their voting 
rights upon conviction.  The term of disenfranchisement is for any term of 
incarceration, probation, and/or parole (South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-
120).  Once an individual has completed the sentence their right to vote is 
restored automatically with no further action required of the former offender 
(South Carolina Code Annotated § 7-5-120).   
South Dakota 
Once convicted of a felony in South Dakota, where the punishment is a 
term of incarceration “in the state penitentiary,” an offender loses their voting 
rights (South Dakota Codified Laws § 12-4-18 and § 23A-27-35).  This 
disenfranchisement occurs at the time of conviction and includes those whose 
term of incarceration has been suspended (South Dakota Codified Laws § 23A-
27-35).  The termination of voting rights for those with a suspended sentence 
lasts as long as the original term of incarceration (South Dakota Codified Laws § 
23A-27-35).  For example, if an individual is convicted of a felony and is 
sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary, but that sentence is suspended, 
the individual cannot vote for that five-year period.  
The disenfranchisement period for anyone convicted of a felony and 
sentenced to a term of incarceration is only for the time sentenced.  Once the 
offender completes the actual sentence, voting rights are restored (South Dakota 
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Codified Laws § 23A-27-35).  Those on parole are allowed to vote.  When an 
individual is discharged from state custody they are “restored to the full rights of 
citizenship” (South Dakota Codified Laws § 24-5-2 and § 24-15A-7).  The 
restoration is automatic, and requires the Secretary of Corrections to send notice 
of discharge to the court where the offender was originally convicted (South 
Dakota Codified Laws § 24-5-2 and § 24-15A-7). 
Tennessee 
The state of Tennessee has changed its laws on disenfranchisement so 
many times over the last three decades, that it has created the most complex 
system in the United States.  Any individual who has been convicted of an 
“infamous crime” is disenfranchised (Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, § 5).  An 
“infamous crime” has been defined as a felony offense (Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 40-20-112).  Disenfranchisement begins upon conviction of a felony 
offence (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-20-112).   
The disenfranchisement period is permanent, but a pardon or restoration 
of civil rights may be obtained, depending upon the time the crime was 
committed as well as the type of crime committed.  Any conviction for the crime 
of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud results in permanent disenfranchisement 
with no possibility of restoration (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105).  A 
person convicted of any other felony before 1973, or between 1981 and 1986, or 
after 1996 may request a gubernatorial pardon or may petition the circuit court of 
the county in which they reside for the restoration of their civil rights (Tennessee 
Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).  Individuals convicted of any 
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other felony (other than the permanent disqualifiers) between 1973 and 1981 
and/or between 1986 and 1996 are automatically eligible to vote upon completion 
of their sentence (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-101 and § 40-29-105).  
Completion of the sentence includes any period of parole, probation, and the 
payment of any fines associated with the crime.  In order to attain the automatic 
restoration, the released offender must obtain a “certificate of restoration” from 
the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-
29-105).   
While state law allows for a pardon to restore “full rights of citizenship,” a 
former offender, who is granted a pardon, must still petition the court for full 
restoration of voting rights (Tennessee Code Annotated §40-29-105).  A pardon, 
in and of itself, does not restore the right to vote.  For full restoration of the right 
to vote, the offender must meet the requirements, regarding time frame and 
crime type, and must petition the circuit court in the county of residence 
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-101 through § 40-29-105).  The petition to 
the circuit court for full restoration must be made after notice is provided to both 
the federal and state prosecutors (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102 
through § 40-29-104).  Additionally, the petition must be accompanied by proof 
that the former offender “has sustained the character of a person of honesty, 
respectability and veracity, and is generally esteemed as such by the petitioner’s 
neighbors” (Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-102).  Once the petition is filed, 
the court determines eligibility for restoration of the right to vote. It is assumed, if 
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the requirements are met, the former offender’s voting rights will be restored 
(Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-29-105). 
Texas 
 Article 6, § 1 of the Texas Constitution, states that an individual is 
disenfranchised upon conviction of a felony.  The disenfranchisement period 
extends from the time of conviction until the sentence is complete.  The 
completion of the sentence requires the full discharge of those who have been 
convicted of a felony offense under Texas law (Texas Election Code Annotated § 
11.002 and § 13.001).  Essentially, once a person has served their entire 
sentence, including any period of parole or probation, they are automatically 
eligible to vote.  There is no additional documentation necessary to register to 
vote for those who have received an unconditional discharge. 
Utah 
Under Utah law, any individual convicted of a felony offense loses the right 
to vote (Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101).  The period of disenfranchisement 
is only for the period of actual incarceration in a penal institution (Utah Code 
Annotated § 20A-2-101).  If an offender is convicted of a felony, but is given 
probation or a suspended sentence then the disenfranchisement statute does not 
apply (Utah Code Annotated § 20A-2-101.5).  Once an inmate is release from 
physical custody either through parole or outright release their voting rights are 
automatically restored with no further action necessary (Utah Code Annotated § 





The state of Virginia is a permanent disenfranchisement state.  Under 
Virginia law, any individual who has been convicted of a felony offense loses 
their right to vote (Virginia Constitution, Article II, § 1; Virginia Code Annotated § 
8.01-338 and § 24.2-101).  The period of disenfranchisement begins upon 
conviction and is permanent unless the former offender is granted a restoration 
of rights or a pardon by the Governor (Virginia Constitution, Article V, § 12; 
Virginia Code Annotated § 24.2-101). 
 A former offender may request either the restoration of rights or a pardon 
from the governor.  The restoration of rights reinstates, among others, the right to 
vote (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).  To qualify for a restoration of rights 
the offender must have three years crime free years (for non-violent offenses) 
after the completion of their sentence (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).  
For violent offenders and those convicted of drug offenses the waiting period is 
five years after the completion of their sentence (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-
231.1).  The process for restoration depends on the nature of the offense.  For 
non-violent offenders, a one-page application is required to be sent to the 
Secretary of Commonwealth who is responsible for investigating the offender’s 
case (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1).  Additionally, non-violent offenders 
may also petition the court for a restoration recommendation to the governor 
(Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.2).  For violent and/or drug offenders, an 
extensive thirteen-page application is required to be sent to the Secretary of 
Commonwealth (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-231.1). 
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The restoration of rights process, as described above, is the first step in 
the process to attain a pardon (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136 and § 53.1-
231.1).  A gubernatorial pardon, either simple or absolute, constitutes “official 
forgiveness” and restores all civil rights lost due to conviction (Virginia Code 
Annotated § 53.1-136).  To qualify for a pardon, the offender must have five 
years crime free years after the completion of their sentence and must show 
“evidence of good citizenship” (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136).  The 
pardon process requires the long-form restoration application be sent to the 
Parole board, which will investigate and make an official recommendation to the 
governor (Virginia Code Annotated § 53.1-136). 
Washington 
 In the state of Washington, “all persons convicted of an infamous crime 
are excluded from the elective franchise” (Washington Constitution, Article 6, § 
3).  An infamous crime is defined as one either “punishable by death” or 
“imprisonment in a state correctional facility” (Washington Revised Code § 
29A.04.079).  Essentially, any felony conviction in Washington results in the 
disenfranchisement of the offender (Washington Revised Code § 29A.04.079; 
State v. Collins, 124 P.903 (WA, 1912)).  The period of disenfranchisement 
begins upon conviction of the felony offense and ends upon the completion of the 
sentence (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637).  To complete the sentence 
the offender must be free of all forms of supervision and must pay all the fines 
associated with the crime (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637).   
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 The restoration of the right to vote is automatic upon the completion of the 
sentence (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.637).  However, there have been 
some challenges to Washington’s restoration process due to the financial 
restitution requirement (Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th 
Circuit, 2003); United States v. Loucks, 149 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Circuit, 1998)).  
In these cases, the court stated that the financial provision of the statute could be 
challenged as “racially discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act” (Farrakhan v. 
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Circuit, 2003).  Washington statute states, 
however, that if the former offender cannot pay the fines associated with the 
offense, they can either petition the court for a reduction or complete elimination 
of the fine, as long as “manifest hardship” can be proven (Washington Revised 
Code § 10.73.160).  Additionally, the former offender may request a restoration 
of civil rights or an outright pardon from the governor in cases where the fines 
cannot be paid (Washington Revised Code § 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020).   
 To request a restoration of rights or a pardon, the former offender must file 
a petition with the Clemency and Pardons Board (Washington Revised Code § 
9.94A.885).  The Board is required to hold a hearing on the merits of each case 
and to notify the prosecuting attorney and those with interest in the case, such as 
victims and the arresting agency, at least thirty days prior to the hearing 
(Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.885).  If restoration is granted it has the 
effect of removal of the unpaid portion of any fines associated with the offense 
and makes the offender immediately eligible to vote (Washington Revised Code 
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§ 9.96.010 and § 9.96.020).  A pardon removes the conviction completely 
thereby returning the right to vote (Washington Revised Code § 9.94A.030). 
West Virginia 
Anyone convicted of “treason, felony, or bribery in an election” is 
disenfranchised until the completion of their sentence (West Virginia Constitution, 
Article IV, § 1).  Completion of a criminal sentence requires the end of 
confinement, probation, and parole (West Virginia Code § 3-1-3 and § 3-2-2).  
Although not clear in state law, according to case law, the right to vote is restored 
automatically upon the completion of the sentence except where the conviction is 
for the crime of bribery of a state official (Webb v. County Court of Raleigh 
County, 168 S.E. 760 (WV, 1933); 51 WV Attorney General Opinion 182 (1965)).  
In a case of a conviction for the bribery of a state official the only alternative for 
the restoration of voting rights is to apply for a gubernatorial pardon through 
application to the state parole board (West Virginia Constitution, Article VII, § 11). 
Wisconsin 
Much like West Virginia Law, an individual convicted of “treason, felony, or 
bribery” is disenfranchised in the state of Wisconsin until the completion of their 
sentence (Wisconsin Statute § 6.03 and § 304.078).  The period of 
disenfranchisement begins upon conviction and the right to vote is restored 
automatically upon the unconditional release of the former offender from any 
form of supervision; no further action is needed when the sentence expires 





According to Wyoming law, an individual who commits a felony is 
prohibited from voting (Wyoming Statute § 6-10-106 and § 22-3-1-2).  This voting 
prohibition begins from the date of conviction and continues until voting rights are 
restored either through the restoration of rights or via gubernatorial pardon 
(Wyoming Constitution, Article 4, § 5).  In essence, there are three ways to 
restore an offender’s right to vote.  First time, non-violent offenders, must wait a 
period of five years and then apply to the parole board for a restoration certificate 
(Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105).  In cases of a first time, non-violent offender, the 
parole board conducts an investigation to determine eligibility and then, if 
eligibility is verified, “shall” issue the restoration certificate (Wyoming Statute § 7-
13-105).  Any other offender (recidivist and/or violent), must apply for a 
gubernatorial pardon or the restoration of rights in order to regain the right to vote 
(Wyoming Statute § 7-13-105 and § 7-13-803 through 806). 
 When seeking a restoration of rights, the former offender must wait for a 
period of five years after completion of the sentence before applying.  Once the 
five-year period has passed, the former offender applies to the parole board, 
which makes the determination of eligibility for restoration, then makes a 
recommendation to the governor (Wyoming Statute § 7-13-803 through 806).  
For those individuals requesting a pardon, they must wait for ten years after 
completion of the sentence before applying directly to the governor.  The 
governor’s office is required to notify the prosecuting attorney to determine the 
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particulars of the case prior to making any decision regarding executive pardon 
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